CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, Robert Anthony Chavez, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for premeditated attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, with firearm use, great bodily injury and prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, [former] 12021, 12022.53, 12022.7, 667.5).[1] Chavez was sentenced to state prison for a term of life plus 28 years to life.
The judgment is affirmed.

Xochilt Casiano (Casiano) filed a wage and labor class action against Wet Seal Retail, Inc. (Wet Seal) in Los Angeles County (Casiano action). A settlement was agreed upon and preliminarily approved by the trial court. Meanwhile, appellant Sally Chaaban (Chaaban) filed a second class action against Wet Seal in Orange County (Chaaban action). Chaaban unsuccessfully objected to the settlement in the Casiano action. The settlement was approved and judgment was entered in favor of Wet Seal. Chaaban appealed. We reversed the judgment in Xochilt Casiano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc. (May 6, 2009, B207672) [nonpub. opn.] (Casiano I) and directed the trial court to conduct a new fairness hearing for final approval of the settlement and independently evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Casiano action pursuant to Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116. After remand, Chaaban opted out of the class and the trial court again approved the settlement. Chaaban appealed. Because Chaaban opted out of the class, she is not an aggrieved party and therefore lacks standing. Accordingly, Chaaban’s appeal is dismissed.
Wet Seal and Casiano request sanctions against Chaaban and her attorney, Sima Fard (Fard). That request is denied.

A jury convicted defendant Reginald Dennison Ferguson of two counts of continuous sexual abuse (counts 1 & 4) (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a));[1] two counts of a lewd act on a child where the defendant was at least 10 years older than the victim (counts 2 & 3) (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)); and two counts of showing harmful matter to a minor (counts 5 & 6) (§ 288.2, subd. (a)). As to all counts, the jury found true the allegation that defendant committed his crimes on multiple victims within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (b).

Pacifica Systems Integration Group (Pacifica) appeals from the following trial court orders: (1) the April 28, 2010, sanctions order striking the fourth cause of action for interference with contract and the fifth cause of action for inducing breach of contract from Pacifica’s first amended cross-complaint (FACC) based upon party misconduct;
(2) the September 1, 2010, order striking Pacifica’s second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh affirmative defenses set forth in Pacifica’s answer based on the same party misconduct; (3) the September 10, 2010, order granting the motion for summary judgment brought by Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (TMCC) on TMCC’s complaint for declaratory relief; and (4) the November 17, 2010, order granting TMCC’s motion for attorney fees and costs.
Regarding the sanctions orders, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pacifica improperly threatened key third party witnesses and sanctioned Pacifica accordingly. As for TMCC’s motion for summary judgment, it was undisputed that Pacifica violated its contract with TMCC, giving TMCC the right to terminate for cause. Alternatively, TMCC had the unilateral right to terminate the agreement for convenience. Thus, TMCC was entitled to judgment. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding approximately half of the attorney fees TMCC requested.
We affirm.

Appellant A.P. appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him on one count of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)), [1] four counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), one count of criminal threats (§ 422), one count of kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), and one count of first degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)). He contends his conviction must be reversed because (1) the trial court erred when it conducted certain pretrial hearings, and (2) the court erred when sentencing him. We conclude the court committed a sentencing error and will remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we will affirm.

After being placed on formal probation in two separate cases,[1] defendant Ignacio Ramirez violated probation, which was duly revoked. He was sentenced to a total term of five years and four months in prison. In case No. 070A, he was awarded 120 days of custody credit and 60 days of conduct credits for a total of 180 days. In case No. 741A, he was awarded 171 days of custody credit and 80 days of conduct credits for a total of 251 days.
On appeal, Ramirez argues that he is entitled to additional conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019.[2] He also contends he is entitled to additional conduct credits in case No. 741A due to a miscalculation by the trial court, a position partially conceded by the Attorney General. We reject his equal protection argument, but agree that he is entitled to four additional days of conduct credits in case No. 741A. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Raymond Desmond Lomelin and Mary Mendoza were living together when defendant was incarcerated at the Santa Clara County Main Jail on Easter weekend of 2009. They were married during defendant’s incarceration. Ms. Mendoza picked defendant up from the jail on August 13th and the two spent time together that day. Reports of what happened between August 13th and August 16th, when police arrived at Ms. Mendoza’s home to conduct a welfare check, vary. A friend who saw bruises on Ms. Mendoza’s chin and arms during this time called the police to conduct a welfare check. Ms. Mendoza told this friend that she had gotten the bruises after defendant playfully threw her in a pool. During the welfare check, Ms. Mendoza told police that defendant struck her in the face and chin after she complained about his reckless driving. At the preliminary hearing, she recanted her story, saying she lied to police because she was angry with defendant for starting a relationship with another woman who had been writing to him while he was in jail. She claimed to have gotten the bruises on her face when she tripped and fell, and the bruises on her arms while she was moving furniture to paint the living room.

