CA Unpub Decisions

What began as a simple effort to collect moneys due and owing under computer software contracts burgeoned into an acrimonious dispute in both state and federal court. Plaintiff nSight, Inc. eventually got its money from Oracle USA, Inc. (successor in interest to PeopleSoft, Inc.), but by then matters were spiraling out of control. nSight and its attorney were repeatedly assessed monetary sanctions for failure to provide discovery. Finally, although the trial court declined to impose a terminating sanction, it did impose the lesser sanction of deeming a large number of factual issues to be admitted by nSight. With no material issues of fact remaining, when the case was sent to trial the court granted Oracles motion for judgment on the pleadings. After entering a net judgment of slightly less than $12,000 for nSight, the trial court awarded nSight slightly more than $30,000 in contractual attorney fees. Prior to entry of the judgment, nSight filed a notice of appeal from three of the sanction orders.
As Court explain, only the final judgment is properly before us. nSights appeal from the judgment permits review of mostbut not allof the sanction orders. We conclude that none of the intermediate sanction orders can be reversed as an abuse of the trial courts discretion to adopt sanctions for a partys failure to provide discovery. Court affirm the judgment, and dismiss a purported appeal from a nonappealable order.

Appellant David Elsebusch initiated a lawsuit to nullify a settlement between the County of Humboldt (County) and its former County Counsel upon allegations that the County violated open meeting notice requirements by discussing and settling threatened litigation in closed session without adequately describing the nature of the session on its posted agenda. The trial court dismissed the complaint after sustaining the Countys demurrer without leave to amend. The court found that any irregularity in an initial closed session meeting was corrected by a properly noticed second session. Court agree, and affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied appellants request for a civil harassment restraining order against respondent. Appellant is a frequent recipient of 911 and other emergency medical services and respondent is a paramedic captain employed by the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD). Appellant argues that the trial courts denial of the restraining order was error; Court affirm.

Appellant Peter G. appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his minor son, I. G., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 He contends the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to raise his status from that of alleged father to presumed father. Court affirm.

The minor appeals from a dispositional order of the juvenile court, which gave the probation officer the authority to place the minor in Juvenile Hall for up to three weekends, alleging that the order was an improper delegation of judicial authority and denied him due process.[1]
Respondent requested that this court take judicial notice of a subsequent order of the juvenile court, dated February 1, 2008, which [s]uccessfully terminated the courts jurisdiction, and argued that the appeal was now moot and requested that it be dismissed. Counsel for the minor acknowledged that request in a letter dated April 15, 2008, and agreed that the issues raised in the minors opening brief were now moot. The appeal is therefore ordered dismissed as moot.

Dolores Q. Sheen (Dolores), and her children Erin Blunt and Carla Angelino, appeal from a judgment after court trial, which set aside real property deeds, ordered real and personal property restored to the Living Trust of Quinlock K. Sheen (trust), and awarded $100,000 damages to petitioners Charles Sheen, Derek Hersha, and Deryl Gaylord, three grandchildren of Quinlock Sheen (Quinlock).[1] The judgment was grounded in a determination that Dolores had obtained the property in question by undue influence upon Quinlock, her 93-year-old mother. Appellants contend that petitioners lacked standing to sue, that the petition was barred by limitations, and that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence of undue influence. Petitioners cross-appeal from the courts declination to award a statutory penalty. Court conclude that only petitioners appeal has merit, and Court affirm the judgment except with respect to penalty damages.

Triyon Jones, Anthony Junnie Zelaya, and Angelo Jeffrey Roberts (collectively, appellants) appeal from their respective judgments entered following a jury trial.[1] Appellants were convicted of murder (Pen. Code 187, subd. (a); count 1); attempted carjacking (664/215, subd. (a); count 2); attempted second degree robbery (664/211; count 3); unlawful taking of vehicle (Veh. Code 10851, subd. (a); counts 4, 8, 9); and second degree robbery (211; counts 5, 6). In addition, Zelaya was convicted of cocaine possession (Health & Saf. Code 11350, subd. (a); count 12), and Roberts was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (12021, subd. (a)(1); count 7); willfully evading an officer (Veh. Code 2800.2, subd. (a)(1); count 10); and possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code 11351.5; count 11).
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, Court conclude that various sentencing errors occurred and Court order the clerk of the superior court to correct those errors that may be modified on appeal as described herein and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion regarding the imposition of gang enhancements. Court remand the matters with directions that the trial court resentence appellants in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgments.

Antonio Javier Saldana (Saldana) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 664/211)[1]and three counts of second degree robbery ( 211), during each of which he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), and the trial courts findings he previously had served a prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)), had been convicted of a serious felony ( 667, subd. (a)), and had been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Saldana to 36 years, 4 months in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Anthony Michael Glassman and Valerie Theresa Glassman were divorced under a stipulated judgment entered on July 1, 1998. On December 6, 2005, Anthony filed an order to show cause in which he requested that the court terminate his spousal support obligations. The trial court denied Anthonys request, and he appealed. Court affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a petition for robbery against defendant and appellant Brandon N. On appeal, Brandon N. contends that the court erred in denying his suppression motion and in denying him a jury trial. Court disagree with both contentions, and therefore Court affirm the judgment.

In a joint jury trial, Gerardo Vasquez and Nelson Perez were convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, 211), during which Vasquez personally used a firearm (id., 12022.53, subd. (b)) and Perez was armed with a firearm (id., 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The convictions arose from an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of August 14, 2006, when defendants approached Alexander Rodriguez, who was sitting in his car getting ready to go to work. Vasquez displayed a gun and demanded Rodriguezs money, and defendants fled after Rodriguez complied with the demand.[1] Vasquez and Perez were also each charged with carjacking and two counts of robbery arising from a separate incident. The jury was unable to reach verdicts on the counts arising from the separate incident, which were dismissed in furtherance of justice. Vasquez was sentenced to the middle term of 3 years for robbery with a 10-year enhancement for firearm use. Perez was sentenced to the middle term of 3 years for robbery with a 1-year enhancement for a principal being armed.
The judgments are affirmed.

Court dismiss Roderick Washingtons purported appeal from a trial court order denying his so-called petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. There is no appealable order. Court affirmed.

Esperanza H. (mother) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights over Enrique and Margarita H. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the exceptions to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) did not apply. Mother also appeals from the issuance of a restraining order against her under section 213.5. Mother argues that substantial evidence did not support the order. Court find no error and affirm the judgment and order of the juvenile court.

James Thomas entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and admitted a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law following a hearing at which his motion to suppress evidence was denied. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the middle term of two years, doubled under the Three Strikes law to four years. Defendants plea was based on a September 13, 2006 incident in which a firearm was found in the car defendant was driving. In exchange for the plea, a second prior conviction allegation under the Three Strikes law and four prior conviction allegations on which defendant had served separate prison terms were dismissed. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief in which no issues were raised. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441442.) Court then notified defendant that he could personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. Defendant has done so.
The judgment is affirmed.