CA Unpub Decisions

jury convicted defendant Robert Edward Heifner of possessing methamphetamine for sale, and the trial court found defendant had two prior drug convictions and had served two prior prison terms.
Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals. He contends (1) the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215] (hereafter Brady) by failing to disclose that, two days prior to arrest, defendant tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine; (2) the trial court erred in denying defense counsels request for a continuance to obtain testimony by an expert regarding the result of the drug test; and (3) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to investigate and secure evidence of the positive drug test to support a lesser offense of simple possession of methamphetamine, rather than possession for sale. Court find no prejudicial error.

Following a contested trial, the minor was found to have violated the City of Elk Groves curfew ordinance (Elk Grove Mun. Code, 9.05.020) and was ordered to perform six hours of community service. He appeals, contending (1) the juvenile court erred in failing to provide a court reporter for the trial, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment. court conclude the juvenile courts determination is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.

jury convicted defendant Salvador Fierro, Jr., of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] on his parents and removing a telephone line ( 591, a misdemeanor), and acquitted him of their forcible false imprisonment ( 236, 237, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison on the felonies (giving him credit for time served on the concurrent misdemeanor term).
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the use of his prior felony conviction for assault ( 245) to impeach his parents opinion of him, and in denying a request for a continuance to review new evidence used to impeach his mother in rebuttal. Court shall affirm the judgment.

November 2003 a jury found defendant Doug Glen Lute guilty of committing lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).)The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years of formal probation subject to specified terms and conditions, including that defendant was to participate in sex offender counseling and was not to have contact with children, including his own, unless accompanied by a preapproved adult. The court imposed fees and fines, including a $200 restitution fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Lute (Mar. 13, 2006, C047005) [nonpub. opn.].)

Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, defendant Leonardo Robaina pleaded guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm in exchange for a grant of five years probation conditioned upon, inter alia, six months in the county jail. The court imposed a restitution fine of $200; a second $200 restitution fine, stayed pending successful completion of probation; a $20 restitution fine surcharge; a $20 court security fee; and a $30 assessment fee for conviction of a criminal offense.

Defendant Jeremy Davis pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted that he inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense. The court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison and imposed various penalties, assessments, and fines, including a $30 assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373. (Further section references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.)

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
felony complaint charged defendant Arthur Zazueta with fraudulently presenting a $400 non-sufficient funds check at Feather Falls Casino on or about August 21, 2006. (Pen. Code, 476a, subd. (a).) Defendant waived a preliminary hearing, and the complaint was deemed an information.
On August 6, 2009, the charge was specified to be a misdemeanor, the parties stipulated to a factual basis, and defendant changed his plea to no contest. A trailing traffic case was dismissed.
The trial court placed defendant on probation with conditions that included a 30day jail sentence. The court also imposed a $100 restitution fine (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)), a stayed $100 probation revocation restitution fine (Pen. Code, 1202.44), a $20 court security fee (Pen. Code, 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, 70373, subd. (a)(1)). The court also ordered defendant to reimburse the county $420 for public defender services, subject to defendants ability to pay. (Pen. Code, 987.8, subd. (b).)

Discussion I, A, footnote 5, last three lines (slip opn., p. 15): after "motion," delete "as the evidence must be substantial to defeat the motion" and replace with "because in discrimination cases 'evidence of " 'pretense' must be 'specific' and 'substantial' in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate" on an improper basis. [Citations.]' "

Appellants Juan Rudolfo Clavel and Ernesto Lopez were jointly charged with a series of offenses arising out of assaults on a store owner and his son. Following a jury trial, Clavel was convicted of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of battery with the infliction of serious bodily injury ( 243, subd. (d)). The jury also found that Clavel had inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Lopez was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of battery with serious bodily injury. The jury also found that Lopez inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Each appellant was sentenced to prison for six years. Both Clavel and Lopez appeal contending the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial and in its instructions to the jury regarding the rereading of witness testimony. Court will reject both contentions and affirm.

jury found Everett Carl Kite, Jr. to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). He was recommitted to an indeterminate civil commitment term under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600-6604.)

Mohamed A. entered a negotiated admission to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court continued Mohamed as a ward and committed him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for seven years. Mohamed appeals.Court affirm.

Steven Montgomery (Montgomery) appeals the trial courts denial of his anti-SLAPP[1]motion. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.)[2] Montgomery makes three contentions. First, Montgomery asserts that the trial court erred by concluding that an anti-SLAPP motion cannot be used to strike a petition to compel arbitration. Second, Montgomery contends that the trial court erred by finding that Montgomerys speech was unprotected, prior to applying the two-prong anti-SLAPP test. Third, Montgomery argues that the trial court erred by finding that Montgomery did not satisfy the requirements for an anti-SLAPP motion. Court affirm in part and reverse in part.

Jeanne Jacobson (Jacobson) sued Michael and Tammy Chesonis (the Chesonises) based upon claims of strict liability (Civ. Code, 3342)[1]and general negligence, due to Jacobson being bitten by a dog. The trial court granted the Chesonises motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c.) Jacobsen contends the trial court erred because (1) the trial court should not have applied the landlord-tenant duty of care when analyzing the element of duty, and (2) the Chesonises owed Jacobson a general duty of care. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jerald L. Belton appeals from his conviction of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle with a prior (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a), Pen. Code,[1] 666.5, subd. (a), count 1), receiving stolen property with a prior ( 496d, subd. (a), 666.5, subd. (a), count 2), and resisting a peace officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1), count 3), with enhancements for two prison prior convictions ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant contends his conviction for receiving stolen property violates the rule against dual convictions for taking and receiving the same property. In the alternative, he contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that it could not convict him of both theft and receiving stolen property. He next contends the trial court improperly made dual use of facts in imposing the upper term on count 1 or, in the alternative, using an element of the crime as the basis for the upper term. Finally, he contends the trial court erred in calculating presentence custody credits. The People concede error in the calculation of custody credits, and we accept that concession. We also conclude the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the rule precluding dual convictions, and we will therefore reverse defendants conviction for receiving stolen property. In all other respects, Court will affirm the judgment.