CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Randy Jay Brown was observed outside his truck, which was equipped with several red and blue lights and a siren, talking to another driver, whom he appeared to have pulled over. He was overheard telling the driver that he could write the person a ticket. Defendant was arrested, and his home and business were searched. Two prohibited assault weapons were found at the business. Defendant was found guilty of impersonating a public officer, investigator, or inspector in violation of Penal Code section 146a, subdivision (b). He was also found guilty of two counts of possessing assault weapons (a Colt AR-15 series and an AK-47) in violation of section 12280, subdivision (b). Defendant was placed on three years formal probation, to include 240 days in county jail.

Defendant and appellant Paul Jones Augustin appeals after he was convicted of several counts of assault with a deadly weapon (using several different weapons), corporal injury to a spouse and false imprisonment. He contends that the trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences on count 5 (assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, and by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury) (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1));[1]count 7 (assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury) ( 245, subd. (a)(1)); and count 8 (false imprisonment) ( 236). The People contend that defendant was properly sentenced on these counts. We agree with defendant as to count 5, but agree with the People as to counts 7 and 8. Court remand for correction of the sentencing error, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

This is a Peoples appeal in the case of defendant and respondent Raymond Paul Aguilar. The trial court, sitting as a magistrate, held defendant to answer on a charge of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and one count of infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. Several months later, the same judge heard defendants motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 955,[1]dismissed the assault count, and reduced the corporal injury offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. The People appeal, contending: (1) it was improper for the judge to sit both as a magistrate and as a superior court judge, in review of her own rulings as a magistrate; (2) the court erred in dismissing the assault count; and (3) the court improperly reduced a charged felony to a misdemeanor before judgment. Court reverse.

suffered a prior conviction of a theft-related offense (Pen. Code, 666).[1]The court stayed imposition of sentence; placed appellant on three years probation; ordered that she serve the first 270 days of her probationary period, less presentence custody credit of nine days, in county jail; and ordered that she complete a residential drug and alcohol treatment program (program). The court also stated it would allow appellant to be released from jail to a program after serving 90 days, and made various monetary orders, including that appellant pay $40.00 per month in probation supervision costs, beginning on the thirtieth day following her release from custody. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the court failed to comply with statutorily mandated procedures in imposing the probation costs order, and (2) the courts implied finding that appellant had the ability to pay the costs of probation supervision was not supported by substantial evidence. Court will reverse the probation costs order and remand for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Robert Jeffrey Stewart pled no contest to the charge of committing a felony violation of Penal Code[1]section 496, subdivision (a) (receiving stolen property). The court placed appellant on two years probation. Thereafter, appellant filed a notice of motion for the return of certain items of property, including a .22-caliber rifle and a .22-caliber handgun. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion. Appellants sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in denying his motion for return of the two .22-caliber firearms. Court will dismiss the appeal.

Defendant and appellant Rickey Edward Stuart appeals after he was convicted of two counts of making criminal threats, one misdemeanor count of elder abuse, and one misdemeanor count of vandalism. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of making criminal threats, and that the court erred in admitting certain evidence. Court affirm the judgment.

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule 8.452) from respondent courts orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son O. and daughter E. Court conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, Court will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate

Lynn Adams filed an action against her former employer, Quiksilver, Inc., and two of its managers, Randy McClelland and Dewey Doan (collectively referred to as Quiksilver), seeking damages for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Claiming Adams had signed an electronic arbitration agreement, Quiksilver filed a motion to compel arbitration of the complaint, and briefs were submitted by both sides. On the date set for argument on the motion, the trial court stated its desire to hold a brief evidentiary hearing as to whether the plaintiff made the electronic signatures on pages 9 and 12 of the Talent-Gateway form. After the hearing, the trial court granted the motion.
Adams filed this petition for extraordinary relief, seeking the issuance of a writ of mandate directing the superior court to enter an order denying the motion to compel arbitration. She claims she never agreed to arbitrate claims against Quiksilver and she never signed the electronic document containing the arbitration clause, thus the trial court erred when it found there was a valid arbitration agreement. Court grant the petition.

The juvenile court did not err in denying a hearing on the mothers petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Nor did the court err not finding the parental benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied here. Court affirm.

This appeal arises out of a marital dissolution action between Keith Thesing (Husband) and Jennifer Thesing (Wife). In this appeal, Husband challenges a June 2009 order that set permanent spousal support at $1,500 per month and awarded Wife $15,000 in attorney fees. He also attacks a March 2007 order awarding Wife $75,000 in attorney fees as a sanction pursuant to Family Code section 271.
We conclude that the March 2007 attorney fees order is not appealable because Husbands appeal from that order is not timely and because Husband failed to specify that order in his notice of appeal.

A jury found San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) liable to plaintiff Oliver Hill under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, 12900 et seq.) in the aggregate amount of $1,271,500 for (1) retaliation ( 12940, subd. (h)); and (2) failing to take reasonable steps to prevent racial harassment, discrimination, or retaliation ( 12940, subd. (k)). BART challenges the award on multiple grounds including instructional error, insufficient evidence, and excessive damages. We reverse the portion of the judgment based on the jurys retaliation award, finding that the jury was improperly allowed to consider matters outside the pleadings in arriving at its verdict on this claim. Court affirm the portion of the judgment based on BARTs failure to prevent conduct violating FEHA. Court remand the matter for a limited retrial on the retaliation claim and for a redetermination of the amount of the statutory attorney fees to be awarded to Hills attorneys.

In a previous appeal, we affirmed appellant Mark Delroy Daleys conviction of multiple felony offenses for supplying methamphetamine to minor teenage girls and arranging for them to engage in prostitution, but Court reversed the sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Appellant now challenges the sentence imposed on remand, contending the trial court failed to consider a compelling mitigating circumstancehis mental illness and drug addiction at the time of his crimesand abused its discretion in sentencing him to the upper term of nine years on the principal count. Court conclude the trial court acted within its discretion and appellant has not shown that it failed to consider all relevant factors. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Appellant Jeffrey A. Conrad sued his former employer, Montgomery-Sansome LP (Montgomery-Sansome) and one of its partners, Leonard Nordeman (collectively, defendants) for various claims, including breach of contract, unpaid wages, fraud, and wrongful constructive termination in violation of public policy. A jury rendered a verdict for Conrad on all claims and awarded him $1,005,002, which included $450,000 in punitive damages. In an amended judgment, the court entered judgment for Conrad on the claims for breach of contract, wrongful constructive termination, and punitive damages and awarded him $705,001.
Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on Conrads wrongful constructive termination claim and on punitive damages. Defendants also moved for a new trial on punitive damages. The court denied the JNOV motion but granted the motion for new trial.

Rochelle P. appeals from orders of the juvenile court declaring her children, Laci L. and Ty L., dependents of the court and removing them from her custody. She contends the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel should have barred relitigation of issues involved in prior proceedings regarding her older daughter, Sierra L., and the evidence was insufficient to support detention, jurisdiction, or out-of-home placement at disposition. Court affirm the jurisdiction order, but reverse the disposition order and remand for further proceedings.