<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html > <head> <title>Save Our Chinatown Com</title> </head> <body> <div> <br/> <br/> <br/> <br/><b >Save Our </b><b >Chinatown</b><b > Com. v. City of </b><b >Riverside</b><b ></b> <br/> <br/> <br/> <br/> <br/> <br/> <br/>Filed 3/21/12 Save Our Chinatown Com. v. City of Riverside CA4/2 <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b ><i > </i></b> <br/><b >NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS</b> <br/> <br/> <br/>California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115<b >.</b> <br/> <br/><b > </b> <br/><b > </b> <br/><b >IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF </b><b >CALIFORNIA</b><b ></b> <br/><b > </b> <br/><b >FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT</b> <br/><b > </b> <br/><b >DIVISION TWO</b> <br/> <br/> <table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0 > <tr > <td width=319 valign=top > <br/>SAVE OUR CHINATOWN COMMITTEE, <br/> <br/>Plaintiff and Appellant, <br/> <br/>v. <br/> <br/>CITY OF RIVERSIDE, <br/> <br/>Defendant and Respondent; <br/> <br/>RIVERSIDE COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION, <br/> <br/>Defendant and Appellant; <br/> <br/>JACOBS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., <br/> <br/>Real Party in Interest and Appellant. <br/> </td> <td width=319 valign=top > <br/> <br/> <br/>E049816 <br/> <br/>(Super.Ct.No. RIC512553) <br/> <br/><b >OPINION</b> </td> </tr> </table> <br/> <br clear=all > <br/> <table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0 > <tr > <td width=319 valign=top > <br/>SAVE OUR CHINATOWN COMMITTEE, <br/> <br/> Plaintiff and Respondent, <br/> <br/>v. <br/> <br/>RIVERSIDE COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION, <br/> <br/> Defendant and Appellant. <br/> </td> <td width=319 valign=top > <br/> <br/> <br/> E050962 <br/> <br/> </td> </tr> </table> <br/> <br/>APPEAL from the Superior Court of <a href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Riverside County</a>. Sharon J. Waters, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions. <br/>Johnson & Sedlack, Raymond W. Johnson, Abigail A. Broedling, and Kimberly A. Foy for Plaintiff and Appellant. <br/>Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, John W. Dietrich, and Jennifer D. Cantrell for Defendant and Appellant. <br/>Best Best & Krieger, Michelle Ouellette, Melissa R. Cushman, and Alisha M. Winterswyk for Real Party in Interest and Appellant. <br/>Gregory P. Priamos, City Attorney, and Kristi J. Smith, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent. <br/>The corner of Brockton and Tequesquite Avenues was once the site of Riverside’s historic Chinatown. Now, it is a vacant lot. Jacobs Development Company, Inc. (Jacobs) entered into an agreement to buy the property from the Riverside County Office of Education (the County). Jacobs proposes to combine the County’s parcel with a smaller, adjacent parcel and to build a medical office building and an associated parking lot there. <br/>Pursuant to the <a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">California Environmental Quality Act</a> (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), the City of Riverside (the City) prepared an environmental impact statement (EIR) for the project. The EIR concluded that, as a mitigation measure, an archaeologist should prepare a plan for the excavation, analysis, and curation of any archaeological resources. It further concluded, however, that even with mitigation, the project would have significant adverse environmental effects on archaeological resources. The City adopted a statement of overriding considerations (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (b)), finding that the benefits of the project outweighed its adverse environmental effects, and approved the project. <br/>The Save Our Chinatown Committee (the Committee) then filed this proceeding against the County, the City, and Jacobs, alleging (among other things) that (1) the County’s sale of the property to Jacobs violated various provisions of the Education Code dealing with the sale of surplus property, and (2) the City’s approval of the project violated various aspects of CEQA. <br/>The trial court ruled that the County had violated the surplus property provisions. Accordingly, it set aside the purchase and sale agreement. However, it found no CEQA violation. It also awarded the Committee attorney fees. <br/>In this appeal: <br/>1. The County contends: <br/> a. The trial court erred by finding that the County had violated the surplus property provisions of the Education Code and by setting aside the purchase and sale agreement as a remedy for the violation. <br/> b. The trial court’s judgment and writ of mandate are “void for vagueness.” (Capitalization omitted.) <br/>2. The Committee contends: <br/> a. The EIR’s rejection of the project alternatives was not adequately explained and was not supported by substantial evidence. <br/> b. The EIR failed to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives. <br/> c. The EIR failed to consider and respond to alternatives suggested by the public. <br/> d. The EIR improperly deferred mitigation. <br/> e. The City erred by adopting a statement of overriding considerations because there was insufficient evidence of the nature and effect of the deferred mitigation. <br/>3. Jacobs and the County both contend that the trial court’s award of attorney fees was erroneous, and the County also contends that the award of costs was erroneous. <br/>We will hold that the surplus property provisions of the Education Code do not apply to the County, because it is not a school district. We will further hold that some (though not all) of the Committee’s contentions regarding the EIR are well taken. In particular, the EIR rejected several alternatives involving the reconfiguration of the project, on the theory that any development whatsoever would require “overexcavation” of the entire site and thus would entail the removal of any remaining archaeological resources. This conclusion, however, was not supported — indeed, it was contradicted — by the geotechnical report on which the EIR purported to rely. As the Committee correctly contends, “The City . . . reached the unsupported conclusion that[, as a result of soils onsite,] no alternatives would substantially reduce impacts to cultural resources . . . , an opinion completely unsupported by substantial evidence in the record yet repeated <i >ad nauseam</i>.” These holdings require us to reverse the awards of costs and attorney fees; thus, the parties’ contentions regarding costs and attorney fees are moot. <br/>I <br/>FACTUAL BACKGROUND <br/>A. <i >Historic Chinatown</i>. <br/>In 1885, Chinese leaders acquired 6.3 acres of land (the Chinatown tract), which became Riverside’s historic Chinatown. The Chinatown tract was bordered on the north by Evergreen Cemetery, on the east by Pine Street, on the south by Tequesquite Avenue, and on the east by Brockton Avenue. The principal buildings of Chinatown were on the east side; the west side was mainly used for farming, gardening, and camping. <br/>It is estimated that, during the height of Chinatown, in the 1890s, some 400 to 500 people lived there. By the 1920’s, however, only about 40 residents remained, and by about 1940, there was only one — Wong Ho Leun (also known as George Wong). Wong purchased the entire Chinatown tract. He covered much of the east side with fill dirt. In 1967, he leased the southeastern corner, at Brockton and Tequesquite, to an oil company, which used it as a Chevron