CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Randall Jeffrey Risher appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of assault upon a peace officer (Pen. Code,[1] 245, subd. (c)) and resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant thereafter admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and the trial court found that defendant violated probation in Case Nos. BA272273, NA068063 and TA083654. The court sentenced defendant to eight years in state prison, plus concurrent sentences for the probation violations. Court modify the judgment by striking DNA fees imposed by the court pursuant to Government Code section 76104.7, and Court affirm the judgment as modified.

James Hunley appeals an order granting an injunction prohibiting harassment in favor of James Hardin. (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6.)The injunction prohibits Hunley from making personnel complaints to Hardins employer, the Los Angeles Police Department, based on Hardins asserted off-duty misconduct without first obtaining a court order.
Hunley contends the order issued by the trial court did not address harassment, section 527.6 does not apply to constitutionally protected speech, the order amounted to a prior restraint on Hunleys speech on matters of public importance and Hardin misused the statute prohibiting harassment.

asmine Jackson appeals a judgment after a jury verdict in a personal injury action. She suffered serious injuries when the car in which she was a passenger was struck by another vehicle being driven by Jo Ann Brasel. Brasel later died from other causes. Plaintiff sued the decedents estate, seeking to recover damages limited by the decedents insurance coverage. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the amount of damages awarded, the apportionment of fault, the admission and exclusion of evidence, the refusal of her proposed jury instruction on an item of economic damages, the denial of her motions for a mistrial during jury voir dire, and other matters.
Court conclude that comments by prospective jurors and the trial court concerning the financial impact of the verdict on the heirs were incurably prejudicial and warrant a complete new trial. court also conclude that the admission of an exculpatory hearsay statement by the decedent was prejudicial error, as was the refusal of plaintiffs proposed instruction on an item of damages. Accordingly, Court will reverse

David Eric Jones appeals from the judgment rendered following his no contest plea to a five-count information that alleged possession for sale of cocaine, possession for sale of cocaine base, transportation of cocaine, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun (Pen. Code, 12020, subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged that appellant had previously been convicted of possession of narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, 11370) and had suffered three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code 667, subds. (b)-(i)). After the court struck two of the strikes, appellant admitted the remaining allegations. He was sentenced to a term of nine years, four months.

Chunlei Leila Guo (Guo) appeals from an order amending a default judgment to include her as a judgment debtor, based on the trial courts determination that she was the alter ego of the corporation against which the default was entered. Guo complains the entry of the amended judgment violated her right to due process, in part because the trial court had not permitted her, a non-attorney, to represent her corporation in the lawsuit. Court affirm.

Chunlei Leila Guo (Guo) appeals from an order amending a default judgment to include her as a judgment debtor, based on the trial courts determination that she was the alter ego of the corporation against which the default was entered. Guo complains the entry of the amended judgment violated her right to due process, in part because the trial court had not permitted her, a non-attorney, to represent her corporation in the lawsuit. Court affirm.

Charles B. appeals the judgment (order declaring Charles B. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602) entered following the finding Charles B. committed two counts of vandalism causing damage to personal property in the amount of $400 or more. (Pen. Code, 594, subds. (a), (b)(1).)
Charles B. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to declare the offenses misdemeanors. (Pen. Code, 17, subd. (b); Welf. & Inst. Code, 702.) Court find no abuse of the juvenile courts discretion and affirm the judgment.

Hratch Bedrossian appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Appellant sought reversal of the decision of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board), affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) who heard evidence and affirmed the determination of the California Employment Development Department (EDD or Department). The Department had determined that appellant was not entitled to certain unemployment insurance benefits, and that due to his false representations and willful material omissions, he was required to repay the benefits with assessed penalties. The Department had further determined appellant should be disqualified for a specified period from receiving future benefits. After an independent review of the administrative record, the trial court denied the petition. Court conclude that appellant has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred, and we affirm the judgment. Respondents have not filed briefs or otherwise appeared in this proceeding.

