CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jorge Espinoza pled no contest, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, to one count of transportation of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of unlawful firearm activity in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (c)(1).[1] Appellant admitted that he had suffered two prior drug convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), and one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in state prison.
Appellant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence of the narcotics found in his car. We order the abstract of judgment corrected, as set forth in more detail in the disposition. We affirm the judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Ronald Kriletich (Kriletich) appeals from an order denying his motion to amend a judgment that had dismissed his petition for a writ of administrative mandate. He contends the court erred by not adding certain language to the judgment in order to confirm that the dismissal was with prejudice. We will affirm the order.[1]

After he was injured during a car accident, plaintiff Albert M. Kun and the registered owner of the car he was driving, Melinda Barany (collectively, plaintiffs), sued Hilary Brook Andron, the driver of the other car, for personal injury and property damage. Before trial, Andron made an offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.[1] Plaintiffs did not accept the offer and trial began. A jury determined Andron was not negligent and the court entered judgment for her. Andron then sought approximately $20,000 in costs. Plaintiffs moved to tax costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, denied it in part, and awarded plaintiffs $15,446.11 in costs.
Plaintiffs appeal.[2] They contend: (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting eyewitness testimony about the accident without making a preliminary finding that the traffic light at issue was in working order; (2) the court â€

Defendant Garry Lee Damon appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). He also admitted allegations that he had suffered seven prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Following the denial of his Romero[1] motion, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus a determinate term of 15 years. Defendant has filed a timely notice of appeal.

Following a contested hearing, the Monterey Superior Court declared child T.S. free from the parental custody and control of his father, B.S., on the ground of abandonment. (See Fam. Code, § 7800 et seq.)[1] On appeal, father contends that the judgment must be reversed because (1) the record does not reflect that the trial court considered appointment of counsel for T.S. (§ 7861) and (2) the court investigator's reports, which the court was required to consider (§ 7851, subd. (d)), did not contain mandated information concerning T.S. (§ 7851, subds. (b), and (c)). Appellant does not attack the substantiality of the evidence to support the court's factual findings.
We agree that the asserted errors occurred but conclude they were harmless. Accordingly, we will affirm.

Defendant Salvador Arciniega appeals a judgment entered following a guilty verdict at trial. On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive term and in requiring him to undergo AIDS testing.

Appellant Robinson Tait, P.S., a Seattle law firm, filed a debt collection action on behalf of its client, Mortgage First, alleging that respondents Edgar Israel Hernandez and Theresa Velasco had failed to repay an $84,000 loan. Hernandez and Velasco responded by filing a cross-complaint alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692). They also asserted that the collection action was barred by California's anti-deficiency judgment statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 580b,[1] because the $84,000 loan was a junior loan used to purchase the home they later lost to foreclosure. The second amended cross-complaint included a third cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Defendant Yolanda Nevarez admitted violating probation for a 2005 narcotics-offense conviction after testing positive for methamphetamine in 2011. The trial court revoked probation and then reinstated probation on condition that defendant serve 275 days in jail. It awarded defendant 137 days of actual custody credit and 68 days of conduct credit. On appeal, defendant contends that she is entitled to an additional 69 days of presentence custody credits under interim Penal Code section 4019, effective January 25, 2010.[1] The People concede the issue in part. And we agree with the People's analysis. We therefore modify and affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent Porfirio Enrique Collado on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Collado was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
Counsel did not provide the court with any specific information to assist it with its independent review pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent Porfirio Enrique Collado on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Collado was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
Counsel did not provide the court with any specific information to assist it with its independent review pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Yolanda Nevarez admitted violating probation for a 2005 narcotics-offense conviction after testing positive for methamphetamine in 2011. The trial court revoked probation and then reinstated probation on condition that defendant serve 275 days in jail. It awarded defendant 137 days of actual custody credit and 68 days of conduct credit. On appeal, defendant contends that she is entitled to an additional 69 days of presentence custody credits under interim Penal Code section 4019, effective January 25, 2010.[1] The People concede the issue in part. And we agree with the People's analysis. We therefore modify and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Robinson Tait, P.S., a Seattle law firm, filed a debt collection action on behalf of its client, Mortgage First, alleging that respondents Edgar Israel Hernandez and Theresa Velasco had failed to repay an $84,000 loan. Hernandez and Velasco responded by filing a cross-complaint alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692). They also asserted that the collection action was barred by California's anti-deficiency judgment statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 580b,[1] because the $84,000 loan was a junior loan used to purchase the home they later lost to foreclosure. The second amended cross-complaint included a third cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Defendant Salvador Arciniega appeals a judgment entered following a guilty verdict at trial. On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive term and in requiring him to undergo AIDS testing.

Appellant Melissa M. Tausan, petitioner in the dissolution action, appeals a number of interlocutory custody orders awarding temporary custody of her two minor children to their father, respondent Steve M. Tausan. Respondent claims that the appeal is taken from a nonappealable order and is untimely. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent was killed in a fatal shooting. For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss the appeal as untimely filed and moot.