gas station until 1973. Wong died in 1974. In 1978, the last remaining Chinatown building was demolished. <br/>In 1980, the County purchased the entire Chinatown tract. In 1981, it built a maintenance and operations facility on the west end. In 1984, it authorized the installation of a parking lot over the central portion. The east end (the property), measuring about 3.2 acres, remained a vacant lot. <br/>The installation of the parking lot awakened public concern about preserving Chinatown. As a result, in 1984-1985, archaeologists excavated portions of the Chinatown tract. They focused on the central parking lot portion, which, unlike the east side, had largely escaped being covered with fill dirt. However, one test trench was dug under the fill dirt; it revealed a “wall stub.” In the opinion of the archaeologists, there were probably additional archaeological resources on the east side, which the fill dirt had effectively sealed and protected. <br/>In 1990, the property was added to the National Register of Historic Places. It had already been designated as a city landmark, a county landmark, and a state point of historical interest. The City and the County agreed, in principle, that the City would buy the property and use it to create a “Chinatown Historical Park.” Negotiations, however, broke down, and this plan came to naught. <br/>B. <i >The Purchase and Sale Agreement</i>. <br/>In May 1999, the County declared the property surplus and adopted a resolution of intent to sell it. The resolution set July 20, 1999, as the deadline for submitting written bids and provided that the County would consider all written bids at its public meeting on July 21, 1999. No bids were submitted by that date, or for years thereafter. Suddenly, however, between March and May 2005, the County received four bids. The highest bid was submitted by Jacobs. <br/>In July 2007, the County and Jacobs entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of the property (the purchase and sale agreement). The purchase and sale agreement gave Jacobs up to three years before close of escrow to obtain all entitlements necessary to develop the property with a medical office building. <br/>Meanwhile, in September 2006, Jacobs had already applied to the City for approval of the construction of a medical office building. The proposed site (the site) consisted of the property, plus a smaller adjacent parcel to the north (the northern parcel).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><b >^{<b >^[1]</b>}</b></a> (See appendix A, <i >post</i>, p. 58.) The building would be in the southeast corner, at the corner of Brockton and Tequesquite. It would occupy approximately 12 percent of the site. Most of the rest of the site would be a parking lot. <br/>Under the Downtown Specific Plan (the specific plan), most or all of the site was designated as part of the Health Care District. Because the specific plan required new buildings in the Health Care District to be in a “similar genre” to certain existing buildings, the proposed building design had a faintly Spanish flavor, with arches and a tile roof. <br/>C. <i >The Draft and Final EIR’s</i>. <br/>Jacobs’s application triggered the preparation of an EIR. The draft and final EIR’s were prepared by Jones & Stokes. In 2007, Jones & Stokes conducted an exploratory archaeological excavation of the east end of the property. They found that the soil had been disturbed by the construction and subsequent removal of the gas station and its associated underground storage tank. However, they did find some artifacts from Chinatown — brick wall footings, part of a brick pavement, Go game pieces, and a glass bottle. They concluded, “[I]t appears that intact deposits extend to the east and possibly the north into areas that were not explored during our excavation.” <br/>In April 2008, the draft EIR was completed and made available for public comment. <br/>According to the draft EIR, the project objectives were: <br/>1. “[T]o develop a medical office facility . . .”; <br/>2. “[T]o provide jobs . . .”; <br/>3. “[T]o develop an underutilized vacant parcel in downtown Riverside in accordance with the applicable land use plans, development standards, and the Downtown Specific Plan (DSP)”; <br/>4. “[T]o develop the site with a use that is compatible with surrounding medical and health care uses”; and <br/>5. “[T]o minimize impacts, to the greatest extent possible, to the remnants of Riverside’s Chinatown that remain buried beneath the site.” <br/>The draft EIR concluded that the project had potentially significant environmental impacts with regard to aesthetics, air quality, hazardous materials, noise, traffic, and cultural resources. It also concluded, however, that after mitigation, the project’s only significant impacts would be on cultural resources: “The project will result in an adverse change to a historical and archaeological resource, the Riverside Chinatown.” <br/>The draft EIR found that “[i]ntact significant archaeological deposits remain on the site . . . .”<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><b >^{<b >^[2]</b>}</b></a> It also found that “[t]he proposed project will have a significant impact on the buried, intact archaeological deposits . . . that are located within the project’s construction footprint. The impacts will result from subsurface excavation for the medical building itself, trenching for utilities, excavation for vaults, and compaction of soils over much of the project site.” <br/>As a mitigation measure, the draft EIR required Jacobs to prepare and implement a “treatment plan.” The treatment plan had to be drafted by an archaeologist and approved by the City. The draft EIR featured guidelines for the treatment plan, including the following: <br/>1. Under the direction of a qualified archaeologist, the “Area of Potential Direct Impact” would be excavated. This was defined as “the areas that will be affected by project construction,” and further defined as “the areas that will be excavated below grade for construction of the medical facility, utility lines, utility vaults, parking facility, and other excavations associated with construction.” <br/>2. “[A]ny discoveries [would be] marked, recorded, and given a designation . . . .” <br/>3. “[A]nalysis of the recovered materials w[ould] be conducted . . . .” <br/>4. A “cultural resources report[],” which would include an “artifact catalog” and “artifact analysis,” would be prepared. The EIR laid out detailed requirements for the contents of the cultural resources report. <br/>5. The archaeologist would “prepare the collection for curation in accordance with the guidelines established by the Riverside Metropolitan Museum.” <br/>6. The archaeologist would coordinate the transfer of “the collection and its associated documentation” to the Riverside Metropolitan Museum. <br/>7. Construction would be subject to archaeological monitoring; an archaeological monitoring plan, to be included in the treatment plan, would specify “what procedures will be followed when intact archaeological features are located during construction.” <br/>Also as a mitigation measure, the draft EIR required Jacobs “to integrate [the following] historical interpretive measures into the site plan”: <br/>1. A “Chinese pocket garden with lantern post or birdhouse” and “Chinese heritage landscap[ing]”; <br/>2. A “[h]istoric walk, which may include bronze plaques set in the sidewalk”; <br/>3. A “Chinatown artifact display area inside the building lobby, which will feature rotating exhibits containing archaeological artifacts from excavations that take place on the site”; <br/>4. A “Chinese rock garden sitting area”; and <br/>5. A page on the Riverside Metropolitan Museum’s website regarding “the results of the Chinatown archaeological excavations . . . .” <br/>In September 2008, the final EIR was completed. The final EIR modified the project in several respects. In response to comments that Spanish styling was inappropriate, the design was revised so as feature “clean lines and simple detailing with . . . elements that evoke a traditional Chinese construction style.” As additional mitigation measures, Jacobs was required to include: <br/>1. A “display area” on every floor of the building, which would include “items such as a computer kiosk for digital information about the site’s history, artifact displays, photographs, and plaques . . . .” <br/>2. An “interpretive garden.” The footprint of the building was shifted 10 feet north, to make more room for the interpretive garden.