Plaintiffs Richard Velzen and Marianne Velzen (plaintiffs) sued, inter alia, defendants Jeffrey C. Willis (Willis), Richard H. Perlman (Perlman), William L. Maragno, Elliot Berkowitz and Trailer Nation USA, Inc. (Perlman, Berkowitz and Trailer Nation USA, Inc. are collectively Perlman defendants) alleging a number of causes of action. Defendants moved to dismiss causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court dismissed the cause of action against Willis for conspiracy to commit fraud, but denied the motion as to the cause of action against Willis for unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed the cause of action against the Perlman defendants for conspiracy to commit fraud but otherwise denied the motion as to the Perlman defendants. Court affirm.

Sek-Kam Suen appeals from the default judgment entered against her following the courts imposition of terminating sanctions after the court found she would not comply with the courts order to provide discovery. Court reverse.

This appeal arises out of a resentencing following a remand by this Court. Following a jury trial, appellants were convicted of first degree murder, in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (count I);[1] attempted carjacking, in violation of sections 664 and 215, subdivision (a) (count 2); attempted second-degree robbery, in violation of sections 664 and 211 (count 3); two counts of second-degree robbery, in violation of section 211 (counts 5 and 6); and three counts of unlawful driving/taking of an automobile, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (counts 4, 8 and 9).[2]Zelaya was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) (count 12). Roberts was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(l) (count 7); felony evading an officer, in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) (count 10); and possession of cocaine base for sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 (count 11). The jury found true that, as to all except three counts, that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(l)(a) (counts 1-6, 8-12); that a principal personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury or death, in violation of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(l) (counts 1-3); that a principal personally used a firearm, in violation of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(l) (counts 1-3, 5, 6); and that a principal (Roberts) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, in violation of section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(l) (counts 1-3).

Wizard Gaming, Inc. ("Wizard") appeals the order of the trial court disqualifying its counsel, Isaacman, Kaufman & Painter ("IKP"), from representing it in this shareholder derivative action. Finding no error, Court affirm the order.

Eric Doi, an employee of the appellant Union Pacific Railroad Company, sued Union Pacific under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) after he suffered life-altering injuries (quadriplegia) in a rollover accident that occurred when Robert Torres, a fellow-employee, lost control of the company-owned truck he was driving. Respondent Doi and Torres were members of one of Union Pacifics zone gangs, which traveled on an as needed basis to and worked at various locations in several states. The accident occurred in July, 2007, on a travel day, after Torres had picked up Doi at the Tucson airport and while they were en route to their hotel after stopping at a store to purchase food and Pedialyte (a liquid containing electrolytes) which they would eat and drink during the following work day in the Arizona desert. The principal question is whether Doi and Torres were acting within the scope of their employment when the accident occurred. A jury decided they were and awarded Doi damages of $48,493,120, a sum that included $35.7 million in noneconomic damages for past and future physical pain and mental suffering. Union Pacific appeals, contending Doi and Torres were not acting within the scope of their employment as a matter of law. Alternatively, the company claims a new trial is necessary because of instructional error and an excessive award of noneconomic damages. Finally, Union Pacific contends that the judgment should be modified to provide that postjudgment interest accrues at the federal rate rather than the rate provided by state law. Court affirm the judgment in all respects.

John Hunley appeals an order denying a petition for writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., 1085.) The petition sought an order directing Darrell George, the city manager of the City of Duarte, to enforce an order issued by the City of Duarte Architectural Review Board directing Hunleys neighbor, John Hardin, to comply with a City of Duarte (City) building code provision that limits the height of fences, hedges and walls on rear and side residential yards to six feet. (Duarte Mun. Code, 19.24.050, subd. (h)(3)(A).)[1]

The trial court denied the writ petition, ruling it lacked authority to order the City to prosecute a code enforcement matter. The trial court also found the evidence presented in opposition to the petition showed the wall substantially complied with the code. On appeal, Hunley contends the trial court relied on a false declaration submitted by the City to show the wall substantially complied with the code and this case does not present an issue of prosecutorial discretion but enforcement of an existing order. Court conclude the trial court properly denied Hunleys writ petition and affirm the order.