CA Unpub Decisions

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When defendant Gregory Ruiz Aguirre arrived at a fast food establishment on May 26, 2010, he expected to meet a female (â€

Michael Armond Omara appeals from the trial court's order denying his postconviction â€

The trial court granted respondent Arthur Voortman's petition for writ of administrative mandate. The judgment set aside a decision of appellant Stanislaus County Employees' Retirement Association (hereafter, the association) that denied respondent's application for disability retirement. In this appeal by the association, we conclude the trial court erred. We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter an order denying the petition for writ of administrative mandate.

Defendant Victor Daniel Martinez was charged with attempted receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 496, subd. (a), 664; counts 1 & 2) and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)[2]; count 3). Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of counts 1 and 2, but convicted of count 3. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years on various terms and conditions. On appeal, he challenges orders that he pay attorney fees and probation fees and costs, and imposition of alcohol-related probation conditions. We affirm the conviction, but order correction of the sentencing minute order and remand the matter for further proceedings.

A jury found defendant Gordon Emmett Headlee guilty of four counts of willfully committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code § 288, subd. (a))[1] and one count of penetrating the genital openings of a child under the age of 14 years with a foreign object for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse (former § 289, subd. (j)). As to all five counts, the jury found true the allegations allowing the statute of limitations to be extended. (§ 803, subd. (f).) Also, as to all five counts, the jury found true the allegations that defendant committed the offenses against more than one victim. (Former § 667.61, subd. (e)(5).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
Defendant raises five contentions on appeal. First, defendant asserts substantial evidence does not support the findings, in two of the counts, that the offenses involved substantial sexual conduct. (§ 803, subd. (f)(1)(B).) Second, defendant contends the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the law related to â€

A jury found Dewayne Freeman guilty of two counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery. The jury also found true that Freeman was armed with a handgun during the commission of the crimes. Freeman admitted one serious felony prior conviction and one strike prior conviction. The court sentenced Freeman to prison for 12 years.
On appeal, Freeman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony implicating him in the crimes. We reject this contention and affirm.

Defendant Michael Anthony Venegas appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence after he pled guilty to selling methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for sale. Venegas contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated Venegas's right to counsel by failing to hold a Marsden[1] hearing and by informing Venegas that he would be held without bail in the interim if the court were to grant Venegas's motion to continue the trial to allow Venegas time to retain counsel. Venegas further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike both of his strike priors for purposes of sentencing.
Neither of Venegas's claims has merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal addresses the adequacy of a defendant's assertions of the right of self-representation during trial, and to reappointment of counsel during sentencing proceedings. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) Following a jury trial in which his request for self-representation was denied, and he was represented by counsel, defendant and appellant Henry Barnhill was convicted of three counts each of pimping (Pen. Code,[1] § 266h) and of human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (a)). He was also convicted of one count of using a tear gas weapon other than in self-defense (§ 12403.7, subd. (g)).
After the convictions but before sentencing, Barnhill's renewed request to represent himself was granted, and he brought a new trial motion and numerous discovery requests. After several continuances of sentencing, his motion for new trial was denied. At the same hearing he requested the reappointment of counsel for sentencing, but the trial court denied the request and imposed sentence. At the outset of trial, he had admitted three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He received an aggregate term of 12 years four months.
On appeal, Barnhill challenges the judgment of conviction, contending his requests for self-representation made at the outset of trial should have been granted. He additionally challenges the imposition of sentence, arguing that although he was acting in propria persona during the hearing on his new trial motion, he was nevertheless entitled to the reappointment of counsel for sentencing purposes. He contends the trial court acted contrary to law or abused its discretion in denying all his requests.
We find no abuse of discretion or error and affirm the judgment.