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><b >^{<b >^[3]</b>}</b></a> <br/>On October 7, 2008, the City certified the final EIR, adopted a statement of overriding considerations, and approved the project. <br/>In February 2009, the City approved and adopted the treatment plan. The treatment plan provided for the excavation of the entire property. It allowed for the discard of the following items, unless “they have heritage or educational value”: <br/>1. “[A]rtifacts less than 45 years old . . . .” <br/>2. “Glass and ceramic sherds smaller than 1 inch in diameter that have no unusual or distinctive qualities[] and that lack markings or decoration . . . .” <br/>3. “Construction materials including: wood; window glass; amorphous, melted or fragmentary metal; brick; plaster; concrete paving stone; mortar; sewer pipe; and other construction materials.” <br/>II <br/>PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND <br/>The Committee filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, naming the City, the County, and Jacobs as defendants and/or real parties in interest. As an affirmative defense, all defendants alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. <br/>The trial court granted a preliminary injunction. <br/>After briefing and argument, the trial court issued a written statement of decision. It found that the County had “failed to comply with statutory requirements regarding its sale of surplus property to Jacobs.” It therefore directed the County “to set aside the Purchase and Sale Agreement . . . .” However, it rejected the Committee’s CEQA claims against the City based largely on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">^{^[4]}</a> The trial court entered judgment accordingly and issued a writ of mandate. The County appealed; the Committee cross-appealed. <br/>The Committee then filed a motion for attorney fees on a “private attorney general” theory. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.) After hearing argument, the trial court awarded the Committee $43,200 in attorney fees against the County and Jacobs, jointly and severally. The County and Jacobs appealed. <br/>III <br/>THE PROVISIONS OF THE EDUCATION CODE <br/>REGARDING THE SALE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY <br/>The County contends that the trial court erred by ruling that it violated statutory requirements for the sale of surplus property. <br/>A. <i >Statutory Background</i>. <br/>Part 10.5, chapter 4 of the Education Code, comprising sections 17385 through 17561, is entitled “Property: Sale, Lease, Exchange.” We will refer to these sections as the surplus property provisions. <br/>The surplus property provisions — in broad general outline, and subject to various exceptions — require the following. <br/>Before a “school district” may sell real property, it must appoint an advisory committee. (Ed. Code, § 17388.) The advisory committee must, among other things, determine what real property of the district is surplus and hold hearings regarding acceptable uses of the surplus real property. (Ed. Code, § 17390.) <br/>The “school district” must offer the property first for park and recreational purposes. (Ed. Code, § 17464, subd. (a).) Second, it must offer it to various public entities and nonprofit charities. (<i >Id.</i>, subd. (b).) “Third, the property may be disposed of in any other manner authorized by law.” (<i >Id.</i>, subd. (c).) <br/>The “governing board” must adopt a resolution declaring its intent to sell the property. (Ed. Code, § 17466.) “The resolution shall fix a time not less than three weeks thereafter for a public meeting of the governing board to be held at its regular place of meeting, at which sealed proposals to purchase or lease will be received and considered.” (<i >Ibid</i>.) <br/>“At the time and place fixed in the resolution for the meeting of the governing body, all sealed proposals which have been received shall, in public session, be opened, examined, and declared by the board. . . . [T]he proposal which is the highest . . . shall be finally accepted, unless . . . the board rejects all bids.” (Ed. Code, § 17472.) “The final acceptance by the governing body may be made either at the same session or at any adjourned session of the same meeting held within the 10 days next following.” (Ed. Code, § 17475.) <br/>The surplus property provisions lay out what should happen if no proposals are received in response to a resolution of intent to <i >lease</i>. (Ed. Code, § 17477.) However, they do not specifically provide for the eventuality that no proposals are received in response to a resolution of intent to <i >sell</i>. The trial court essentially ruled that the County’s compliance with the surplus property provisions in 1999 was <i >functus officio</i> once no bids were received by the date specified in the resolution and that a new round of compliance was required before the County could sell the property in 2007. <br/>B. <i >Analysis</i>. <br/>The County contends that the trial court erred in invalidating the purchase and sale agreement based on the violation of the surplus property provisions. It offers a variety of arguments in support of this contention. One is that the surplus property provisions do not apply to the County, because it is a county office of education, not a school district. Because we conclude that this argument is meritorious, we do not discuss the County’s other arguments. <br/>As the County admits, it failed to raise this argument in the trial court. However, we have discretion to consider an issue for the first time on appeal when it involves a question of law based on undisputed facts. (<i >Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc.</i> (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 24.) This is such an issue, and we exercise our discretion to consider it. <br/>The Constitution and the Education Code contemplate that each county will have a county board of education (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 7; Ed. Code, § 1000) and a county superintendent of schools. