CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant S.B., mother of Angel G., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Appellant gave birth to Angel G. in October 2005, in a tent on Soledad Street in Monterey while appellant was homeless and using drugs. Six days after his birth, mother and child were both transported to the hospital where Angel tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. After her release from the hospital, appellant disappeared. Angel was placed with a foster family, where he remains to this day.

Appellants whereabouts remained unknown until April 14, 2006, when she was arrested. Thereafter, appellant became involved in a sobriety program and successfully participated in reunification services for close to one year, until she once again disappeared. Because of appellants relapse, the court adopted the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services (the Department) recommendation that reunification services be terminated as well as appellants parental rights. Although appellant reappeared at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated her parental rights on August 24, 2007. This appeal ensued. Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this court.

Appellant S.B., mother of Angel G., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Appellant gave birth to Angel G. in October 2005, in a tent on Soledad Street in Monterey while appellant was homeless and using drugs. Six days after his birth, mother and child were both transported to the hospital where Angel tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. After her release from the hospital, appellant disappeared. Angel was placed with a foster family, where he remains to this day.
The appeal is dismissed.

Appellant Albert M., father of Alexis M., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Alexis was taken into protective custody when her mother was arrested for a DUI with Alexis in the car, and she was ultimately detained because of neglect and domestic violence. At the time, appellant was in custody on drug charges. Appellant earlier had been ordered to have no contact with Alexis, her mother, and sibling because he had allegedly threatened to kill both Alexis mother and her sibling. Appellant waived his right to reunification services. His visitation remained contingent upon his jail status. After reunification services were terminated for Alexis mother, the trial court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. At the contested hearing on September 7, 2007, the court terminated appellants parental rights. This appeal ensued. Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this court.

A jury convicted defendant Britton Mode of two counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor counts of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and unauthorized possession of a hypodermic needle (Bus. & Prof. Code, 4140). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by mentioning uncharged crimes to the jury. The motion to suppress was properly denied and any error in mentioning uncharged crimes is harmless. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Defendant Alfred E. Burch Jr. entered a negotiated plea of no contest to attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code 459, 664)[1] in exchange for dismissal of a murder charge and firearm enhancement. He was placed on probation. One of the probation conditions is that he pay restitution to the family of the murder victim for medical and funeral expenses. Defendant contends the trial court lacked authority to impose that probation condition because the court did not take a Harvey waiver on the murder charge. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey).) Court disagree and affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Angel Gomez was convicted of three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (counts 1, 2, and 3) and three counts of shooting from a motor vehicle (counts 4, 5, and 6). (Pen. Code, 664/187, subd. (a), 189, 12034, subd. (c).)[1] In the commission of each crime, defendant was found to have personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and to have committed the offenses with the specific intent to benefit a criminal street gang. ( 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), and (d), 186.22, subds. (b)(1) and (5).) He appeals, contending that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, (2) the court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for the three attempted murder counts, (3) his sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment, (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing, and (5) the enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) on counts 4, 5, and 6 must be stricken. Court modify the judgment and affirm.

Samantha Gibson appeals an order denying her motion to certify a class of plaintiffs consisting of approximately 2,000 individuals whose vehicles were detained for a period of up to 10 days by defendant Credit Managers Association of California dba CMA Business Credit Services (CMA) after CMA accepted an assignment of the assets of M2 Collision Care Centers (M2) for the benefit of its creditors. Court affirm the trial courts order.

Following his conviction by jury of possessing heroin for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351), defendant Ocdulio Quintero Anguiano admitted that he had been convicted of first degree residential burglary within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and had served four prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b) through (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) through (d), 667.5, subd. (b).) He appeals, contending his admission that he had been convicted of first degree residential burglary must be aside because the trial court failed to inquire into the factual basis of his admission, as required by section 1192.5. Court conclude that the requirements of section 1192.5 do not apply to defendants admission, and affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, plaintiff and his wholly-owned company recovered a $1.2 million judgment against defendant, a company he founded, for breach of contract, fraud, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both sides have appealed. Court affirm the judgment.

Maurice Schmir appeals from the trial courts post-judgment order terminating his obligation to pay spousal support to his former wife, Judy Schmir, but refusing to reduce support for the period prior to May 3, 2006, the date on which Maurice[1]filed his application for an order to show cause following issuance of the remittitur in the parties prior appeal on the issue of spousal support. (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 (Schmir I).) Maurice contends the trial court erred in concluding, under both Family Code section 3653[2]and our directions on remand in Schmir I, it was not authorized to make its order terminating support retroactive to a date prior to the filing of his application (and specifically to October 2003 when Judy concedes she ceased to make any effort to become employed). Court affirm.

Danielle Milton appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of possession of methamphetamine and transportation of methamphetamine. She was placed on probation under Proposition 36. Milton contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence and in failing to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense. Court affirm.

Simon Marketing, Inc. was retained by McDonalds Corporation to assist it in developing and administering promotional games for McDonalds customers. Simons director of security Jerry Jacobson was responsible for maintaining the integrity of the promotional games and personally distributed (or seeded) the high-value game pieces to various McDonalds restaurants throughout the country. Simon engaged the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P. (PwC) to monitor the printing of the high-value game pieces, transportation of the pieces to various packaging plants and insertion of the pieces into McDonalds packaging materials. According to Simon, these duties included supervision of Jacobsons handling of the high-value game pieces between the printing site and the designated seeding location. Nonetheless, Jacobson successfully embezzled high-value game pieces over a period of several years before he was exposed, indicted and convicted of various felonies. Simon sued PwC for breach of contract, alleging its failure to properly supervise Jacobsons work permitted the embezzlement to occur and caused Simon to lose its business relationship with McDonalds. In an earlier appeal we reversed the trial courts order sustaining PwCs demurrer to Simons third amended complaint without leave to amend. (Simon Marketing, Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP (Sept. 21, 2005, B175221) [nonpub. opn.] (Simon I).) The case has now returned after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of PwC. Court again reverse.

On respondent Susan Palitz's application, the trial court issued an Order Against Harassment (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6)[1]against appellant David Clark. Under the terms of the order, which expires in September 2009, Clark may not harass or contact Palitz, must stay 20 feet away from her, her residence, and her car, and may not own a gun. Court affirm.

The Bellflower Unified School District (the District) appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the Bellflower Educational Association and the California Teachers Association (collectively referred to herein as the Association). The District contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because: (1) compliance with the award would require the District to violate Education Code sections 44663 and 44664; (2) the award grants a remedy not authorized by the terms of the parties agreement and disregards a provision in the agreement that prohibited the arbitrator from altering or adding to the terms of the agreement; and (3) the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, namely, evidence of the Districts past practices in performing evaluations. (Code Civ. Proc., 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) Court affirm.