CA Unpub Decisions

In February 2010, defendant James Lomas was placed on probation after pleading guilty to one count of possession of hydrocodone for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351).[1] In May 2011, the trial court found defendant violated the terms of his probation by committing an assault with a barber's razor; in August, the court sentenced him to the middle term of three years on the possession offense. Defendant's counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We have considered a supplemental brief filed by defendant. We find no arguable issues and affirm.

Appellant Kevin Urbatsch filed a petition seeking attorney fees and costs for legal services his law firm rendered to the conservators of the estate and person of Bing Jiao Xie. In this appeal from the order authorizing payment of attorney fees and costs from the conservatorship estate, Urbatsch contends the probate court abused its discretion by reducing the amount he requested as attorney fees by over 40 percent. Because we conclude the court acted within its discretion, we shall affirm the order.

Defendant Mary M. Stacher (appellant) appeals the court's revocation of her probation and imposition of a two-year state prison term. She contends that, in light of her chronic, serious health problems, the imposition of a state prison term was an abuse of the court's discretion and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree and affirm.

Emery Craig Barnes (appellant) appeals following his conviction for one count of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)).[1] The only issues raised by appellant on appeal concern two conditions imposed when sentencing was suspended and appellant was granted formal, felony[2] probation. He objects to a search and seizure condition (search condition), and to another condition that he not â€

The San Francisco Unified School District (School District) filed an action for declaratory relief and a petition for a writ of mandate against the City and County of San Francisco (City) seeking a determination that the joint civil service system of employment for City and School District employees established by Education Code section 45318, as applied by the City, transfers school control to an entity outside the public school system, in violation of article IX, section 6 of the California Constitution. The trial court rejected the claim and entered judgment in favor of the City and employee unions that intervened on the City's side. We affirm the judgment.

Local governments must regulate privately operated taxicab companies to protect public safety. (Govt. Code, § 53075.5)[1] The Marin General Services Authority (MGSA) administers a variety of county-wide programs in Marin County, including regulation and permitting of taxicabs. MGSA regulations require taxicab companies to report the results of state-required periodic screening tests of drivers for drugs and alcohol as a condition of permitting. Novato Taxi and its owner, Dan Carlson (collectively, appellants), maintained that the reporting requirement conflicted with, and was preempted by, section 53075.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A)(iv), and refused to comply.
MGSA and the City of Novato (collectively, respondents) obtained an order enjoining appellants from operating a taxicab business without the required permits. Rather than appeal from the order granting a preliminary injunction, appellants unsuccessfully filed a motion to dissolve it. On appeal from the order denying the motion to dissolve, appellants argue that the trial court misconstrued section 53075.5. Because this argument should have been raised in an appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction and the time to file such an appeal has long since passed, we must dismiss the appeal.

Appellant David Thomas Ostrander appeals from his conviction for auto theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He claims the trial court erred by admitting evidence during his trial that he had suffered two prior convictions for auto theft in 2004 and 2009, and that he had in his possession at the time of his arrest â€

Defendant Kenneth Cobrette Adams was convicted after jury trial of two counts of second degree robbery with the personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (b)).[1] The trial court sentenced him to 12 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights when it denied his motion to sever the two counts for trial; (2) the court erred when it denied his motion to exclude evidence of a photographic lineup; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (4) the court prejudicially erred by denying his motion to suppress; (5) the court erred in instructing the jury; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. As we find no error requiring reversal, either individually or cumulatively, we will affirm the judgment.

Before their marriage, Jeanne Macaluso and Michael Macaluso[1] signed two documents: an antenuptial agreement providing that all of their property, whether acquired before or during marriage, would be maintained as separate property; and an acknowledgment that provided, in relevant part, â€

The juvenile court found true allegations that Robert J. committed arson. On appeal, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that Robert acted with malice in igniting a paper towel in a boys' bathroom at his school. We further conclude the juvenile court failed to consider Robert's age when it determined a police officer's questioning of Robert was not a custodial interrogation. Because Robert's responses to that questioning constituted the evidence of malice, we reverse and remand for the juvenile court to reconsider Robert's motion to suppress his statements. If, on remand, the motion to suppress is granted, the petition against Robert shall be dismissed. If, however, the motion is again denied, the disposition order shall be reinstated.

Defendant Filiberto Morales Matus appeals from a judgment after a jury found him guilty of multiple counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years old and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years old. The jury also found defendant had engaged in substantial sexual conduct, including sexual intercourse, oral copulation, and sodomy, in committing several of those offenses. Defendant solely contends in this appeal that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM No. 302 entitled â€

Lee R. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying him reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11)[1] and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his two-year-old son B. We will deny the petition.

Mario S. (father) appealed from a juvenile court's permanency planning hearing order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to three of his children, who ranged from 15 months to 5 years of age.[1] After reviewing the entire record, father's court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she had found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for father to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Father has since written this court requesting a second chance. He makes the following claims: he filed a section 388 petition, which was denied; he was not advised by his attorney â€

After the court denied his motions to suppress evidence in two cases, Jeramy Cole Noennich pled no contest in case number RF005926A to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)),[1] possession of a device for injecting a controlled substance, a misdemeanor (§ 11364) and possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor (§ 11357, subd. (b)). In case number RF005986A, he pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a)), and driving on a suspended or revoked license, a misdemeanor with three enhancements for prior violations (Veh. Code, §§ 14601.1, subd. (a), 14601.1, subd. (b)(2)). The court imposed the indicated sentences in both cases and placed Noennich on three years of probation with specified conditions including that he serve one year in county jail and complete a residential drug treatment program. On appeal, Noennich contends the court erred in denying his suppression motion in case number RF005926A because his consent to search was the product of an unlawful and unduly prolonged detention. We affirm.