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 3; Ed. Code, § 1200 et seq.) The board of education (as governing body) and the superintendent of schools (as chief executive officer) jointly administer the county office of education. A county office of education provides various services for school districts in the county. (See Ed. Code, §§ 1600-1606, 1700-1946, 2400-2403; see also <http://www.cde.ca.gov/re/sd/co/coes.asp>, as of Mar. 14, 2012.) <br/>Under certain circumstances, a county office of education may operate schools — for example, when the county as a whole constitutes a single unified school district. When acting in this capacity, the county office of education is treated as if it were a school district. (Ed. Code, §§ 1000, 1791, 1792, 1906.) Otherwise, however, a county office of education and a school district are distinct entities. <br/>Some of the applicable provisions of the surplus property provisions, by their terms, refer to school districts. (Ed. Code, §§ 17388, 17464.) Indeed, the very first provision, Education Code section 17385, states: “<i >The governing board of any</i> <i >school district</i> shall receive in the name of the district conveyances for all property received and purchased by it, <i >and shall make in the name of the district conveyances of all property belonging to the district and sold by it</i>.” (Italics added.) Other related provisions of the surplus property provisions similarly apply specifically to school districts. (E.g., Ed. Code, §§ 17463 [use of proceeds from sale of surplus real property], 17470 [school district must give notice to former owners of intent to sell real property], 17482 [school district may sell historic building to nonprofit organization].) <br/>Admittedly, Education Code sections 17466 and 17477 refer only to a “governing board”; they do not specify the governing board of <i >what</i>. The Committee claims that Education Code section 78 defines “governing board” as including a county board of education. Not so. Education Code section 78 states: “‘Governing board’ means board of school trustees, community college board of trustees, and city, <i >and city and county board of education</i>.” (Italics added.) There is only one “city and county board of education,” because there is only one “city and county” in California — San Francisco. Thus, this definition is limited to city-level or school-district-level boards; it is not intended to encompass county-level boards. <br/>In any event, this definition does not apply when “the context otherwise requires . . . .” (Ed. Code, § 10.) When these sections are taken in context — among related statutes referring to a school district — they can only be understood as referring to the governing board of a school district. <br/>We also note that most of the provisions dealing with the acceptance of bids refer to a “governing <i >body</i>,” not a “governing <i >board</i>.” That includes Education Code section 17472 and 17475, which the Committee is claiming were violated here, as well as Education Code section 17476 and 17578. This indicates that the Legislature did not intend the definition of “governing board” in Education Code section 78 to apply to these provisions. <br/>The Legislature may, when it chooses, make a statute applicable to county offices of education as well as school districts. Generally, however, it has done so explicitly. (E.g., Ed. Code, §§ 224.5, subd. (a), 14600, subd. (b), 17920.) Sometimes it uses the umbrella term “local agency” or “local education agency” to include both county offices of education and school districts. (e.g., Ed. Code, §§ 421, 7051, 8208, subd. (ak), 8802, subd. (e).) Also, it sometimes defines “school district,” for purposes of a specific section or sections, as including a county office of education. (E.g., Ed. Code, § 17070.15, subd. (m), 17161, subd (e).) Significantly, Education Code section 1279 specifically limits a county office of education’s ability to sell <i >personal</i> property. The Legislature, however, has not used any similar wording to make the surplus property provisions, regarding the sale of <i >real</i> property, applicable to a county office of education. <br/>We did briefly consider whether Education Code section 8771 applies. It requires a county office of education, when selling or otherwise disposing of real or personal property, to follow “the same procedures as are established by law for the sale . . . or other disposition of real or personal property by a school district . . . .” That section, however, was enacted as part of an article entitled, “Outdoor Science, Conservation and Forestry.” Another section of that same article authorizes a county office of education to purchase real property “necessary to conduct classes in outdoor science education and conservation education.” (Ed. Code, § 8768.) And significantly, Education Code section 8772 — the section immediately following Education Code section 8771 — provides, “All proceeds from the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of real or personal property received by the county superintendent of schools <i >pursuant to the provisions of this article</i> shall be used for the purpose of acquiring other real or personal property for use in connection with programs and classes in outdoor science education and conservation education or to pay the cost of conducting such programs and classes.” (Italics added.) It would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to require that the proceeds of <i >any</i> sale of real property be used for these limited purposes. Thus, even though Education Code section 8771 does not explicitly so provide, it must be understood as limited to the sale of property purchased for the purpose of outdoor science and conservation education. <br/>Finally, at oral argument, the Committee argued for the first time that the sale of the property was subject to an entirely different set of surplus property statutes — Government Code sections 54220 through 54232. “‘We need not consider an argument not mentioned in the briefs and raised for the first time at oral argument. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (<i >McCarty v. Department of Transportation</i> (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 986, fn. 11 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) “For obvious reasons of fairness, it is not appropriate to rely upon points not mentioned in the parties’ briefs. [Citations.]” (<i >Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania</i> (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1309.) <br/>Here, since 2008, the Committee has been challenging the sale of the property based on a particular set of statutes. While the County did not argue below that it was not subject to those statutes, it did raise that argument squarely in its opening brief on appeal. The Committee had a full and fair opportunity to raise its present argument in its respondent’s brief, but it did not. If we allowed the Committee to raise the argument belatedly, at oral argument, we would have to allow the County to file supplemental briefing. All of this would unduly delay the resolution of the status of the property. We therefore conclude that the Committee has forfeited any reliance on any other statutes. At the risk of being obvious, we point out that, as a result, we can express no opinion on whether the sale of the property might be invalid under such other statutes. <br/>We therefore conclude that the surplus property provisions did not apply to the County’s sale of the property. Thus, the trial court’s ruling setting aside the purchase and sale agreement must be reversed. We hasten to add that this should not be viewed as any kind of aspersion on the trial court. Once again, the County did not raise this issue below; thus, the trial court had no occasion to consider it. Nevertheless, it would be inequitable to let the purchase and sale agreement remain set aside based on inapplicable statutes. <br/>In light of this outcome, we need not address the County’s contention that the judgment and the writ of mandate are vague. <br/>IV <br/>CEQA ISSUES <br/>A. <i >General Legal Principles</i>. <br/>“‘“The EIR is the heart of CEQA,” and the integrity of the process is dependent on the adequacy of the EIR. