CA Unpub Decisions

On appeal, Robinson contends the prosecutor committed misconduct, the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings and failed to appreciate its discretion to impose a concurrent subordinate term, and Robinson is entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court has ordered to be considered concurrently with the appeal, Robinson asserts defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object in the trial court to preserve various of the errors Robinson seeks to raise on appeal.
We accept the People's concession Robinson is entitled to an additional day of presentence custody credit. However, Robinson's remaining contentions lack merit. We therefore affirm the judgment as modified to provide for one additional day of presentence custody credit and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A jury convicted defendant Rickie J. Crouch of first degree burglary. (See Pen. Code, § 459.) In a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found that Crouch had suffered a prior â€

Defendant and appellant, Robert Roy Francis, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for first degree murder with knife use and prior serious felony conviction findings (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.5, 667, subd. (a)-(i)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 86 years to life.
The judgment is affirmed.

Cross-defendant and appellant Instone, LLC appeals from a judgment following a trial in which a jury awarded cross-complainant and respondent William Brescia $4.9 million on his causes of action for breach of express contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and breach of confidence against Instone and other cross-defendants not parties to this appeal. Brescia was the creator of a formula for high protein, low carbohydrate pudding, and the jury determined that Instone and the other cross-defendants sold pudding products based on his formula without compensating him, in violation of their agreements with him and their duty of confidence.
We conclude that the jury's findings for Brescia on his claims for breach of express and implied contract were not supported by substantial evidence: No evidence was presented at trial that Instone breached its narrow obligations under its express agreements with Brescia not to use or disclose proprietary information provided to it by Brescia, and no evidence was introduced of any conduct based on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Instone had an implied agreement to make royalty payments to Brescia in the event Instone used his pudding formula. We also hold that Brescia's breach of confidence claim was preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA). Thus, we reverse the judgment in favor of Brescia and vacate the damages award.
For his part, Brescia appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his claim for misappropriation of trade secrets against Instone for failure to identify his trade secrets with sufficient particularity. We agree that our previous decision in Brescia v. Angelin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 133, 138-139 (Brescia), reversing the trial court's decision on this issue as to other cross-defendants, constitutes the law of the case and mandates the reversal of the judgment dismissing that misappropriation claim.

On January 3, 2011, defendant pleaded no contest to corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] The trial court placed him on probation and ordered him to pay fees and fines, including a $600 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and imposed, but stayed, a $600 probation revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.44.
Subsequently, defendant violated his probation and the court sentenced defendant to the previously suspended upper term of four years for his conviction of corporal injury on a cohabitant. Among other fines, the court stated that defendant had to pay a $600 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The court orally pronounced that defendant had to pay a $90 criminal justice administrative fee pursuant to Government Code section 29550, subdivision (c), but the minute orders from the hearing and the abstract of judgment set the fee at $92. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court improperly imposed a second restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and that the abstract of judgment incorrectly set the criminal justice administrative fee at $92 rather than at $90.
We conclude that the trial court's oral pronouncement is not clear as to whether it was imposing the original $600 fine or incorrectly imposing a second fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to specify that the fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b) was imposed on March 1, 2011, when defendant was placed on probation. We agree that the abstract of judgment incorrectly stated that the criminal justice administrative fee imposed was $92 and we modify it to reflect a $90 criminal justice administrative fee pursuant to Government Code section 29550, subdivision (c).

RODUCTION
This is the second round of appeals in this case arising out of the rescission of a May 2000 contract to purchase a home on Gardenview Place in Santa Rosa (the Gardenview purchase agreement). Ronald and Victoria Hogan (the Hogans) completed their unilateral rescission of the Gardenview purchase agreement when they filed an August 2002 complaint against two sets of defendants, (1) the sellers and developers of the Gardenview property, DeAngelis Construction, Inc., Marvin DeAngelis and Gary Pope (collectively the Developers), and (2) the real estate agents for the sale, Clayton and Mary Engstrom (the Engstroms). Thereafter, during pre-trial proceedings, the Developers made a formal concession that the rescission was valid and offered to restore the Hogans' consideration. Accordingly, in May 2004, the superior court filed an order confirming that the Gardenview purchase agreement was rescinded.
The rescission of the Gardenview purchase agreement became the linchpin of the lengthy litigation that followed; it was an established fact at a jury trial to determine the Hogans' consequential damages, and it was an integral component of a June 2007 amended judgment that was reviewed by this court in Hogan, et al. v. DeAngelis Construction, Inc., et al. (A117321, A118257, A120840, May 20, 2009) [nonpub. opn.] (Hogan I). We are, therefore, very dismayed to learn that the Hogans continue to retain possession the Gardenview property. We are equally concerned that the two appeals before us today[1] are evidence of a pattern of delay, designed to prolong the Hogans' stay in a home that does not belong to them.
The first appeal, by the Engstroms, is from an order denying their motion to strike or tax a memorandum of costs on appeal that the Hogans filed after this case was remanded pursuant to our decision in Hogan I. We will reverse that order with instructions to the trial court to enter a new order granting that motion. The second appeal is by the Hogans, who challenge several post-remand orders. Despite their more than 100 pages of briefing, the Hogans' complaints boil down to two. First, they contend they are being denied a full recovery. Second, the Hogans maintain they are entitled to full payment of all of their money damages and litigation costs before they have to vacate the Gardenview property. We reject these arguments, in all of their forms. We also unequivocally affirm prior orders in this case which establish that the payment of any consequential damages to the Hogans is conditioned on the return of the Gardenview property to the Developers.

