CA Unpub Decisions

The mother in this dependency case contends the juvenile court erred in finding her daughter was subject to dependency court jurisdiction. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s jurisdictional finding, so we affirm its order.

Andres Contreras appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction of assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)) by plea of no contest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to the middle term of four years in state prison. It also imposed a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Govt. Code, § 70373),[1] a $20 Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) fine (§ 76104.7),[2] a $240 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), and imposed and stayed an equal parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45). Appellant contends that the DNA fine is improper because it is not a “stand-alone fee” and thus may only be imposed when there are other properly imposed fines to which the DNA fine can attach.”

Donte T. Harp appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of the sale of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and his admissions that he previously had been convicted of two narcotics-related offenses (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.2, subd. (a), 11351.5) for one of which he served a prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Harp to six years in county jail (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(1) & (2)). We affirm.

Coastal Defender challenges land use approvals by the City of Manhattan Beach in connection with a development project by MB Dining, LLC (MB Dining), involving the renovation of a restaurant and nightclub. The city determined that the project was categorically exempt from the requirements for environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) and exempt from the requirement of a coastal development permit under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act) (§ 30000 et seq.). Coastal Defender appeals a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate.
Coastal Defender contends (1) the city abused its discretion by relying on mitigation measures in determining that the project was categorically exempt from CEQA; (2) an exception to the categorical exemption applies; and (3) a coastal development permit is required because the project changes the intensity of use of the existing building.
We conclude that the city did not rely on mitigation measures in applying a categorical exemption under CEQA, and Coastal Defender has failed to show a reasonable possibility that the project will have a significant effect on the environment so as to justify an exception to the categorical exemption. We also conclude that Coastal Defender failed to exhaust its administrative remedy as to some issues under the Coastal Act and has shown no abuse of discretion by the city on another issue. We therefore will affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Virtic E. Brown appeals from a judgment, following a court trial, entered in favor of defendants and respondents Mission Filmworks, LLC, and Jay Kamen. Plaintiff’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff was an independent contractor, and not an employee entitled to unpaid wages. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision and affirm.

Harold J. Bernhardt (Bernhardt), a resident of New Jersey, [1] appeals from a judgment of dismissal in favor of Steiner Transocean Limited (Steiner), a Bahamian corporation, and Hu Alaric Toy (Toy), an acupuncturist employed by Steiner, subsequent to an order granting a summary judgment motion. Bernhardt contends that he raised triable issues of material fact and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting respondents’ motion. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

Edgar Eduardo Pelayo, also known as Jose Bonilla and Edgar Bonilla, appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187).[1] The jury found to be true the allegation that appellant used a dangerous weapon, a knife, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court found to be true the allegations that appellant had suffered a prior felony strike within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) thorough (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). After denying appellant’s Romero[2] motion, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of 32 years to life. Appellant contends that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion.
We affirm.

Commonly known as AB 178, Health and Safety Code section 33426.7 and Government Code section 53084 (Stats. 1999, ch. 462, §§ 3 & 2, respectively), prohibit a redevelopment agency from providing financial assistance to a “big box retailer” to relocate from one community to another within the same market area. At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, AB 178 allowed such financial assistance only if the receiving agency shared the sales tax generated by the retailer with the losing community. AB 178 penalized those redevelopment agencies bestowing prohibited financial assistance by requiring them to share for a period of 10 years the retailer’s sales tax revenue with the community that lost the retailer. (Health & Saf. Code, § 33426.7, former subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 53084, former subd. (c).)[1]

While the jury was deliberating, the trial court entered into the record an oral settlement agreement. As part of the oral settlement, “all parties” agreed to dismiss all actions pending before the court with prejudice. Following dismissal, plaintiff and appellant Kracksmith, Inc., doing business as American Business Fund (Kracksmith), filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b))[1] on the ground that Boschal Lee (Lee), the only plaintiff to assent to the settlement agreement, did not have settlement authority to dismiss Kracksmith’s complaint. Kracksmith appeals from the order denying the motion. We conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for new trial and did not abuse its discretion in denying section 473(b) relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff Malcolm Thomas (Thomas), a police officer in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), brought suit against the City of Los Angeles (City) for disability discrimination and related claims. After a two-week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding the City liable to Thomas for disability discrimination. The City appeals, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error in giving an incomplete written instruction on Thomas’s disability discrimination claim, an instruction that differed from the oral instruction, and submitting a special verdict form to the jury that did not conform to either the oral or written jury instructions.
We agree with the City that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its instruction on Thomas’s disability discrimination claim. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial on that cause of action.

This appeal presents the question of whether, in response to a construction defect action brought by a condominium homeowners association, the developer can compel binding arbitration of the litigation pursuant to an arbitration provision in the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s). The answer is yes.

SARAH R. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from orders of the Del Norte County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered August 28, 2012, terminating Mother’s reunification services after a continued 12-month permanency hearing, and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for her three daughters, D.C. (born 1996), E.R. (born 1998) and L.R. (born 1998). Mother contends essentially that the Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) failed to identify and offer services for her mental health issues, and such failure impaired her ability to engage in her reunification case plan. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided or offered Mother reasonable services, and deny on the merits Mother’s petitions for extraordinary writ.[2]

Appellants Jimmy Mitchell, Steve Mitchell, and Christopher Mitchell appeal from a restraining order that requires them to stay away from respondent Tammy Nicholas and her son. Appellants argue that the evidence does not support the finding of harassment as the result of a single incident and in the absence of any credible threat of violence. Because the order is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction because it found, based on this “unexplained injury,” that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).)
The mother appeals. We will reverse. There was insufficient evidence that that the ear injury constituted “serious physical harm.” If this injury could qualify as serious, we find it hard to imagine what injury would not qualify. There was also insufficient evidence that the child had a substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future.