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶] The EIR is presumed legally adequate, however [citations], and the agency’s certification of the EIR is presumed correct [citation]. Persons challenging the EIR therefore bear the burden of proving it is legally inadequate and that the agency abused its discretion in certifying it. [Citations.]” (<i >Cherry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont</i> (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 316, 327-328 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) <br/>“‘In determining the adequacy of an EIR, [we] look to whether the report provides decision makers with sufficient analysis to intelligently consider the environmental consequences of a project. [Citation.] . . . “[T]he sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible . . . . The courts have [therefore] looked not for perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The overriding issue on review is thus ‘whether the [lead agency] reasonably and in good faith discussed [a project] in detail sufficient [to enable] the public [to] discern from the [EIR] the “analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (<i >California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of California</i> (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 262 <br/>“We do not review the correctness of the EIR’s environmental conclusions, but only its sufficiency as an informative document. [Citation.] ‘We may not set aside an agency’s approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable. “Our limited function is consistent with the principle that ‘The purpose of CEQA is not to generate paper, but to compel government at all levels to make decisions with environmental consequences in mind. CEQA does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that these decisions will always be those which favor environmental considerations.’” [Citation.] We may not, in sum, substitute our judgment for that of the people and their local representatives. We can and must, however, scrupulously enforce all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements.’ [Citation.]” (<i >Save Round Valley Alliance v. County of Inyo</i> (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1446-1447 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], fn. omitted.) <br/>Under CEQA, the “relocation” of an archaeological resource “such that [its] significance . . . [is] materially impaired” is deemed to be a significant environmental impact. (Guidelines, § 15064.5, subd. (b)(1); see also <i >id</i>., subd. (c).)<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><b >^{<b >^[5]</b>}</b></a> “Preservation in place,” rather than “data recovery through excavation,” “is the preferred manner of mitigating impacts to archaeological sites.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(C).) <br/>B. <i >The EIR’s Analysis of Project Alternatives</i>. <br/>1. <i >Additional factual and procedural background</i>. <br/>The draft EIR concluded that the project would have a significant impact on archaeological resources, due to “subsurface excavation for the medical building itself, trenching for utilities, excavation for vaults, and compaction of soils over much of the project site.” <br/>The draft EIR considered four project alternatives: <br/>1. The “No Project Alternative.” <br/>2. “Development on Pilings”: Using pilings to support the building, so that it would “float” over any archaeological resources. <br/>3. “Reconfiguration of the Site Plan”: Moving the building to the southwest corner, which had been excavated in 2007, and moving the parking lot to the southeast corner, which was where any archaeological resources were likely to be. <br/>4. “Reduced Site”: Eliminating the northern parcel and building a smaller building on the resulting smaller site. <br/>The draft EIR concluded that all of these alternatives (other than the no project alternative) would have essentially the same impacts on archaeological resources as the project itself. <br/>It explained that alternative 2 (development on pilings) would require excavation of “areas for the piling footings, areas directly beneath the proposed building footprint, and areas across the site that would be graded and overexcavated^[<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="">^{^[6]}</a>^] to native land depths.” <br/>It conceded that, in alternative 3 (reconfiguration of the site plan), “impacts to subterranean archaeological resources may be slightly reduced.” However, it explained that “the majority of the site would still need to be graded and overexcavated . . . to minimize soil hazards beyond the building footprint and under parking areas.” <br/>It added that alternative 3 “would place the building at the back of the site, with the surface parking lot dominating the southwest corner of Tequesquite and Brockton Avenues. This . . . is not compatible with the City’s goals and policies for pedestrian-oriented design and walkability by keeping buildings oriented toward the streets in the Downtown Health Care District.” <br/>Finally, with regard to alternative 4 (reduced site), it explained: “While the site may be reduced by one acre, the majority of the former Chinatown artifacts remain on [the property].” <br/>During the public comment period, many commenters suggested turning the site into a historical park. Others suggested that it should be developed as a Chinese cultural center or history center. Some commenters suggested shifting the building’s footprint from the east of the site to the west or building a parking structure. Still other commenters suggested simply building the medical office building somewhere else: “[T]he project may be good. The site is wrong.” <br/>One commenter challenged the rejection of alternative 3 (reconfiguration of the site plan), stating: “Jones & Stokes wrote in a report that even if the building’s moved away onto a different part of the site, the entire site still has to be excavated . . . because of the soil instability. That argument has never been well presented in any of our past meetings. We are, therefore, far from convinced . . . .” <br/>One commenter asked whether the archaeological resources could be preserved by covering the site with asphalt. In response, the final EIR stated, “As stated in previous responses, it will not be possible to develop the site without overexcavating the majority of the site to accommodate adequate soil conditions for development.” <br/>The EIR’s conclusions regarding “overexcavation” were based on a 2006 geotechnical investigation report (the geotechnical report or the report).