CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Felipe Jesus Villasenor appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).)[1] He claims the delay between his arrest and the trial violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial. He further claims the admission of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct against a different victim under Evidence Code section 1108 violated his right to due process.
We affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent Porfirio Enrique Collado on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Collado was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
Counsel did not provide the court with any specific information to assist it with its independent review pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant Joaquin Manuel Rodriguez‑Rojas appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of three counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14 years, one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child by oral copulation, and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child by sexual penetration by a foreign object. As to the counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14 years, the jury found true the allegation defendant committed substantial sexual conduct with a child within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8). (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant challenges the judgment on the ground the trial court erred by sentencing him to consecutive 15‑year‑to‑life terms for the aggravated sexual assault of a child by oral copulation count and the aggravated sexual assault of a child by sexual penetration by a foreign object count.[1]

Elizabeth seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to her one-year-old daughter, G. We deny the petition.

Lacy W. (mother) appeals juvenile court exit orders terminating dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4,[1] awarding sole legal and physical custody of her daughter Pamela to Pamela's father, John P., and granting mother once a week, two-hour, visits with Pamela, which visits could not be increased in length or frequency unless mother establishes independent housing and is consistent with her counseling appointments. The visitation order further states that if disputes arise regarding custody or visitation, the parties are required to contact Tulare County Family Court Services and participate in mediation before filing further proceedings.
Mother contends the exit orders must be reversed because the juvenile court: (1) did not have authority to award custody of Pamela to John because the court never found him to be Pamela's presumed father; and (2) improperly interfered with the family court's jurisdiction by imposing conditions for increasing visitation and limiting the parties' access to the family court. We disagree and affirm.

Parents Michael C. and E. C. appeal from an order terminating their parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to their eight- and nine-year-old sons (the boys).[1] Mother contends the juvenile court found compelling reasons existed not to terminate parental rights, but erroneously disregarded its finding. According to mother, there was substantial evidence of a beneficial relationship between her and the boys (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) to support the court's finding and, therefore, this court should reverse the termination order. Father joins in mother's argument. On review, we disagree and affirm.

On October 18, 2010, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant, Francisco L., committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, subd. (a)(1), count one),[1] resisted a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count two), and committed misdemeanor battery (§ 242, count three). On January 19, 2011, appellant admitted the allegations contingent upon receiving deferred entry of judgment (DEJ).
On February 2, 2011, the juvenile court found appellant unsuitable for DEJ. Appellant, however, reaffirmed his admission of the allegations in the petition. The court found that DEJ was not as restrictive a disposition as the court would like and noted appellant had been in â€

A jury convicted Pedro Evaristo Lopez of numerous crimes related to the molestation of his minor daughter (the victim) that occurred over a period of years. He argues that the judgment must be overturned because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts on three of the counts and because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence provided by the People's expert witness. We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 sets forth orders a court may issue when a minor is adjudged a ward of the court including an order to commit the ward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). At the time the minor here was committed to DJF, subdivision (a)(4) of that section stated that such a commitment was allowed â€

Petitioner R.S. (Mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court's order removing her three children from her custody and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in removing her children from her custody because it did not have clear and convincing evidence there was a substantial danger to the children if they were returned home. Mother requests that the children be returned to her care under family maintenance services. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant, D.R. (Father), appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights and placing his four-year-old son J.R. for adoption. Father claims insufficient evidence supports the court's determination that the parental benefit exception to the adoption preference did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)[1] We conclude that substantial evidence supports the determination, and affirm the order.

A jury found defendant Chad Isaac Huber guilty as charged of three counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1-3)[1] and one count of hit and run causing death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subds. (a), (b)(2); count 4). The jury also found defendant had three prior convictions which the trial court found constituted two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(a)), and one prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of 40 years, to be followed by an indeterminate term of 160 years to life in prison.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny S.E., Sr.'s, request to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, S.E., Sr.'s, counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide him the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.