CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Julie Ann Shanholtzer pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and related charges after the trial court offered (without securing the prosecutor's consent) to strike her prior prison terms for purposes of sentencing, suspend execution of a six-year prison sentence, and grant her probation. The court subsequently vacated the grant of probation after realizing the grant was statutorily invalid. On appeal, defendant contends the court engaged in judicial plea bargaining, voiding her guilty pleas. She asserts she must be given the opportunity to withdraw her guilty pleas. As we shall explain, because defendant received the benefit of her bargain, she is estopped to challenge it on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Freddy Rodriguez appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree murder committed for a criminal street gang purpose, possession of a firearm by a felon, and street terrorism, and found true street terrorism and firearm enhancements. Rodriguez argues: (1) insufficient evidence supports his convictions for murder and street terrorism; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt; (3) there was cumulative error; (4) the court should have stayed his sentence for street terrorism; (5) and we must strike the sentence on the street terrorism enhancement as to his murder conviction. We agree with Rodriguez's contentions concerning his sentencing, but his other claims are meritless. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Vanessa S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception is inapplicable to her case and the order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Nevaeh B. We reject mother's contention and affirm the juvenile court's order.

On April 28, 2011, defendant and respondent, Taj Dupree Carter, was charged in an amended information with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, count one),[1] possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count two), being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), count three), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count four).[2] The information also alleged a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) and a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant brought a motion pursuant to section 995 to set aside the gang offense. Among the issues defendant raised, was that he was the sole perpetrator of the offense for which he was charged and section 186.22(a) requires the accused to â€

The minor, A.L., was on probation for a felony adjudication of inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend. He now appeals after the juvenile court revoked his probation and entered a dispositional order changing his placement. He contends that the items of evidence establishing the violation were improperly admitted. We affirm the dispositional order.

This CEQA case concerns a project to build two 10,000-square-foot single-family homes on an approximately 2.5-acre portion of an 11.87-acre parcel of undeveloped, sloping terrain on the southern boundary of the City of Palm Desert (the City). One of the home sites is to be approximately 240 yards from a 30-acre â€

The juvenile court found that defendant and appellant G.W. (minor) had committed arson of forest land (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)), placed him on probation, and revoked his privilege to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13550. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he burned forest land and that the juvenile court was not authorized to revoke his driving privileges pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13550. We modify the judgment to strike the revocation of driving privileges and otherwise affirm.

The corner of Brockton and Tequesquite Avenues was once the site of Riverside's historic Chinatown. Now, it is a vacant lot. Jacobs Development Company, Inc. (Jacobs) entered into an agreement to buy the property from the Riverside County Office of Education (the County). Jacobs proposes to combine the County's parcel with a smaller, adjacent parcel and to build a medical office building and an associated parking lot there.

On October 20, 2011, petitioner Tanneesha L. Campbell pleaded guilty to two counts of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1))[1] for conduct that occurred in July and August of 2011. On November 21, 2011, the court sentenced her to county jail for a term of 16 months under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment) (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 1). (§ 1170, subd. (h).) The trial court also awarded Campbell 82 days actual days of credits, and 40 days of conduct credits. At sentencing, counsel for Campbell requested that Campbell receive credits at a day-for-day rate, but the court rejected the argument and set credits at a rate earning less credits.
Campbell contends she is entitled to relief because her sentence to county jail under Realignment denied her conduct credits she would have received had she been sentenced to state prison. She alleges that she is entitled to day-for-day credits under the former version of section 2933, subdivision (e), and that denying her these credits is a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and equal protection. We requested an informal written response from respondent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b)(1).) Respondent concedes that Campbell is entitled to relief.

Ray Coles appeals from a judgment convicting him of battery with serious bodily injury and a finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. He argues the judgment must be reversed based on numerous claimed errors, including the following. First, his counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to present eyewitness and impeachment evidence. Second, the trial court committed instructional error by (1) refusing his request for instruction on the defense of accident, (2) improperly instructing on causation for the personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, and (3) giving a flight instruction. Third, the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him at length about his procurement of cocaine, and his counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to request a mistrial or a limiting instruction based on this cross-examination. Defendant also asserts he did not receive a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of error, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his new trial motion.
We reject defendant's claims of reversible error and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Curtis Brown called the California State Automobile Association (CSAA) and reported that he had run out of gas and had parked on the side of the road. When he returned with some gas, he found his car had been side-swiped and his stereo and clothing had been taken. CSAA paid him $689 for the stereo and stolen clothing and $6,062 for the vehicle damage. It was determined that defendant had staged the accident as well as the thefts.
Pursuant to a plea bargain whereby defendant stipulated to a sentence of four years and the dismissal of other counts, he pleaded no contest to making false or fraudulent claims (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(5)) and admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
Defendant waived time for judgment and the court sentenced him to state prison for four years,[1] ordered him to pay restitution of $6,751, and imposed fines, fees, and assessments as set forth in detail in the abstract of judgment.
Defendant appealed and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from defendant. We have undertaken an examination of the entire record and find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

Defendant Christopher Michael Smithers pleaded guilty to felony resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 69) and admitted a prior strike conviction. He was sentenced to a term of 32 months in state prison. He appeals, contending the trial court erred by failing to award him presentence custody credits as a result of a parole hold that was placed on him at the time of his arrest. We agree and remand the matter for resentencing.
Facts and Proceedings

Defendant Sandy Lee Morris, Jr., asks us to reverse his conviction of first degree robbery and participating in a criminal street gang because he allegedly was not brought to trial timely. Due to a court clerk's calendaring error, the trial court, without objection from the parties, set a trial date on the 62nd day after defendant was arraigned, two days beyond the 60-day limit established by Penal Code section 1382.[1] Defendant claims the court wrongly denied his subsequent motion to dismiss the case and thereby violated his speedy trial right provided him by section 1382. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Christina G. (mother) appeals the juvenile court order denying her modification petition, terminating her parental rights, and establishing adoption as the permanent plan for her minor child Christian S. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 366.26, 388.) Mother contends the court abused its discretion in denying her modification petition, and erred in failing to find that the parental benefit exception to adoption applied (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We affirm.