<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="">^{^[7]}</a> The report stated: <br/>“[I]t is our opinion that the upper undocumented fill and loose soils will not, in their present condition, provide uniform or adequate support for the proposed structures. . . . <br/>“In order to mitigate the settlement potential at the site, it is our recommendation that the proposed structures be supported on one of the following foundation systems: 1) pile foundations, 2) conventional shallow foundations on compacted fill with complete removal of loose soils (to 25 feet or more), or 3) posttensioned slab or grade beam footings supported by compacted fill with partial removal of loose soils. Other measures of liquefaction mitigation would also be utilized. <br/>“Because of the site conditions, it will be necessary to remove, at a minimum, the upper 36 inches of existing native soil in all areas to be graded, regardless of foundation type selected[,] . . . to locate and facilitate removal of undocumented fill, debris, or loose and disturbed soils.” <br/>“To assist in undocumented fill and/or loose soil identification and removal, it is our opinion that all areas to be graded should be subexcavated to a minimum depth of 36 inches bgs.” <br/>“In addition, it is our recommendation that all existing undocumented fills and loose soils under any proposed paved or flatwork area be removed and replaced with properly compacted and controlled fills. If this is not done and any undocumented fills are left, premature structural distress of the paved and flatwork areas can be expected. However, the additional cost . . . should be compared to the higher maintenance costs and other problems caused by distressed paved and flatwork areas. It is our opinion that decreased settlement will result from increasing the amount of undocumented fill and loose soils removed, with complete removal of all undocumented fill and loose soil being the upper limit on reasonable efforts to minimize settlement. <i >An economic analysis of the relationship between current construction costs and ongoing maintenance costs should be undertaken to determine the most cost-effective amount of undocumented fill and loose soil to be removed</i>.” (Italics added.) <br/>The trial court rejected all of the Committee’s challenges to the alternatives analysis based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It stated: “It is not sufficient that members of the public proposed other alternatives . . . . [The Committee] has failed to point to any comment that actually raised a question about the number of alternatives or challenged the range of alternatives selected for analysis in the EIR. Otherwise, [the] City made findings regarding the four alternatives. [Citation.] [The Committee] does not appear to raise a specific objection with respect to these findings.” <br/>2. <i >General legal principles</i>. <br/>“An EIR shall describe a range of reasonable alternatives to the project, or to the location of the project, which would feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the significant effects of the project, and evaluate the comparative merits of the alternatives. An EIR need not consider every conceivable alternative to a project. Rather it must consider a reasonable range of potentially feasible alternatives that will foster informed decisionmaking and public participation. . . . There is no ironclad rule governing the nature or scope of the alternatives to be discussed other than the rule of reason.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).) <br/>“The range of potential alternatives to the proposed project shall include those that could feasibly accomplish most of the basic objectives of the project and could avoid or substantially lessen one or more of the significant effects. . . . Among the factors that may be used to eliminate alternatives from detailed consideration in an EIR are: (i) failure to meet most of the basic project objectives, (ii) infeasibility, or (iii) inability to avoid significant environmental impacts.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (c).) <br/>CEQA requires the lead agency to respond to “each significant environmental issue that is raised by commenters . . . .” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21091, subd. (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B).) “[T]he major environmental issues raised when the lead agency’s position is at variance with recommendations and objections raised in the comments must be addressed in detail[,] giving reasons why specific comments and suggestions were not accepted.” (Guidelines, § 15088, subd. (c).) “Responses to comments need not be exhaustive; they need only demonstrate a ‘good faith, reasoned analysis.’ [Citations.]” (<i >Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka</i> (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 378.) <br/>“The lead agency should ordinarily respond to comments suggesting a new alternative that can substantially reduce significant project impacts by either explaining why further consideration of the alternative was rejected or providing an evaluation of the alternative. [Citations.]” (1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont. Ed. Bar 2d ed. 2011) Project Alternatives § 15.41, p. 770.6.) <br/>3. <i >Failure to support the rejection of alternatives</i>. <br/>The Committee contends that the final EIR’s rejection of the alternatives that it did analyze was not adequately explained and was not supported by substantial evidence. <br/>a. <i >Exhaustion</i>. <br/>“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenging any project approval. ‘An action or proceeding shall not be brought . . . unless the alleged grounds for noncompliance with [CEQA] were presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period . . . or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.’ [Citations.]” (<i >Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. City of Santa Clarita</i> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1050.) <br/>“Some courts have interpreted the statutory [exhaustion] requirement . . . to mean that the ‘exact issue’ raised in the litigation must have been presented to the agency . . . . [Citations.] [¶] Other courts have found the specific-objection requirement satisfied if the issue was raised in some form. [Citations.] [¶] The [exhaustion] determination . . . turns on whether the agency was apprised of the basis for the challenge in a way that g[a]ve[] it an opportunity to respond by either correcting any errors it has made or showing why it ha[d] not erred. [Citations.]” (2 Kostka & Zischke, <i >supra</i>, CEQA Litigation, § 23.98, pp. 1238-1239.) <br/>“‘While “‘less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal in an administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding’ because[] . . . parties in such proceedings generally are not represented by counsel . . .” [citation]’ [citation], ‘generalized environmental comments at public hearings,’ ‘relatively . . . bland and general references to environmental matters’ [citation], or ‘isolated and unelaborated comment[s]’ [citation] will not suffice. The same is true for ‘“[g]eneral objections to project approval . . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (<i >Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego</i> (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515, 521, original quotation marks corrected.) <br/>“‘“The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in the judicial proceeding were first raised at the administrative level. [Citation.]” [Citation.] . . .’ [Citation.]” (<i >Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego</i>, <i >supra</i>, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) Accordingly, we have not combed the record to ferret out every potentially relevant public comment; rather, we have limited our review to the public comments cited by the Committee in its briefs. “‘An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies.’ [Citation.]” (<i >Ibid</i>.) <br/>The Committee relies, in part, on comments made before or after the public comment period. To satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement, however, a comment must be submitted “during the public comment period . . . or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21177, subd. (a).) Statements made before the completion of a draft EIR (<i >Sierra Club v. City of Orange</i> (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536) or after the public hearing on the project (<i >Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd.