CA Unpub Decisions

Y.A. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 387[1]removing her daughters Naomi A. and Vanessa A. from her care and custody and terminating her family reunification services. She contends the juvenile court erroneously sustained a supplemental dependency petition, removed Naomi and Vanessa from her custody and failed to extend family reunification services beyond the 18-month limitation due to the inadequate provision of such services by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Court affirm.

J. H. (Father), the father of minors Sabrina H. and J.H. III, appeals from the juvenile courts orders made pursuant to a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 342,[1]declaring Sabrina H. a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivision (d), denying Fathers continued family reunification services, and ordering that Father not have any visitation with Sabrina H. Father contends that the juvenile courts finding that Sabrina H. was sexually abused by Father was not supported by substantial evidence, and that its orders denying Father continued reunification services and visitation with Sabrina H. were an abuse of discretion. For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm.

Appellant Natalie V. Matthews appeals from post-judgment orders modifying child custody and denying attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering custody of the parties minor children to respondent William O. Matthews and denying appellants motion for attorney fees. Court affirm the orders.

Johnnie Kemp appeals the judgment of conviction following a plea of no contest to failure to register as a sex offender with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (b))[1]and admission that he has suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court sentenced appellant to 32 months state prison, awarded 356 days presentence credit, and ordered appellant to pay a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 parole revocation fine (1202.45), a $20 court security fee ( 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov Code 70373). Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsels examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300 et seq.),[1] Ezequiel M., the father of children declared dependents of the juvenile court (Father), challenges a disposition order whereby the trial court directed him to participate in certain programs and counseling but declined to provide him with reunification services. Father contends that although the trial court failed to make required findings to justify denying reunification services, the evidence in the case would not support such findings in any event and therefore the denial of services must be reversed. Our review of the record and the law regarding reunification services convinces us that the order denying Father services must be reversed and on remand of the case the trial court should hold a hearing to reconsider the issue and make the required findings.

Plaintiff Ray Patrick Willig, an experienced snowboarder, alleged that a loose wire sticking up through the early season snow at Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (Mammoth) caused him to fall and sustain devastating personal injuries. The ski patrollers who responded to the accident testified they found plaintiff perched on a rock amidst other rocks several hundred feet above the wire, which was discovered three weeks later after nine inches of snow had melted. Plaintiffs ski companion testified, however, that he found his friend at a location below the wire. The jury found that, although Mammoth committed willful misconduct, the wire protruding from a gabion (an erosion control device) did not cause plaintiffs injury.
We conclude the ruling on the theory of liability was separate and distinct from causation, and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate prejudice, that is, how the pretrial ruling limited, circumscribed, or otherwise precluded him from proving what actually caused him to fall. Court also reject his claim of prejudicial juror misconduct and affirm the judgment.

A police officer received a dispatch call that a man had possibly been shot twice at a house in Elk Grove. When the officer arrived at the two-story house, he found a man and a woman bleeding on the front porch. The man said the perpetrators had driven away, but he was equivocal about whether anyone was inside the house, and the officer saw what appeared to be droplets and smudges of blood on the front door. After the officer threatened to kick down the locked front door to gain entry, the man handed over the keys. Four police officers entered the house. They saw no signs of struggle or blood. They searched the first floor and found nothing. While searching the second floor, one of the officers encountered a locked bedroom door. After announcing his presence and receiving no response, he broke down the door and inside the bedroom found a scale and a glass jar filled with marijuana, which led to the charges against defendant Albert Troyer. Because the warrantless search of the locked bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment, the trial court erred in denying defendants motion to suppress. Accordingly, Court will reverse.

A jury convicted George Ivan Santillan of two counts of lewd act on a child under 14 years old. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).) The jury also found true allegations of substantial sexual contact. (Pen. Code, 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The trial court sentenced Santillan to an aggregate term of eight years in prison. On appeal, Santillan contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police without first being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Dahir Diaz Garcia of misdemeanor false imprisonment (Pen. Code,[1] 273, subd. (a)), misdemeanor assault ( 240), corporal injury to a spouse ( 273.5, subd. (a)), and battery with serious bodily injury ( 243, subd. (d)). As to the corporal injury to a spouse charge, the jury found true allegations Garcia personally inflicted great bodily injury. As to the battery with serious bodily injury charge, the jury found true allegations Garcia personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Garcia to an aggregate term of seven years in state prison and ordered him to pay victim restitution to Reyes of $13,000. Garcia appeals, arguing the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction sua sponte and in imposing a $13,000 restitution fine. Court affirm the judgment.

Dr. M. Lou Marsh appeals from a judgment denying her petition for a writ of administrative mandate seeking to overturn a decision by the California Coastal Commission (Commission). Court affirm.

In August 2008 Jessica P. was arrested after selling drugs in the presence of one of her children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a dependency petition for Jessica's other child, two-year-old Joseph P. Joseph was detained in foster care. In September the court entered a true finding and ordered him placed in foster care. In October Joseph began a 60-day visit with Jessica. The visit became a placement in December.
In July 2009 the court held a hearing to consider Jessica's request for legal and physical custody of Joseph with no visitation for Joseph's father, Javier T. There is no indication in the record that either Javier or his attorney was given notice. Neither was present at the hearing. Counsel for the father of Jessica's other child stated she was "making . . . appearances today" for Javier's attorney. Counsel asked that the hearing be continued for one day, if the existing order for supervised visits was to be changed, so Javier's counsel could argue. The court denied the continuance request, awarded legal and physical custody of Joseph to Jessica, denied visitation to Javier, terminated dependency jurisdiction and directed the custody order be placed in the family court file. The judgment is reversed.

Two dead bodies were found in a parking lot off University Avenue in Riverside, in an area that is notorious for drug sales. The victims had been shot in the head, execution style. Three witnesses linked defendant Raymond Griffin to the slayings. One of them Robert Pruitt had agreed to testify in exchange for a reduced sentence in an unrelated case. This deal was unusual, in that it had been offered to Pruitt, not by the prosecutors office, but rather by the court that was due to sentence him. Defense counsel learned about Pruitts deal in the middle of trial but never used it to impeach Pruitt, apparently because he misunderstood the terms of the deal.

After the trial court granted a SLAPP motion[1]by defendant Robert Buch, it entered judgment against plaintiffs Kevin Jen-Kang Yang and Lee Yang. The Yangs appealed from the judgment, arguing, among other things, that the SLAPP motion should have been denied. We held that the Yangs had failed to file a timely appeal from the order granting the SLAPP motion, which was separately appealable, and hence Court had no jurisdiction to review that order. Court also awarded Buch costs on appeal.

On remand, the Yangs filed a motion for sanctions, on the ground that Buch had failed to prepare a proposed order granting the SLAPP motion and thus had somehow prevented them from filing a timely appeal; the trial court denied this motion. The trial court also awarded Buch $25,000 as attorney fees for the appeal. The Yangs now appeal both of these postjudgment orders. Finding no error, Court affirm.

A jury found defendant Darwun Lemar Singletary guilty of petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, 666),[1]a lesser included offense of the charged offense of robbery ( 211), and of commercial burglary ( 459). Defendant admitted that he had sustained a prior strike conviction. ( 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).) The trial court later struck a prior serious felony allegation based on the verdict and sentenced defendant to a total term of four years in state prison. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda). Court reject this contention and affirm the judgment.