Defendant Francisco J. Jaramillo a former member of the Fremont Boys, a Norteno gang, was arrested after he evaded a routine traffic stop. He appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to one count of evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)), and admitted an enhancement for commission of a crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (d).) Defendant also admitted a strike and prison prior. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of one year, doubled for the strike prior, plus one year for the prison prior, for a total of three years in state prison. The court imposed a variety of fees and fines and directed the defendant to register as a gang member pursuant to Penal Code section 186.30. The court dismissed all remaining charges and special allegations. The timely appeal ensued.

Defendant Shawn Avant was convicted after jury trial of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury further found true the allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a metal bar, in the commission of the assault within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7. The trial court found true allegations that defendant had two California prior serious felony convictions, one of which qualified as a strike. (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction in Washington state for repeatedly violating a no-contact order because the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He further contends that the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 852. Lastly, defendant contends that reversal of his convictions is required due to the cumulative error. As we find no error requiring reversal, we will affirm the judgment.

Megan M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders taking dependency jurisdiction over Maverick, removing him from mother’s custody, placing Maverick with his father, Scott M. (father), and providing mother with reunification services and father with family maintenance services. On appeal, mother contends (1) the juvenile court erred in finding jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (f),[1] because the findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the order temporarily removing physical custody of Maverick from her was not supported by evidence that removal was necessary to avoid a substantial danger to his physical health or emotional well-being. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Dylan Timothy Hurrle, of two felony counts of resisting an executive officer by means of threat or violence (Pen. Code, § 69;[1] counts 7, 8) and individual counts of felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); count 6) and the following misdemeanors: resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 9); vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A), count 10); and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a); count 11). The jury acquitted appellant of the remaining felony charges: two counts of second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); counts 2, 3); and individual counts of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1); unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4) and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 5). Appellant admitted enhancement allegations that he had served three separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court imposed a prison term of six years eight months, consisting of the three-year upper term on count 6, concurrent eight-month terms on each of counts 7 and 8, and one year on each of the three prior prison term enhancements. The court imposed concurrent one-year terms on each of counts 9, 10 and 11, and awarded presentence custody credit of 348 days, consisting of 232 days of actual time credit and 116 days of conduct credit.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant, apparently in response to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing, has submitted a letter in which he argues, as best we can determine, that (1) he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge was biased against him, and (2) he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

A jury found Keiwaun Kesem Harvey (appellant) guilty of one count of maliciously depriving a lawful custodian of the right to custody of a child (Pen. Code, § 278.5)[1] and he was sentenced to two years in state prison.
On appeal appellant argues that the trial court prejudicially erred when it allowed evidence of the child’s condition at the time she was returned because it was irrelevant and inflammatory, and when it failed to sua sponte instruct on mistake of fact. He also contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. We disagree and affirm.

A jury found defendant Rodelio Limpo Cataroja guilty of multiple firearm-related offenses, including, as pertinent to this appeal, assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2);[1] count 1) and brandishing a firearm at a motor vehicle occupant (§ 417.3; count 2). Fabian Rosales was the victim of these crimes. The jury further found that defendant personally used a firearm in count 1.
The jury also found defendant guilty of multiple theft-related offenses, unrelated to the firearm assault and brandishing offenses. Most of the theft-related offenses involved unauthorized purchases at Target and Best Buy stores by defendant and a female accomplice, using the credit cards, personal checks, and driver’s licenses of several women whose purses were stolen from their cars while their cars were parked in their garages.

The body of Sandi Duncan was found in the desert; she had been robbed, strangled, and shot to death. Her phone records showed that the last call made to or from her cell phone was between her and defendant Melvin Lee Satcher. Defendant’s own phone records showed that, around the time of death, he was in the same desert area as the body. A shoeprint matching defendant’s shoes was found at the scene. When the police interviewed defendant, he lied repeatedly, including about when he last saw the victim and when he last tried to phone her.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212, subd. (c)). In connection with each count, an armed principal enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) was found true. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 26 years to life in prison, along with the usual fines and fees.