CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and respondent Raymond James Johnson pled guilty to being involved in a hit and run accident. (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a).) He also admitted the allegation that the victim died as a result of the accident. (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (b)(2).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years, under certain conditions, including spending 180 days in jail. The People appeal, contending that: 1) the trial court engaged in illegal plea bargaining; and 2) the court erred in failing to order a probation report. Court affirm.

Defendant and respondent Jesus Fernando Armenta pled guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1),[1]and one count of vandalism[2]( 594, subd. (b)(1), count 2). The court sentenced him to one year in county jail and ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. The People appeal, contending that the trial court engaged in illegal plea bargaining. Court affirm.

F.R. (father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26 as to Fa.R. (Fa.), born in January 2009. Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding he was merely an alleged father because the overwhelming evidence showed he was the quasi-presumed father of Fa. He further contends his trial counsels failure to request presumed father status was ineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in prejudicial error. Plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) contends: (1) father is foreclosed from attacking the juvenile courts dispositional orders and from asserting ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) fathers contentions fail on the merits. We find no error, and Court affirm.

In this matter we have determined that the superior court erred in granting a peremptory writ of mandate without affording the County of Riverside (County) due process. Accordingly, after reviewing Countys petition and the opposition, we grant Countys petition for writ of mandate. Because theresolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

Markel Shar Hollman and others assaulted Elaine Neal over a period of about 24 hours for the purpose of eliciting the whereabouts of Neals son, Joseph Jynes, a suspect in the killing of Jamal Johnson. Most of the other perpetrators of the crimes against Neal pled guilty. Hollman and codefendant Precious Johnson stood trial. The jury convicted Hollman of torture, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment by violence. It also was found true that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Hollman raises three challenges to his convictions and sentence. First, Hollman contends the trial courts rulings during Neals cross-examination deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, and effective representation of counsel. Second, Hollman contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a defense request for juror contact information. Third, Hollman contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights because it imposed a sentence based upon his failure to plead guilty. Court reject Hollmans contentions and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant Jon Michael Doucette appeals from his conviction following the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to California Penal Code section 1538.5. Defendant argues that his initial detention was unlawful and therefore the subsequent search should have been suppressed by the trial court. We conclude that the evidence does not support a detention but a consensual encounter which requires no objective justification, and the subsequent search was permissible by virtue of defendants consent and his parole status. Thus, Court find no error and affirm.

After a jury convicted defendant Thai Van Vo of grand theft (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code), the trial court placed him on three years formal probation with 365 days of local custody and ordered him to pay victim restitution. He contends the court committed reversible error in giving the flight instruction, CALCRIM No. 372, because it violated his constitutional rights and there was no evidence of flight from the crime to warrant the instruction. Finding no error, Court affirm the judgment.

At a permanency planning hearing conducted pursuant to section 366.26, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of W.R. (father) and T. R. (mother) to N.R., now 10 years of age. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Father appeals from the judgment, arguing there was not substantial evidence supporting the juvenile courts finding that the beneficial parent‑child relationship exception to adoption ( 366.26, subd. ((c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. Court affirm.

Defendant Robert Malachi Maldonado was convicted after jury trial of attempting to dissuade a witness by use of force or threat of force (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c)(1))[1] for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). Defendant admitted that he had a prior conviction that qualified as both a serious felony ( 667, subd. (a)) and a strike ( 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12). The trial court denied defendants request to strike the prior and the punishment for the gang enhancement, and sentenced him to prison for the indeterminate term of 14 years to life consecutive to the determinate term of five years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his conviction for witness intimidation must be reversed as the record affirmatively demonstrates that the jury relied on a factually inadequate theory to find him guilty, (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to strike the punishment for the gang enhancement. As Court find no error or abuse of discretion, Court will affirm the judgment.

After his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5)[1] was denied, defendant Adam Thomas Kleemeyer pleaded no contest to conspiracy to commit burglary and robbery ( 182, subd. (a)(1), 459, 460, subd. (a), 211, 212.5, subd. (a)), receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)), misdemeanor carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle ( 12025, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor carrying a loaded firearm ( 12031, subd. (a)(1)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions. Defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress. ( 1538.5, subd. (m).) On appeal, defendant contests the validity of the detention and search of his person by officers on February 5, 2008. Defendant also argues that the officers were not justified in searching the vehicle in which he had been a passenger. As we find the searches and seizures were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Court will affirm the judgment.

This is the third appeal related to a dispute over the terms of a commercial lease. On this occasion appellant Gatley Properties, LLC (Gatley) contests a postjudgment order denying its request for attorney fees. Gatley contends that it was the prevailing party and therefore was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the lease and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(1). Court find the issue to be moot and therefore dismiss the appeal.

Defendant and appellant Eduardo Pascual Naval (defendant) appeals the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of various offenses, including continuous sexual abuse of his daughter K.N., in violation of Penal Code, section 288.5. Court affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the matter for resentencing.

After a jury trial, defendant John Alan Gillies was convicted of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (Pen. Code, 209.5, subd. (a)),[1] and robbery in the second degree ( 211).[2] The jury also found defendant had personally used a firearm during the commission of the offenses ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 23 years to life in state prison, with parole eligibility after 30 years. On his direct appeal, defendant contends he was deprived of a fair trial because a juror may have been biased against him. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Court affirm the judgment and summarily deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.