CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Randall Watanabe, Jr., of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more. The trial court sentenced him to six years in prison and awarded 201 days of presentence credit (134 actual and 67 conduct).
Defendant contends on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Miranda[1] challenge to statements he made to the police. In a supplemental brief, he contends that the prospective application of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (Stats. 2011, ch. 15) violates his right to equal protection of the law.
We will affirm the judgment.

Diane Brockman appeals from a judgment of dissolution terminating the domestic partnership status of Brockman and Ann L. Miller, dividing community property, and ordering spousal support. On appeal, Brockman contends the trial court erred in failing to consider her Family Code section 2640 claims in dividing the parties’ community property. We affirm.

We strongly discourage anyone from choosing crime as a career. Nevertheless, as with any pursuit in life, one should be prepared. For instance, if you are planning to carjack someone, you should make sure you can drive a stick-shift.

About to be rejected from probation in his new position, an attorney working for the State Board of Equalization (BOE), petitioner Sukhdev Rye, took a notebook from the desk of another attorney in the office and used notes found in that notebook concerning confidential attorney-client communications to try to prove that the BOE was not giving him a fair chance in his new position. Dismissed for his conduct, Rye sought a writ of administrative mandate in the trial court. The court upheld the dismissal, and Rye appeals.

Thomas King appeals from an order denying his petition for a review of the determination of the Board of Prison Terms that he meets the criteria as a mentally disordered offender. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) We affirm.

A defendant is not entitled to a retroactive application of an amendment to Penal Code section 4019 granting one-for-one presentence custody credits.[1] (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314.) We affirm.

Julio Cesar Garcia appeals from a conviction after jury trial of one count each of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] criminal threats (§ 422) and battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). The felony information alleged that he committed these offenses while released on bail in two other pending cases (Nos. 2010020113 and 2010032933). (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).) After appellant waived jury, the trial court found the on-bail allegations to be true.
The trial court sentenced appellant to the middle term of three years on the robbery count. The court granted appellant's motion to reduce the remaining two counts to misdemeanors, and imposed a one-year jail sentence on each count, to run concurrently with the prison sentence, plus two years for the on-bail enhancements. In the other two cases, appellant pled guilty to one count of second degree burglary of a motor vehicle (§ 459) and one count of brandishing a weapon (§ 417). The trial court sentenced him to eight months (one-third the middle term) on each count, to run consecutively to the five years imposed in the present case, for a total sentence of six years four months.
The trial court imposed the minimum statutory restitution fines in each case (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45), and awarded appellant a total of 327 days custody credit, consisting of 283 actual custody credit and 44 days good conduct credit. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment in the present case.

This is the second action brought by Douglas Gillies in an attempt to prevent foreclosure of a trust deed on his home. The trial court concluded the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

During A.F.’s (mother’s) long history with children in the dependency system, she received almost $15,000 in housing assistance and received reunification services on-and-off since 1997. Yet, mother demonstrates no ability to care for her youngest seven children – L.D., Le.R., Ni.R., I.R., El.R., Em.R., and J.R. (collectively children) – who suffered from a multitude of ailments as a result of mother’s neglect.[1]
This appeal is from the denial of mother’s reunification services as to L.D., I.R., El.R., Em.R., and J.R.[2] We find no error and affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Kenneth J. Ellis[1] appeals from judgments of dismissal entered in favor of defendants and respondents Golden Security Bank and Western Commercial Bank following the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend to the two causes of action against these defendants in the verified fifth amended complaint. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ruling that both the quiet title and cancellation of deeds causes of action failed as a matter of law against both defendants, and also abused its discretion in refusing plaintiff a further opportunity to amend. It is clear from the pleadings that Mr. Ellis’s wife took advantage of him and of the trust he placed in her, to his great loss. However, the facts alleged are insufficient to show the defendants share responsibility for the loss, and so we affirm.

Appellant Ernest Franceschi appeals a judgment dismissing his action against Respondent Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (Harrah’s) on the doctrine of res judicata. Prior to this judgment, a federal court in Nevada had heard Franceschi’s same exact causes of action and dismissed them as claims upon which relief could not be granted as a matter of law. Franceschi argues that the federal court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) without giving him an opportunity to respond was a denial of due process. In this action, the trial court determined that Franceschi had a full opportunity to litigate the case in both the Nevada federal district court and the Ninth Circuit, and the doctrine of res judicata prevents the case from being re‑litigated in California. We conclude that the trial court’s dismissal on the grounds of res judicata was not error. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Steven Schwartz appeals a trial court action in June 2011 which embodies either a “finding [he was] still on probation” – as stated in his notice of appeal – or an order “reinstating probation” – as stated in his opening brief on appeal. Schwartz’s overriding claim is that his probationary period expired in April 2011, so that any probation order issued after that is void for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

Appellant Rudy Puga appeals the judgment following his conviction for attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246).[1] The jury found an allegation to be true that he personally discharged a firearm in the attempted murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).)[2] Appellant was sentenced to 27 years in prison, consisting of concurrent terms of 7 and 5 years for the attempted murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, respectively, plus a consecutive term of 20 years for personal discharge of a firearm. He contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the theory of imperfect defense of another. We affirm.

Allen Gelbard (Gelbard) and Lisa Du Boise (Du Boise)[1] sued (1) Gelbard’s former business partners, Rodney Unger (Unger), individually and through his company, Manatee Design Group, Inc.[2] (Manatee), and Robert Beaton (Beaton); (2) the company that they owned, AB Investments, LLC (ABI); and (3) several other parties representing the business partners in some way, including Michael Littman, an attorney who previously represented ABI and Beaton.[3] The complaint was based on ten causes of action born of the business dealings between the parties. Defendants Unger,[4] Beaton, ABI, Littman, and Manatee[5] demurred to Gelbard’s First Amended Complaint (FAC), the operative complaint in this appeal. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend with respect to all causes of action other than the eighth cause of action for conversion.[6] Judgment was entered in favor of Beaton, ABI, Littman and Manatee with respect to the first through seventh and ninth through tenth causes of action. Gelbard appealed.