CA Unpub Decisions

At the dispositional hearing on a supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 387), the juvenile dependency court limited Carmen G.'s right to make educational decisions for her daughter, Mariah G. (§ 361, subd. (a)). Carmen appeals, contending the court erred by limiting her right to make educational decisions.[2] We affirm.

This appeal involves two criminal cases. On February 14, 2011, in San Diego County Superior Court case No. SCD223402, Michael James Perry pleaded guilty to two felony assault counts and admitted he used a deadly weapon in the commission of both offenses. Pertinent to this appeal is (1) Perry's plea of guilty to count 3, which charged him with assaulting the victim with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code[1] section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter § 245(a)(1)); and (2) his admission that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a drum) in the commission of this aggravated assault within the meaning of former section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) (hereafter § 12022(b)(1)) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). That criminal case arose from Perry's act of injuring the female victim by hitting her in the back of the head with a small drum.
On that same date, Perry pleaded guilty in the second case─No. SCD230842─to four counts of making a criminal threat in violation of section 422. That case arose from Perry's four acts of threatening his public defender with death or great bodily injury (counts 1, 3, 6, & 8), and his act of throwing and destroying a laptop computer the court had provided to him to assist him in the courtroom due to his hearing impairment (count 5: vandalism over $400 in violation of § 594, subds. (a) & (b)(1)). The court dismissed count 5.

Following a court trial the juvenile court found the allegations in a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions section 602 to be true. Specifically, the court found that William H. (the Minor) committed battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 243, subd. (d)) and simple battery (§ 242).
In a separate disposition hearing, which included disposition of other unrelated offenses, the Minor was placed on probation on various terms and conditions. The court set the maximum confinement for all the offenses at five years.

The present appeal from the probate court has its genesis in a prior family law matter.[1] In 1991, the family court entered an order directing Hari Wilburn (Hari) to pay Cathy Tate $226 per month in child support for their then minor child, A.B. Hari failed to pay any of the ordered support.

Plaintiff Sam Arman brought an unlawful detainer action (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161 et seq.) against defendants, Ali Poojani and his wife, alleging defendants had failed to pay rent as promised.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that defendants are entitled to remain in possession of the premises, and to recover attorney fees and costs. It ultimately awarded defendants $14,587.50 in attorney fees, pursuant to the reciprocal application of a provision in the parties’ lease agreement that provided, in a suit brought for the recovery of rent or the recovery of the premises, “Lessee shall pay to said Lessor a reasonable sum as and for attorney’s fees . . . .”
In this pro se appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in awarding defendants attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code[1] section 1717, and awarded fees in an unreasonable amount. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Eric Alonzo Thigpen of felony indecent exposure (Pen. Code,[1] § 314, subd. 1) and found true an allegation that he had suffered a 2005 conviction of lewd acts with a child under age 14 (§§ 288, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for six years.[2]
On appeal, defendant contends (1) this court should review the sealed reporter’s transcript of the trial court’s review of the victim’s personnel file; the Attorney General does not oppose this request, and (2) the trial court’s instructions and orders to the deadlocked jury violated his state and federal due process rights. We shall affirm the judgment.

Petitioner A.D. (mother), appearing in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ vacating the order of the juvenile court setting a permanent planning hearing with regard to her two minor daughters pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. We deny the petition because petitioner has not complied with the requirements of rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court.[2]

Jennifer G. (Mother) appeals from an order denying her second and third petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,[1] by which she sought to have her three-year-old twin daughters, Delilah and Denise, returned to her custody and to receive family maintenance services. We affirm.

Christine J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, contending that one of her children is not named in the operative petition and insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings. We affirm the orders.

Michael Richard Fleming appeals a judgment entered following his nolo contendere plea to one count of passing checks with insufficient funds, with an admission that he suffered a prior felony strike conviction for attempted carjacking. (Pen. Code, §§ 476a, subd. (a), 664, 215, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)[1] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to strike a prior serious felony conviction and affirm. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504.)

Appellant M.K. (Mother) is the mother of M.H. (M.), a boy, currently eight years old. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and summarily denying her last-minute petition for modification. Finding no error, we affirm.

Benny Blake appeals from an order denying his petition for review of the determination of the Board of Prison Hearings (BPH) that he met the criteria of a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and his commitment to the Department of Mental Health (Department) for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.)[1] Appellant's sole contention is that the BPH lacked authority to determine that he was an MDO, and commit him to the Department, because the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) did not certify his MDO status before his scheduled release date. We conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that by certifying appellant's MDO status on the date of his scheduled release, CDCR complied with the statutory requirement that a person be certified "prior to release on parole," and we affirm. (§ 2962, subd. (d)(2).)

Jennifer F., the mother of 14 year-old Alexander F., appeals from a portion of the order made at a review of permanent plan (RPP) hearing that granted her monitored visitation with Alexander twice per week for two hours each visit. Jennifer contends the order improperly delegates discretion to third parties to decide whether her visitation should continue to be monitored. We affirm.

Defendant Victor Echeagara Torres was convicted following a jury trial of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2) and kidnapping for ransom (§ 209, subd. (a); count 3). The jury found true the allegations of firearm use (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)), great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and commission for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)) with respect to each count.[2] The trial court sentenced defendant on count 3 to a term of life without the possibility of parole, plus 10 years for the firearm use enhancement, and stayed sentencing on count 2 under section 654. Defendant appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements. We affirm.