CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant John Patrick Williamson was charged by felony complaint with one count of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; unspecified section references that follow are to this code). It was further alleged that he had a prior first degree burglary conviction which was a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170, subd. (d)), a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)), and an offense for which he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On November 12, 2010, prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant entered into a plea bargain whereby he pleaded no contest to the residential burglary charge in exchange for a state prison sentence of two years (low term) and the dismissal of the prior conviction allegations. The prosecutor stated the prior strike was being dismissed â€

This is the second time these parties have paid us a visit. Last time, we affirmed an order entering summary judgment in favor of Jay Cooper[1] in an age discrimination lawsuit brought by Donna Leek, John Borden, and Cindy Buschmann, but reversed the portion of the judgment awarding attorney fees to Cooper. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 416, 421 (Leek I).) During the pendency of the appeal, Cooper and his attorney, John A. Britton (collectively, Cooper), sought a writ of execution and obtained orders directing Leek, Borden, and Buschmann (collectively, Leek) to submit to debtor's examinations. The trial court then granted Leek's motion for a protective order preventing the examinations, ruling that the appeal automatically stayed enforcement of the judgment.
Not satisfied with that victory, Leek filed a second lawsuit, this time alleging causes of action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (emotional distress), each arising out of Cooper's attempt to conduct the debtor's examinations. Cooper moved to strike the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.[2] The trial court granted Cooper's motion and awarded attorney fees and costs to Cooper. Leek appeals. Leek challenges the trial court's order striking the complaint and awarding attorney fees and costs to Cooper.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Epperson was terminated from his position as a correctional sergeant employed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) at High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California, as a result of an incident during transportation of an inmate at the prison's administrative segregation unit. The termination was upheld by the State Personnel Board (the board).
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate to overturn the board's decision. He contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it found his testimony was not credible, he knowingly failed to include the use of force in his written reports in an effort to cover up another officer's improper use of force, and his dismissal was appropriate. Since the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Mother appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights in her child, C.P., and denying her request for a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] Mother asserts that the court denied her due process when it terminated her parental rights without a contested hearing, and it erred in terminating parental rights before an adoption home study was completed. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Defendant Dale Heller appeals an order denying his motion to strike causes of action in a civil case filed against him by plaintiffs Elaine Keith and Randall Shepard. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).)[1] Keith and Shepard alleged several causes of action, including defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, relating to Heller's act of distributing packets of information to his neighbors about an injunction Keith sought against Heller.
We conclude, among other things, that the trial court erred because Heller met his burden of establishing that his actions were protected conduct that fell within the first prong of his anti-SLAPP motion. The court should have held a hearing on the second stage of the anti-SLAPP motion to determine whether Keith and Shepard had met their burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits. We reverse and remand.

Antonio Gonzales appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1)[1] and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Appellant stipulated that he suffered a prior section 314, subdivision (1) conviction. The court sentenced him to 4 years 4 months in state prison (a 3-year base term for indecent exposure; and one 8-month term for each of his other offenses (indecent exposure and possession of a controlled sentence).

A jury convicted appellant John Thomas Jordan III of the voluntary manslaughter of Steve Moore and found true the allegation that he had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. Appellant contends that we must reverse his conviction because the trial court failed to instruct on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm.

Bradley Zook appeals the judgment following his convictions for arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)),[1] first degree residential burglary (§ 459), and conspiracy to commit grand theft (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found to be true an allegation that he took, damaged or destroyed property valued in excess of $200,000. (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2).) The trial court found to be true allegations that he had two prior serious or violent felony convictions for purposes of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and one prior conviction for purposes of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Zook was sentenced to a prison term of 72 years to life. The sentence consisted of 25 years to life for the arson plus 10 years for the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement and two years for the section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2) enhancement, and 25 years to life for the burglary plus 10 years for the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement. All terms were ordered to run consecutively. The section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2) allegation was dismissed as to the burglary, and the section 667.5 allegation was stricken. The sentence for taking, damaging or destroying property was stayed pursuant to section 654.

Defendant Jefferson Hull appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] in count 1. Defendant was found not guilty of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) in count 2, but he was convicted of the lesser included offenses of misdemeanor simple assault and battery (§§ 240, 242).[2] The jury found not true the allegation in count 1 that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).[3]
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the upper term of four years on count 1. The court granted the People's motion to dismiss count 2 and the prior conviction and prior prison term allegations.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct on accomplice testimony. We affirm.

Ponani Sukumar appeals an order granting special motions to strike his complaint for malicious prosecution and an order awarding attorney fees and costs to the defendants prevailing on the motions. His complaint is yet another chapter in a long‑running saga of litigation between Ponani Sukumar and his former wife, Saraswati Sukumar.[1] Ponani's malicious prosecution complaint arises from Sara's prior malicious prosecution action against him, which in turn arose from Ponani's cross‑complaint for indemnity filed in an action for breach of contract by Shih-Hua Alan Lee against Ponani and Sara.
Ponani contends the evidence in the record is sufficient to support a determination that Sara pursued her malicious prosecution action against him without probable cause and with malice. He also contends the denial of his request for leave to conduct discovery on the issue of malice was error. We conclude that the evidence in the record compels the conclusion that Sara had probable cause to sue Ponani for malicious prosecution and that he therefore cannot show a probability of prevailing on his complaint against her. We therefore will affirm the orders granting the special motions to strike and awarding attorney fees and costs.

Plaintiff and appellant Lisa Fisher, the former attorney of decedent Rami Rodriguez, appeals from an order dismissing her complaint for defamation against defendants and respondents Steven H. Haney and the law firm of Haney, Buchanan & Patterson (collectively the â€

Defendant Christopher Lee Kennedy appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegations that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait, and during the course of a robbery and kidnapping (id., § 190.2, subds. (a)(15), (17)). Defendant was also found guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime (id., § 182, subd. (a)(1)), with the jury finding one or more of the alleged overt acts to be true. In addition, the jury found him guilty of robbery (id., § 211), kidnapping to commit a crime (id., § 209, subd. (b)(1)), and arson causing great bodily injury (id., § 451, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted the truth of the two prior strike convictions (id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The jury deadlocked as to penalty, and the People ultimately elected not to retry the penalty phase of the trial.
The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the murder and imposed a concurrent indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison for the conspiracy. It imposed a concurrent indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison for the kidnapping and a concurrent term of nine years for the arson causing great bodily injury, and it stayed a determinate term of three years for the robbery.[1]
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the statements of Ronald Kupsch[2] and admitting evidence of racist gangs. We find no error and affirm.

Dawn McIntyre (McIntyre), a former employee of the Sonoma Valley Unified School District (the District), filed a petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) to compel the District to reinstate her as a permanent tenured teacher. The primary issue in this case is whether the District had a mandatory duty under the Education Code to classify McIntyre as a â€

Jason Broadbent appeals his conviction, which followed his no contest plea to a violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a),[1] using personal identifying information for an unlawful purpose. He argues that his constitutional equal protection rights require the retroactive application of section 4019, as amended in October 2011, to award him additional conduct credits, despite its stated prospective application. He also argues we must reverse and remand for resentencing because he was sentenced based on a materially inaccurate characterization of the facts underlying his prior â€