CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Cramer

Filed 2/1/10 P. v. Cramer CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LEE CRAMER,

Defendant and Appellant.
G041362

(Super. Ct. No. 06NF3168)

O P I N I O N


Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.

Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela Ratner Sobeck and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Christopher Lee Cramer was convicted of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. He claims there is insufficient evidence he acted with premeditation, and the trial court committed a variety of evidentiary errors that violated his right to a fair trial. court reject his claims and affirm the judgment.

M.J. (Mother) appeals from a July 9, 2009 order terminating her parental rights to two children, T.B. (born in Jan. 2007) and D.J. (born in Dec. 2007). Mother seeks review of an earlier order of February 10, 2009, denying without a hearing her petition for modification seeking reunification services and unmonitored visits. After the briefing on the instant appeal was completed, we filed our decision in Mothers earlier appeal from the February 10, 2009 order, affirming that order. (In re T.B. (Oct. 28, 2009, B214469) [nonpub. opn.].) The decision in the earlier appeal operates as law of the case and we thus affirm the July 9, 2009 order terminating parental rights.

Brian Edwards appeals from the trial court's judgment granting respondent's petition for his continued involuntary treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that his mental disorder caused or aggravated the commission of the underlying crime. We affirm.

A.G., the presumed father of C.G., seeks extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452 & 8.456, Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26;.) Father asserts that he is developmentally delayed and did not receive reasonable reunification services. court deny the petition.

Defendant Grant Scott Parkison, Jr., was accused of murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) and of personally and intentionally using a firearm causing great bodily injury or death ( 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). A jury convicted him of involuntary manslaughter ( 192, subd. (b)) and of personally and intentionally using a firearm causing death ( 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed a state prison term of 14 years, consisting of the four-year upper term for the offense and the 10-year upper term for the enhancement.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 362 and by imposing the upper term on the enhancement. Court affirm the judgment.

After defendant Charley Vulcans motion to suppress was denied, and in exchange for the dismissal of other charges, he pled no contest to possession of cocaine base, and admitted allegations that he had a strike conviction and had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a total of 10 years, and defendant timely filed this appeal.
Defendant contends the trial court should have granted his suppression motion because peace officers had no cause to detain him, and then acted unreasonably by forcibly searching his mouth. Court conclude the record at the suppression hearing supports the trial courts rulings. Court shall affirm.

On the morning of January 31, 1985, 19-year-old Lowlin Saepharn stabbed his 15-year-old, pregnant girlfriend in the chest, causing her death and that of her unborn child. Saepharn pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree murder with a weapon use enhancement and was sentenced to an indeterminate term in state prison of 16 years to life. On April 30, 2008, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) conducted a sixth parole consideration hearing and found Saepharn unsuitable for parole.
Saepharn filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which was denied on December 8, 2008. On January 26, 2009, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. We issued an order to show cause to John Marshall, Warden of California Mens Colony--East (Warden) in order to review the Boards decision. The Warden filed a return to our order to show cause, and Saepharn filed a traverse.
On July 21, 2009, the Board disapproved its April 30, 2008, decision and ordered a rehearing of Saepharns sixth parole suitability hearing. Shortly thereafter, the Warden moved to dismiss the petition as moot. Saepharn filed opposition.
court conclude that, because the best Saepharn could hope for on his petition would be a rehearing by the Board, and the Board has already ordered a rehearing, the matter is moot.Court therefore dismiss the petition.

Appellants, mother and father of the minor, appeal from the juvenile courts orders terminating their parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.) Mother contends reunification services should not have been terminated because she had not been provided reasonable services and she had sufficiently progressed in the services she did receive. Both parents contend the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile courts finding that the minor is adoptable. Court shall affirm.

As the trial court noted, this family law case presents something of a procedural knot. As we explain more fully below, we agree with the trial court's resolution of the procedural tangle. In brief, the trial court, having ordered dismissal of the underlying dissolution proceeding, was thereafter without power to enter any substantive judgment. Thus the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to the day before respondent's wife died.

Appellant Stephen Willis and his uncle, Dr. Stanley Willis, were members of a limited liability company (LLC) that owned the Park Manor Suites Hotel (Hotel) in San Diego.During his lifetime, Dr. Willis transferred his membership interest in the LLC into his revocable trust. After Dr. Willis died, two independent successor trustees of Dr. Willis's trust (Trustees) petitioned the court for approval of certain proposed actions, including dissolving the LLC, marketing and selling the Hotel, and distributing the assets to the named trust beneficiaries. Stephen opposed the petition, asserting he had an immediate right to purchase Dr. Willis's former interests in the LLC (or a portion of those interests).

Michael William Gray and Patricia Ann Gray, as trustees of the Gray Revocable Trust, appeal an order denying in part their motion for attorney fees from Monterey Financial Services, Inc. (Monterey) following their acceptance of Monterey's offer of compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Grays contend the court erred by deducting fees they incurred before a certain date that were unrelated to the filing of the complaint, as the section 998 offer that contains the fee provision has no temporal limitation on fees. They also contend the court abused its discretion by deducting attorney travel time, and alternatively, by miscalculating the amount of the deduction. Further, they contend the court failed to exercise its discretion on their supplemental request for fees, and remand is required for the exercise of discretion. Lastly, they claim the court erred by not entering a judgment on the section 998 compromise, and the error caused them to incur additional fees the court disallowed. We modify the order to increase the award of fees by $660. As modified, Court affirm the order.

Appellant A.B. appeals from a postjudgment order denying her request to move her son's residence from San Diego County to Riverside County. On appeal, A.B. contends that as her son's primary caretaker, she had a presumptive right to change his residence. She further contends that in denying her request, the trial court failed to make findings as required by In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 (LaMusga).

Plaintiffs Rance Duyan and Adam Hutchins (Plaintiffs) appeal from an order of the trial court granting defendant Paul Buckley's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law Plaintiffs filed this action against Buckley and two other defendants in relation to conduct on the part of the defendants with respect to a failed downtown health club called Bodyworks. Plaintiffs were minority owners of the company that operated Bodyworks. The majority owner retained Buckley to represent the company in an unlawful detainer action against it by its landlord.

John J. Roach entered a negotiated guilty plea to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)); and admitted that he personally used a deadly weapon, a tree branch, in committing the offense (id., 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Under the plea agreement, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a second charge of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and various enhancement allegations. The plea bargain called for a stipulated sentence of three years, to run concurrently with Roach's sentence in San Diego Superior Court case No. SDC207625. All parties agreed that, with application of credits, time would be served at 50 percent, and were there an error in calculation of credits, Roach would have the opportunity to withdraw his plea, unopposed by the People.