CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and Appellant Kristine Adams (Adams) has filed two lawsuits against Newport Crest Homeowners Association and certain others, and three appeals. The trial court dismissed the first lawsuit as having been settled, even though the parties continued to squabble. (Adams v. Newport Crest Homeowners Association (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2007, No. 05CC05516) (Case No. 05CC05516).) In our decision in the first appeal, we affirmed the dismissal. (Adams v. Newport Crest Homeowners Association (Sept. 9, 2009, G039956) [nonpub. opn.].)
Adams filed a second lawsuit having to do with the settlement agreement in Case No. 05CC05516, as well as certain related matters. (Adams v. Newport Crest Homeowners Association (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2008, No. 07CC01390) (Case No. 07CC01390).)[1] In Case No. 07CC01390, the trial court granted a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 anti-SLAPP motion with respect to three out of the 15 defendants, and dismissed that lawsuit as against those three defendants. In her second appeal, Adams challenged the dismissal and we affirmed. (Kristine L. Adams v. Scott L. Ghormley (Feb. 8, 2011, G040

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that D.G., a minor, possessed marijuana for sale. The court adjudged D.G. a ward of the court and placed her on probation. On appeal, D.G. contends (1) the prosecutor and the court failed to notify D.G. and her mother of D.G.'s eligibility for Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ); (2) the court failed to consider whether D.G. was suitable for DEJ; and (3) D.G.'s written statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. We agree with D.G.'s first two contentions and will remand to allow the juvenile court to consider whether D.G. is suitable for DEJ.

This appeal has been taken from an order that sustained OneWest Bank and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company's (defendants) demurrer to all of the causes of action of plaintiff's third amended complaint without leave to amend. We find that the demurrer was properly sustained, and no reasonable possibility exists that plaintiff may be able to state causes of action against defendants for wrongful foreclosure, fraud, unfair business practices, or to quiet title. We therefore conclude that the action was properly dismissed in its entirety, and affirm the judgment.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that D.G., a minor, possessed marijuana for sale. The court adjudged D.G. a ward of the court and placed her on probation. On appeal, D.G. contends (1) the prosecutor and the court failed to notify D.G. and her mother of D.G.'s eligibility for Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ); (2) the court failed to consider whether D.G. was suitable for DEJ; and (3) D.G.'s written statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. We agree with D.G.'s first two contentions and will remand to allow the juvenile court to consider whether D.G. is suitable for DEJ.

The juvenile court committed appellant, Bryson H., to the Department of Corrections, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after appellant admitted violating his probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)) by making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422)[1].
On appeal, appellant contends: 1) the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the DJJ; and 2) he is entitled to additional predisposition custody credit. We find merit to this last contention. In all other respects, we will affirm.

Tommy Jackson Nichols appeals following resentencing. We will modify the judgment by striking the parole revocation restitution fine and order that the abstract of judgment be amended to correct various errors, but otherwise affirm.

Appellant Jason Lee Mitchem appeals from his conviction for receipt of stolen property on two grounds: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Mitchem was the target of a search warrant unrelated to the charges brought against him, and (2) the trial court erred in finding that Mitchem's Miranda[1] waiver and statements made at a police interview were voluntary despite his being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time. Mitchem also contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reduce the amount of the security fees imposed, which the People concede. We affirm the judgment and direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the proper amount for the court security fees imposed.

On September 1, 2010, a first amended complaint charged defendant and appellant Stephen James Lattin with battery with serious bodily injury under Penal Code[1] section 243, subdivision (d) (count 1); and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury under section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). The complaint also alleged as to count 2 that defendant had inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under section 12022.7, subdivision (a).

Timothy Bishop (defendant) seeks relief from a $411.96 criminal justice administration or â€

Defendant and appellant Bonny Sue Hathaway pled guilty to petty theft with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 666.)[1] She also admitted that she had served one prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) She was placed on probation for a term of 36 months and was ordered to participate in drug court. A petition to revoke probation was subsequently filed alleging defendant's failure to participate in drug court. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing, and a bench warrant was issued. Defendant subsequently appeared in custody and admitted the violation. She was ordered to remain in custody for one week, at which time she would return to drug court and be reinstated on probation. Defendant failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and her probation was revoked. She later appeared in custody and admitted that she violated probation again by failing to appear at the drug court review. The court reinstated her on probation again, but modified her probation terms to delete the drug court requirement; instead, she was required to serve 365 days in county jail. Defendant was ordered to surrender, but she failed to appear. The court revoked her probation. Approximately two months later, defendant appeared in custody and admitted a violation of probation. The court terminated her probation and sentenced her to the low term of one year four months, plus one year on the prison prior, for a total state prison sentence of two years four months. She was awarded 176 days of presentence custody credits.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. She subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus (case No. E054273), which this court granted.[2] We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Toni Lang appeals after the trial court granted nonsuit to defendant and respondent Quality Car Co., Inc. (the dealer), in plaintiff's action for breach of contract or warranty and violation of the lemon law, concerning plaintiff's purchase of a used car. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant David Angelo Villarreal appeals after he pleaded guilty to theft. As part of his sentence, defendant was ordered to pay $1,500 in restitution to compensate the victim for moving expenses. Defendant contends that this restitution order was improper. He argues that the victim was caused to move by (1) crimes committed by other persons, and/or by (2) criminal conduct of which he was not convicted. Thus, he argues, the criminal conduct of which he was convicted was not related to or did not cause the victim to incur the expense, and the restitution order was therefore improper. We disagree. Whether or not other actors may also have committed crimes that may have contributed to the victim's decision to move, and even if defendant was not charged with or convicted of other crimes (e.g., criminal threats) that contributed to her decision to move, the criminal conduct that he did commit had a sufficient causal nexus to the victim's economic loss to support the restitution order. The context of his crime was a series of threats to the victim that she must move or her house would be burned down. In that context, defendant's criminal conduct--theft of a blowtorch--was responsible for the victim's loss. We affirm.

Plaintiff Joshua Duke (Duke) challenges his termination as a police officer for the City of Ontario (Ontario) in the year 2000, nearly 12 years ago. The basis for the termination was Ontario's contention that Duke supplied his underage stepson and friends with confiscated driver's licenses or identification cards to gain admission to bars and casinos.
After years of procedural skirmishing, the Ontario City Council conducted a public hearing and issued a written decision in December 2006, upholding the termination and rejecting an arbitrator's recommendation to reinstate Duke. In March 2007, Duke filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. In July 2009, the trial court issued a written decision also upholding Duke's termination. The court entered judgment in September 2010.
On appeal, Duke â€

A jury convicted defendant, Jeff Duffett, of three counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor (the first victim) and three counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on another minor (the second victim) (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).[1] The jury further found true an allegation that defendant victimized more than one minor (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted having suffered a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)). He was sentenced to prison for two terms of 30 years to life and appeals claiming evidence was erroneously admitted and his motion to dismiss his strike prior was improperly denied. We reject his contentions and affirm. The facts involving these offenses, except as discussed in connection with the issues, are irrelevant to this appeal.