</i> (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 245, 273-274) simply do not count. <br/>Here, however, during the public comment period, one commenter stated: “Jones & Stokes wrote in a report that even if the building’s moved away onto a different part of the site, the entire site still has to be excavated . . . because of the soil instability. <i >That argument has never been well presented in any of our past meetings</i>.<i > We are, therefore, far from convinced</i> . . . .” (Italics added.) As we will discuss in more detail below, the EIR rejected each of the alternatives because, supposedly, like the project itself, they would require overexcavation due to soil instability, and thus they would have the same impact on archaeological resources. The Committee argues that the EIR failed to explain why the alternatives would require overexcavation and that the conclusion that they would is not supported by substantial evidence. This is exactly the same point that the commenter was making. Thus, there was exhaustion with regard to this issue. <br/>The trial court also stated that the Committee “does not appear to raise a specific objection with respect to the[] findings” concerning the alternatives. That is incorrect. In its trial briefs, the Committee specifically raised the same challenges to the findings that it does on appeal. Hence, these arguments have been preserved. <br/>b. <i >Analysis</i>. <br/>The EIR rejected alternative 3 (reconfiguration of the site plan) on the ground that it would have nearly the same impacts on archaeological resources as the project would, because “the majority of the site would still need to be graded and overexcavated . . . .” However, it is impossible to tell, from the final EIR or from the administrative record, whether any part of the site (other than the building footprint) would have to be overexcavated, or if so, what part. <br/>This conclusion is supposedly based on the geotechnical report. However, the report is self-contradictory. It states that at least 36 inches of soil would have to be removed under any “graded” areas. But does this mean only areas under the building, or does it also include areas under the parking lot‌ It might seem reasonable to assume that the entire site would have to be graded. However, the report states that the whole reason for removing fill is that it would not support “the proposed <i >structures</i>.” (Italics added.) Moreover, the report goes on to state <i >explicitly</i> that “paved” areas did <i >not</i> have to be overexcavated, if it would be cheaper to fix them if and when they subsided. <br/>In addition, whatever “graded” areas might mean, it is not clear how much excavation is required under them. At one point, the report states that at least “36 inches of existing native soil” should be removed. As the City points out, “native soil” would seem to mean soil that had accumulated naturally at the site, as opposed to imported fill. At another point, however, the report states that graded areas “should be subexcavated to a minimum depth of 36 inches bgs.” “Bgs,” or “below ground surface,” would ordinarily be measured from the surface, including fill. Thus, it is not at all clear that the recommended overexcavation would be deep enough to impact archaeological resources. <br/>Significantly, the EIR never found that <i >the entire site</i> would have to be overexcavated. With regard to the project itself, it found (rather vaguely) that the project would require “subsurface excavation for the medical building itself, trenching for utilities, excavation for vaults, and compaction of soils over <i >much</i> of the project site.” (Italics added.) It also required the treatment plan to provide for the removal of artifacts in the “Area of Potential Direct Impact,” which it defined (again vaguely) as “those areas that will be excavated below grade for construction of the medical facility, utility lines, utility vaults, parking facility, and <i >other excavations associated with construction</i>.” (Italics added.) <br/>Similarly, with regard to the alternatives, the EIR merely found that alternative 3 would require overexcavation of “the majority of the site . . . .” Most glaringly, it stated that, under alternative 3, “impacts to subterranean archaeological resources may be slightly reduced.” This effectively conceded that alternative 3 would not require as much overexcavation as the project itself would. <br/>There is no support — in the EIR itself, in the geotechnical report, or elsewhere in the administrative record — for the conclusion that this reduction would be only “slight” rather than significant. Based on this record, it is simply impossible to quantify it. However, the whole point of alternative 3 was to move the building to the southwest side of the site, which had already been excavated, and to pave over the southeast side, which had not. To the extent that the paved area did not have to be overexcavated, it would appear that the reduction in the archaeological impact would be substantial. <br/>In this appeal, the City and Jacobs flatly assert that <i >any</i> construction on the site would necessarily require overexcavation of the <i >entire</i> site. There is absolutely no evidence of this. As already noted, the geotechnical report does not support this conclusion; to the contrary, it indicates that paved areas may be left unexcavated, if that would save money in the long run. <br/>Admittedly, at one public hearing, Dana McGowan, a representative of Jones & Stokes stated, “[D]uring the course of our work, we’ve determined that it’s not possible to maintain the portion of the site that is not going to be built upon because the soils are too unstable to build even a parking lot on. So that the whole site will have to be over excavated . . . .” Ms. McGowan, however, did not claim to be a geotechnical expert<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title="">^{^[8]}</a> or to have any basis for her opinion other than the geotechnical report.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title="">^{^[9]}</a> Using the unsupported opinion of a nonexpert EIR preparer as substantial evidence to support the EIR would be sheer bootstrapping. (Cf. <i >Gentry v. City of Murrieta</i> (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1417 [“in the absence of a specific factual foundation in the record, . . . predictions by nonexperts regarding the consequences of a project do not constitute substantial evidence”].) <br/>Finally, even if there were <i >some</i> evidence that overexcavation of the entire site was required, the final EIR itself essentially <i >rejected</i> such evidence, by finding that (1) “much” or the “majority” of the site required overexcavation, and (2) alternative 3 would require less overexcavation than would the project itself. <br/>The EIR’s very failure to disclose that it was not necessary to overexcavate paved areas was fatal to its analysis of alternatives. If there could be sound economic reasons not to overexcavate the paved areas, there could also be sound environmental reasons. The public was entitled to know that in paved areas archaeological resources could be left in situ, in exchange for higher maintenance costs. Instead, when one commenter specifically asked whether archaeological resources could be preserved by covering the site with asphalt, the