Penal Code section 1203.4 allows a defendant who has successfully completed probation to be relieved of his or her conviction and all disabilities associated with the conviction.[1] However, in 1997, section 1203.4 was amended with retroactive effect to exclude certain sex offenders from its provisions. Prior to the enactment of the amendment, Michael U.[2] pleaded guilty to a sex offense, was granted probation, and was told he would be required to register as a sex offender. Several years after completing his probation, he petitioned the court for relief under section 1203.4, and the court denied his motion.
On appeal, defendant argues he was promised section 1203.4 relief as part of his plea agreement, and accordingly as a matter of constitutional due process he is entitled to this relief. He recognizes there are no express terms in his plea agreement referencing section 1203.4 relief, but asserts the promise is implied based on the implicit incorporation of then-existing law into the agreement. For reasons we shall explain, we reject this contention. Defendant also argues that extrinsic evidence shows that a section 1203.4 promise was part of his plea agreement. On the record before us, we conclude he has not made this evidentiary showing.
Finally, defendant argues he is entitled to relief because prior to his acceptance of the plea, he was not advised that the sex offender registration requirement would last a lifetime. The contention fails because defendant has not shown it is reasonably probable he would have rejected the plea agreement had he been fully advised of the consequences of his plea.
We affirm the court's order.

Defendants Lorenzo Ross and Joel Armine Arnold appeal from judgments of conviction after a joint jury trial. Ross and Arnold contend that the trial court (1) erred in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of whether a "special relationship" existed between one of the victims and his sister and her boyfriend, who were the owners of a PlayStation game system that the defendants stole from the victims, such that defendants could be convicted of robbery as to that victim; (2) abused its discretion in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of one of the victims concerning compensation that she received for expenses related to relocating from the apartment where the crime occurred; and (3) erred in permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the gang expert regarding their prior contacts with police, on the grounds that the information was inadmissible hearsay, and that its introduction was more prejudicial than probative, as well as on the grounds that the admission of this evidence violated their confrontation clause and due process rights.
Ross separately contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the aiding and abetting doctrine, as applied in this case, by telling the jury that he was "equally guilty" of the crime as the direct perpetrator, even though he could have been found guilty of a lesser crime than the direct perpetrator. Finally, Ross contends that there is insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction for assault with a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory.
We conclude that none of the defendants' claims on appeal provides a ground for reversal or modification of the judgments. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendants Joseph Peter Pineda, Solina Sandra Gonzales and Johnny Montano appeal their convictions and sentences after a jury convicted them of robbery, carjacking, kidnapping and murder. The defendants contend (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to CALCRIM No. 540B, the felony murder instruction, by using improper formatting that allowed the jury to convict the defendants of felony murder based solely on a finding that the defendants either committed, aided and abetted, intended to commit or intended to aid and abet a robbery, carjacking, or kidnapping; (2) that the trial court erred in including the crimes of torture and murder when instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 376, which tells the jury how it may use evidence that a defendant possessed stolen property; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the crime of assault, as a lesser included offense of robbery; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the prosecutor did not have to prove motive, because some of the charged offenses required a showing that the defendants had a particular purpose in carrying out the crime; (5) that the court erred in not staying the imposition of sentence for the offense of torture pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 654, since the murder and torture were part of a single course of conduct; (6) that the court erred in denying the defendants' motions to sever their trials from that trial of a fourth codefendant whom the jury eventually acquitted; (7) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with respect to the "one continuous transaction rule" as it applies to felony murder; (8) that there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions for murder based on felony murder because there is insufficient evidence that the torture and murder were part of one continuous transaction; (9) that there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions for carjacking as to two of the three victims; (10) that the prosecutor committed misconduct in at least two ways; and (11) that the cumulative effect of the identified errors requires reversal.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On November 27, 2010, when a sheriff's deputy attempted to stop defendant Heath Wesley Galbraith for speeding, defendant sped away. Defendant reached speeds in excess of 110 miles per hour, drove erratically, changed lanes without signaling and cut off other vehicles. He finally lost control, ended up in a ditch and collided with a drainage pipe. Defendant tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine and opiates. He previously had been convicted of driving under the influence in August 2001, April 2003, and March 2010.

Defendant's appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. In accordance with Kelly, we will provide a summary of the offenses and the proceedings in the trial court.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Denny Gene McCarty pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) -- count 1)[1] with an admission of personal infliction of great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in exchange for a stipulated 10-year state prison term and the dismissal of other counts and charges. He also admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and the service of a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant requested immediate sentencing and the court imposed the stipulated 10-year term, credited him with 347 days of presentence custody (302 days actually served plus 45 days for good conduct),[2] and imposed fines, fees and assessments as set forth in detail in the abstract of judgment.