Jose Cruz Patino was convicted by plea of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[1] He was placed on probation for three years on the condition he serve 210 days in jail, with pre-sentence credits of 32 days. The portion of pre-sentence credit attributable to conduct credits under section 4019 was calculated under the version of the statute in effect on September 10, 2011, when defendant committed the crime. He contends that principles of equal protection compel an award of additional conduct credits under the current version of section 4019, which expressly applies only to defendants whose crimes were committed on or after October 1, 2011, the operative date of the statutory amendments. (§ 4019, subd. (h).) We reject this claim and affirm the judgment.

Ronald R. Brown, Jr., appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b))[1] to vacate a judgment entered against him. The judgment, in the total amount of $164,564.44, had been entered against Brown, following a bench trial at which the court struck his answer after he failed to appear.
Brown contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate judgment because, he claims, on the morning of trial he had been misinformed by the court clerk about his need to appear or he had misinterpreted the court clerk's message left on his cell phone. He also contends the award of $100,000 in punitive damages is void because it exceeded the amount alleged in the complaint and the plaintiff, Shelly Fuller, never served a statement of punitive damages under section 425.115, as is required to recover punitive damages in a default judgment.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion because substantial evidence supported a finding Brown did not act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances by ignoring the court clerk's instructions to report to court and to call the clerk immediately. The award of punitive damages is not void because the judgment resulted from an uncontested hearing under section 594, subdivision (a) (section 594(a)) rather than a default prove‑up under section 585, subdivision (a). Brown received notice of trial and notice, sufficient to satisfy due process, of the amount of punitive damages to be sought against him at trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

After investigating Appellant Luis Jaime for two weeks, police suspected him of selling drugs. On August 9, 2009, they followed him as he left his apartment and stopped his car, which had expired license tags. Upon contacting Jaime, they noted symptoms of drug usage. He was in fact under the influence of a controlled substance. This led to a search warrant for his home, where the contraband supporting the charges against him was found.

Save Our San Juan (SOSJ) appeals from the denial of its writ of mandate regarding the approval of an office development in San Juan Capistrano proposed by the Koll Company. SOSJ has several complaints about the way the City of San Juan Capistrano (the City) reviewed the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence in case number BF128800A, Johnny Howard Laughlin pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Additional charges and enhancements were dismissed. The court imposed the midterm of three years plus one year for the enhancement for a total term of four years. In case number BF132704A, Laughlin pled no contest to obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 69) and the court imposed a consecutive eight-month term (one-third the midterm). On appeal, Laughlin contends the court erred in denying his suppression motion because he was detained without reasonable suspicion. We affirm.

Petitioner T.V. (mother) challenges the juvenile court's order of January 10, 2012, setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] She argues the court used the wrong standard when it determined that her daughter T.V. (the child) should not be returned to her care, and that under the correct standard, the child would have been returned to her. Specifically, mother contends the juvenile should have used the â€

Defendant and appellant, T.D. (Father), appeals from juvenile court orders terminating parental rights to his son, B.D., and placing B.D. for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 336.26.)[1] Father claims he was denied due process and statutory rights to counsel at initial, critical stages of the proceedings. He also claims plaintiff and respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.A. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law (§ 224.3, subd. (c)).

Darcy Lynn Matthews (defendant) seeks relief from probation conditions which require that her place of residence and any plans to change it be approved by her probation officer. Defendant argues the conclusions are overbroad, vague and infringe upon her constitutional rights to travel and freedom of association. We do not find the conditions unconstitutional and will affirm the judgment of the trial court on this point. Defendant also claims that the conversion of the restitution order against her to a civil judgment is unauthorized. We agree and vacate the order of conversion.