final EIR said they could not. In light of the geotechnical report, this was not only unsupported, but affirmatively false. <br/>Finally, the EIR gave an additional reason for rejecting alternative 3 — that it was not compatible with the specific plan, which provides that buildings in the Health Care District “should have a strong architectural orientation toward the street . . . .” But not so. The only difference was that in the project, as proposed, the building would be close to both Brockton and Tequesquite (although the entrance would face <i >away</i> from both streets, toward the parking lot), whereas in alternative 3, the building would only be close to Tequesquite. A “strong architectural orientation toward the street” does not appear to prohibit buildings in midblock nor parking lots at corners. <br/>The flaws in the EIR’s analysis of alternative 3 also infect its analysis of alternative 4 (reduced site). Alternative 4 involved a smaller building. The EIR rejected it on the premise that it would still require overexcavation of most or all of the site. However, if it was only necessary to overexcavate under the building, and not in paved areas, then reducing the size of the building had at least the potential to reduce the impact on archaeological resources. The analysis in the EIR is inadequate to show why it would not. <br/>We find no fault, however, with the EIR’s analysis of alternative 2 (development on pilings). The geotechnical report stated that, even if the building had a pile foundation, the same amount of overexcavation would be required. Admittedly, the geological report was unclear about exactly how much overexcavation that meant and where it was needed. Even so, it seems reasonable to conclude that alternative 2 would have the same impacts on archaeological resources as the project would. <br/>In sum, we conclude that the EIR’s analyses of alternatives 3 and 4 were inadequate and unsupported by the record. This would be a sufficient reason, standing alone, to reverse the judgment. Nevertheless, whenever we “find[] . . . that a public agency has taken an action without compliance with [CEQA],” we should “specifically address each of the alleged grounds for noncompliance.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21005, subd. (c)). Hence, we will also address the Committee’s other contentions. <br/>4. <i >Failure to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives</i>. <br/>a. <i >Exhaustion</i>. <br/>As discussed in more detail below, during the public comment period, a number of commenters suggested various specific alternatives to the project. Thus, at a minimum, there was exhaustion as to the claim that these alternatives should have been considered. <br/>The trial court ruled, however, that this was insufficient to exhaust the claim that the EIR failed to analyze a reasonable <i >range</i> of alternatives. We disagree, because these two claims are inextricably intertwined. A claim that an EIR failed to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives will likely be doomed unless the claimant can show that some feasible alternative existed. (See <i >Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency</i> (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 248 [appellants “identify no specific alternatives improperly omitted from the EIR”]; <i >Save San Francisco Bay Assn. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com.</i> (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 908, 922-923 [“[a]ppellants have not pointed to a single [alternative] location brought to the City’s attention that was disregarded”].)<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title="">^{^[10]}</a> Similarly, a claim that an EIR was deficient because it failed to analyze a particular alternative is doomed unless the claimant can show that, as a result, the EIR failed to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives. (See <i >Cherry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont</i>, <i >supra</i>, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 354-355.) <br/>Accordingly, a public comment that a particular alternative should have been considered is, in effect, a claim that the EIR failed to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives. As this court has stated, “less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal in an administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding. This is because ‘“[i]n administrative proceedings, [parties] generally are not represented by counsel. To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.” [Citation.] . . .’ [Citation.]” (<i >Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo</i> (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Certainly the City was on notice that it should respond to the suggested alternatives, either by analyzing them or by explaining why its selection of alternatives was adequate without them. Hence, we conclude that there was exhaustion as to both of these contentions. <br/>The City argues that no commenter ever raised the Committee’s additional argument that the final EIR failed to give adequate reasons for not considering the public’s suggested alternatives. A final EIR, however, is not normally recirculated for further comments. (See 1 Kostka & Zischke, <i >supra</i>, Overview of CEQA Process, § 1.8 at pp. 8-9.) The exhaustion requirement “does not apply to any alleged grounds . . . for which there was no . . . opportunity for members of the public to raise those objections orally or in writing prior to the approval of the project . . . .” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21177, subd. (e).) Thus, a challenge to material that appears for the first time in a final EIR need not have been raised in the administrative proceedings. <br/>The City cites <i >Towards Responsibility in Planning v. City Council</i> (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 671 (<i >TRIP</i>). There, however, in response to comments, the lead agency prepared a supplement to the draft EIR. (<i >Id</i>. at p. 682.) The court suggested (though it did not hold) that the plaintiff had forfeited its challenge to material in the supplement by failing to raise it during the period for additional public comment regarding the supplement. (<i >Ibid</i>.) Accordingly, <i >TRIP</i> is actually consistent with our conclusion. <br/>b. <i >Analysis</i>. <br/>i. <i >Installing a park</i>. <br/>Many commenters suggested using the site as a historical park or garden, along the lines of the plan that had been proposed in 1990. The final EIR responded: “The suggested resurrection of the plan would require collaboration and cooperation between [the County and the City] and purchase of the site, or part of the site. . . . The current proposal is from a private developer, which would require the developer to subsidize the Chinatown Historical Park . . . . It should be noted that any development on the site, including a museum or public park, could not preserve the archaeological resources within the site due to the soil conditions and underlying fill associated with the former Chinatown.” <br/>This response adequately explained why this alternative was infeasible. In particular, Jacobs had no incentive to develop the property as a park, and there was no “deep pocket” standing by to purchase the site and turn it into a park. We also note that this alternative would fail to satisfy two of the five project objectives (to develop a medical office facility and to provide jobs). <br/>The Committee notes — correctly — that there was n