CA Unpub Decisions

Ernest seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to his five children. We will deny the petition.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an amended complaint for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief against a county employees' retirement
association. The case involves actions taken by a county retirement association in transferring funds from a supplemental benefits account to the general trust fund and in establishing a schedule for the county's payment of unfunded liabilities of the retirement plan. We conclude the trial court erred in sustaining respondent's demurrer to appellants' complaint and, thereafter, in granting judgment when appellants declined to further amend their complaint. In summary, we conclude appellants have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief and have adequately pled causes of action for such relief. At the demurrer stage, of course, there is no way to know whether appellants ultimately will prevail, but we conclude the demurrer should have been overruled. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

Two children, C.G., and J.G., were declared dependents based on neglect and failure to protect (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)),[1] due to their parents' domestic violence, drug use, and transient lifestyle and were placed with a maternal aunt. M.M. (Mother) informed the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) that her grandfather was an enrolled member of a Cherokee tribe. The parents only minimally participated in reunification services where Mother was sentenced to a term of 16 months and L.G. (Father) only began some components of his plan after Mother was incarcerated. Services were terminated at the six-month review hearing as to both parents, and, after considering the parents' section 388 petitions, filed on the date of the selection and implementation hearing, the court terminated their parental rights. (§ 366.26.) The parents appeal from that judgment.

Defendant is serving 25 years to life after a jury convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder, three counts of attempted murder, and three counts of assault with a firearm.
On the afternoon of October 1, 2009, defendant and his brother-in-law, Urbano Gonzalez, drove to the home of Cesar Saldana to test fire some .380-caliber handguns on the rear portion of Saldana's property. Saldana later told police officers that he saw defendant take two handguns and a box of ammunition out of the back of the car, and stick the two handguns in his waistband.

R.R. (father) appeals from juvenile court jurisdiction and disposition orders, sustaining jurisdiction over his only child, C.R., and ordering her placed in foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b) & (g).)[1] Father challenges the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings that he should have known about C.R.'s mother's drug abuse, even though he was a noncustodial parent living in Nevada. The court also found that father permitted C.R. to live with inappropriate caretakers and failed to intervene. Father further argues that the juvenile court erred in requiring an approved Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) assessment before placing C.R. with father. Father asserts that the court erred in denying his request to place C.R. in his custody under section 361.2, subdivision (a), since there were no findings or evidence of detriment to C.R.

Defendant and appellant Donjell Orlondo Morrison was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1)[1] and assault on a child under eight years old resulting in death (§ 273ab, count 2). A jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter on count 1 (§ 192, subd. (b)), and guilty on count 2. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on count 2. The court imposed a term of four years on count 1, but stayed it pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault (§ 245) on count 2. We affirm.

Marvin B. appeals findings and orders entered at a dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Nadine S. appeals juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights to her children, Aubrey R. and G.R. She contends the court erred by not applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights and adoption of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).[1] We affirm the orders.

A jury convicted Santos Torres of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code,[1]§ 246, counts 3 & 4) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 5-7 & 9). The jury also found true Torres personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 667, & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) as to counts 5 through 7 and 9. The court sentenced Torres to prison for 11 years, eight months.
Torres appeals, contending the court committed reversible error in denying his motion to dismiss the charges because his right to due process under the United States and California Constitutions was violated by the over 14-year delay between the filing of the criminal complaint and his arrest. He also asserts his due process right to present a defense was violated when the trial court sustained an evidentiary objection preventing him from asking an eyewitness if she could identify him in court. Because we determine the court committed reversible error in denying Torres's motion to dismiss, we do not reach his second contention.

A jury convicted Mario Soto of one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a))[1] and three counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69). The trial court sentenced him to aggregate term of two years in prison.
Soto appeals, contending there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for making a criminal threat. He also requests we independently review the transcript of an in camera proceeding conducted by the trial court under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess proceeding)[2] to determine whether the trial court erred in finding an internal affairs report contained no discoverable information.
We conclude there is no merit to Soto's first contention. Additionally, we have reviewed the transcript of the Pitchess proceeding and conclude the trial court did not err in finding the internal affairs report contained no discoverable information. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

Fred Howe appeals his conviction for possessing counterfeiting apparatus and forgery. He argues the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) overruled his continuing objection to prior act evidence; (2) did not strike the prior act evidence; and (3) failed to sua sponte instruct the jury to disregard such evidence. He also asserts that a unanimity instruction should have been given on the count for possessing counterfeiting apparatus, and that the sentence on the forgery conviction should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Howe contends his trial counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to ask that the prior act evidence be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard the evidence. We reject Howe's arguments, affirm the judgment and deny his habeas corpus petition.

Mark Gibbons appeals a judgment entered in favor of Fraser Yachts California, Inc. (Fraser), after the trial court sustained Fraser's demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend. We reverse the judgment.

Mother (L. A.) appeals from the juvenile court's orders terminating her parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption for minors K. H. and J. H. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 366.26.) Mother contends: (1) the termination of parental rights violated due process because the court never found she was an unfit parent; and (2) the court erred by finding the sibling relationship exception to adoption inapplicable. We affirm.

After the minor, Mitchell W., violated juvenile probation by possessing child pornography on his laptop computer, the juvenile court ordered the computer destroyed, over the minor's objection that destroying the hard drive would suffice. The court stayed the order pending appeal.
The minor contends that the court's order violated constitutional due process, was overbroad, and was not specifically tailored to his needs.
We affirm.