CA Unpub Decisions

On November 27, 2006, Kern County Sheriff Deputies attempted unsuccessfully to contact appellant, Delmon Lynn Buchanan, at his home because he had not registered as a sex offender since February 17, 2006. On March 4, 2007, Buchanan was arrested on a felony warrant that was issued in this case.
On March 26, 2007, the district attorney issued an information charging Buchanan with failure to register as a sex offender and alleging that Buchanan had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i).) The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Alfredo Soto, challenges the sentence imposed on his guilty plea. According to appellant, he was denied the benefit of his plea bargain when the prosecutor argued for an upper term. Appellant asserts that there had been a previous agreement to recommend the midterm. Appellant further contends that his sentence to the upper term was contrary to his constitutional right to have any facts increasing his sentence submitted to a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed below, appellant was sentenced in accordance with the plea bargain. Further, since imposition of the upper term was based on appellants prior criminal history, appellant was not denied his right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed.

Victor V., already a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, was found to have committed the charges in a subsequent petition by the juvenile court. Specifically, he was found (1) in contempt of court for violating certain terms of a gang injunction (see Pen. Code, 166, subd. (a)(4), 186.22. subd. (d)),[1] and (2) resisting and obstructing a police officer in the lawful performance of his duties. (See 148, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (d).) The juvenile court found that the gang injunction violation was committed for the benefit of, or at the direction of a criminal street gang. (See 186.22, subd. (d).) Victor was ordered to spend 180 days in an appropriate juvenile facility under a renewed grant of probation. On appeal, Victor claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court findings and that the gang allegation could not legally be attached to the gang injunction contempt charge. We agree with the latter contention and direct the clerk of the superior court to modify the juvenile court order by striking the special allegation attached to the first charge. Once modified, Court affirm the juvenile court order.

Robyn A. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, Joshua. She contends the court failed to offer reasonable reunification services to treat the mental health and substance abuse problems that led to Joshuas removal. Court reach the merits of this claim because the court did not adequately notify mother that she could challenge its order terminating reunification services only by writ petition. On the merits, mother received reasonable reunification services. Court affirm.

Petitioner Anna M. (mother) seeks a writ of mandate reversing orders of the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. ( 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She claims the court erred in finding that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrens Services (the Department) provided reasonable reunification services.
Court disagree and deny the petition.

Appellant Glenn Louis Ray was found guilty, following a jury trial, of the murder of his stepfather, Glen Luttrell. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his renewed motion to suspend criminal proceedings pending a competency hearing. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and murder with special circumstances on the basis of testimony that, intending to take drugs and money, he barged into the home of a drug dealer and shot him. Defendant contends that (1) the prosecution dismissed jurors for racially discriminatory reasons, (2) the court erroneously admitted evidence of his commission of an uncharged robbery, (3) the court improperly struck his testimony when he refused to answer questions on cross-examination about an uncharged robbery, and (4) the jury committed misconduct. court affirm.

Defendant Edward A. Britton contends that his conviction for several violent offenses, including first degree murder, should be reversed because of a number of purported errors by the trial court, and that, at a minimum, one of his sentences for counts 2 and 3 should be stayed. The People oppose the appeal, except that it agrees that a stay of the sentence imposed for count 3 is appropriate. We affirm the judgment, except that Court stay defendants sentence with regard to count 3.

Defendant Isaac Ortiz appeals his conviction for multiple sexual offenses. He contends the court abused its discretion when it admitted preliminary hearing testimony given against him by a prior sexual assault victim in another case; that the prosecutor committed misconduct by citing facts not in evidence and making an improper gender-based appeal in her closing argument; and that his sentence violates Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856]. Court find these contentions to be meritless and affirm.

Several individuals commenced separate actions against owners and operators of grocery stores alleging that the defendants sold artificially colored farm-raised salmon without disclosing to consumers the artificial coloring. The actions were coordinated in Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4329. Plaintiffs filed a coordinated complaint alleging as a class and representative action counts for unfair competition, violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, 1750 et seq.), false advertising, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), and particularly section 337(a) of that act (section 337(a)), preempted each cause of action; that the dispute should be referred to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the California Department of Health Services (DHS) under the primary jurisdiction doctrine; and that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for violation of the CLRA. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment.
We concluded in our prior opinion that section 337(a) impliedly preempted each cause of action, and affirmed the judgment without addressing the other issues raised on appeal. The California Supreme Court determined that the action is not preempted, reversed our judgment, and remanded the matter to this court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1099.) Accordingly, Court address in this opinion the other grounds asserted in support of the demurrer.

Defendants and appellants, Leonardo Padernal, Jose Daniel Aguilar and Michael Vasquez, appeal from the judgments entered following their convictions, by jury trial. Padernal was convicted of second degree murder, attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer (11 counts), assault on a peace officer with a semi-automatic firearm (6 counts), possession of firearm by a felon, and evading an officer with willful disregard for safety, with principal armed and firearm use enhancements (Pen. Code, 187, 664/187, 245, subd. (d)(2), 12021, 12022, 12022.53; Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)).[1] He was sentenced to 228 years to life. Aguilar was convicted of attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer (9 counts), assault on a peace officer with a semi-automatic firearm (6 counts), and possession of a firearm by a felon, with firearm use enhancements ( 664/187, 245, subd. (d)(2), 12021, 12022.53). He was sentenced to 255 years to life. Vasquez was convicted of attempted premeditated murder of a peace office (4 counts) and assault on a peace officer with a semi-automatic firearm (4 counts), with principal armed enhancements ( 664/187, 245, subd. (d)(2), 12022.) He was sentenced to 16 years to life.
Padernals judgment is affirmed as modified.

Plaintiffs, HLC Properties, Ltd. (HLC Properties) and Thomas E. OSullivan, as trustee for the Wilma Wyatt Crosby Trust (the trust), appeal from a judgment in their favor against defendants: MCA Records, Inc. (MCA); GRP Records, Inc.; UMG Recordings, Inc.; MCA, Inc.; and Universal Studios, Inc. Plaintiffs contend: they were denied their right to a jury trial; the summary adjudication motions were improperly granted; and they were the prevailing parties and, as such, were entitled to their costs. Court conclude: the judgment must be set aside because plaintiffs were denied their right to a jury trial; the orders granting the summary adjudication motions may not be set aside; and the cost issue is now moot.

Appellant Ranger Insurance Company, surety on a bail bond issued on behalf of a criminal defendant, appeals from an order denying its motion for exoneration of the bond and the subsequent entry of summary judgment. Ranger sought exoneration under Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (g). Court agree with the trial court that the statutory conditions for exoneration were not met and affirm.

Dwight Anthony Coleman appeals from judgment entered following a court trial in which he was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and his admissions that he suffered two prior convictions of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prior convictions of a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and 667.5, subdivision (b). One of the strike prior convictions was dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 and appellant was sentenced to prison for a total of 16 years, consisting of the middle term of three years, doubled to six years by reason of the Three Strikes law, plus two five-year enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1). He contends the trial court erroneously ordered restitution in the amount of $10 to Starbucks.[3] For reasons stated in the opinion, Court strike the restitution order of $10 to Starbucks and affirm the judgment.