CA Unpub Decisions

On April 21, 2006, pursuant to a plea bargain in case number TA082765, Michael Aguinaldo pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of firearm ammunition in violation of Penal Code section 12316, subdivision (b)(1), and admitted having earlier been convicted of violating Health and Safety Code section 11366.5, subdivision (a). The court placed him on probation for three years and ordered him to serve 365 days in jail.
The judgment is affirmed.

Christina H. (mother) appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to six-year-old Elizabeth H. and three-year-old James H. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the courts finding that the benefit-contact exception to termination under section 326.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply. Court disagree and affirm.

In August 1985, in case number A632203, Harold Bridges pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.) Bridgess subsequent motion to withdraw his plea was denied, and probation was granted on condition that he spend one year in county jail.
The judgment is affirmed.

On July 10, 2006, an agent of the California Department of Corrections and a member of the Tehama County District Attorneys Office went to a residence in Gerber to arrest defendant James Lister for violating parole. Defendant ran out the door before they could arrest him. During the pursuit, defendant managed to strike a man and steal his truck, dragging the victim behind the vehicle for about 30 feet before successfully fleeing. Officers found defendant coming out of a residence on July 19, 2006. He had armed himself with a shotgun while he was inside the house, though defendant was unarmed when arrested.
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant John Archangle Caro was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a child after he pled no contest. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred when it failed to conduct a competency hearing after he produced a psychological report prior to sentencing that concluded he was legally incompetent. Court agree and reverse with instructions to conduct a competency hearing consistent with sections 1367 through 1369 of the Penal Code.

Edgar appeals, contending the court prejudicially erred in not granting her motion for new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and in ruling pretrial that the prosecutor would be allowed to impeach her with her two misdemeanor convictions should she testify. Court affirm.

Eugene Coleman pled guilty to unlawfully selling methamphetamine, and the court imposed a three-year prison sentence. On appeal, Coleman contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from his telephone conversation with an undercover police officer. Coleman argues the conversation violated the Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.), and constituted an unconstitutional warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Carl Anthony Hale appeals from the judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to a two-year prison sentence. Hale contends his due process rights were violated because the information filed against him did not plead that he would be ineligible for probation.
The judgment is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of a ruling by the probate court concerning the estate of Mrs. Geneva Mae Jean Moore, deceased (Jean), which established that Jean's stepdaughter, respondent Lauretta DeForge (DeForge), was entitled to share in the distribution of Jean's estate. That ruling, resolving the estate administrator's petition for instructions under Probate Code,[1]section 11700, is appealed by Jean's stepson, Gary Moore (Gary).[2] Both Gary and DeForge are the adult children of Guy Moore (Guy) (who was married at the time of his death to Jean), and of Guy's previous wife, Lauretta Moore (referred to here as Mother). Gary and DeForge have been involved in several previous disputes in litigation of the estate of their father, Guy,[3]and also concerning the disposal of the property of Mother. Some of those disputes provide the background for the current appeal.

This appeal arises out of a ruling by the probate court concerning the estate of Mrs. Geneva Mae Jean Moore, deceased (Jean), which established that Jean's stepdaughter, respondent Lauretta DeForge (DeForge), was entitled to share in the distribution of Jean's estate. That ruling, resolving the estate administrator's petition for instructions under Probate Code,[1]section 11700, is appealed by Jean's stepson, Gary Moore (Gary).[2] Both Gary and DeForge are the adult children of Guy Moore (Guy) (who was married at the time of his death to Jean), and of Guy's previous wife, Lauretta Moore (referred to here as Mother). Gary and DeForge have been involved in several previous disputes in litigation of the estate of their father, Guy, and also concerning the disposal of the property of Mother. Some of those disputes provide the background for the current appeal. The order is affirmed; motion to dismiss is denied.

Menachem and Peggy Shoval (together the Shovals) brought a motion for attorney fees and costs against the City of Poway (City) under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] 1021.5) after successfully challenging the City's resolution to install a vehicle access gate across Mina de Oro Road.[2] The court denied the Shovals' motion, finding that: (1) the Shovals did not provide sufficient evidence to support their fee claim; and (2) the Shovals did not satisfy the requirements of section 1021.5 because they were primarily motivated by their own interests, rather than the public's, in pursuing the action. The Shovals contend that the court erred by not applying the requisite legal standard under 1021.5, subdivision (b) (section 1021.5(b)). They assert that the court should have determined whether the costs they incurred in challenging the City's resolution transcended their personal stake in the matter, not whether they were primarily motivated by their own interests in challenging the City.

Phillip M., Sr., appeals the findings and orders entered at a nonstatutory hearing at which the court made custody and visitation orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny his request to review the record for error. Phillip M., Sr.'s, counsel also requests leave for him to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)),[1]two counts of forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)), one count of false imprisonment ( 236), and one count of attempted robbery ( 664/211).[2] As to the rape (count 1) and two forcible oral copulation counts (counts 2 and 3), the jury found true the following allegations: (1) defendant possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the sex offenses ( 12022.3, subd. (a)); (2) defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during the offenses ( 667.61, subd. (e)(4)); (3) defendant committed the offenses during the commission of a first degree burglary ( 667.61, subd. (d)(4)); and (4) the offenses constituted serious felonies ( 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Defendant admitted suffering a prior felony conviction that resulted in a prison sentence ( 667.5, subd. (b)), as well as a prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)), which also qualified as a prior violent felony ( 667.5, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a determinate term of nine years plus an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that (1) if it finds defendant suppressed evidence, then such a finding could be proof of consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.06); (2) if it finds defendant fled from the scene of the crime, then such a finding could be proof of consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.52); and (3) if it finds defendant gave false statements, then such a finding could be proof of consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.03). Defendant argues that sufficient evidence does not support the courts decision to give these three instructions. Defendant further contends that there is insufficient evidence that the crimes were committed during the commission of a first degree burglary. Court affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant O.S. (mother) appeals from a juvenile courts order terminating reunification services with regard to her son, Angel (the child). She argues that the order should be reversed because: 1) the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) failed to provide proper notice that it changed its recommendation; 2) the court failed to provide a factual basis for the order; and 3) there was insufficient evidence to support the order. Court affirm.