CA Unpub Decisions

On February 9, 2011, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Duane Blackburn with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code[1] section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); and assault causing serious bodily injury upon the same victim under section 243, subdivision (d) (count 2). As to count 1, the complaint also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim during the commission of the offense within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The complaint further alleged that defendant (1) had a prior conviction for possession of an assault rifle with a gang allegation under section 12880, subdivision (b) and section 186.22, subdivision (b), and did not remain free of prison custody for, and did commit an offense resulting in a felony conviction during, a period of five years under section 667.5, subdivision (b); and (2) had a strike prior under sections 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1) and 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1).
On March 22, 2011, the trial court declared doubt as to defendant’s mental competence; proceedings were ordered suspended under section 1368. Two reports as to defendant’s mental competence were prepared and filed, leading counsel to stipulate to the appointment of a third doctor to prepare an additional report. A third report was filed on June 17, 2011. After a hearing, the trial court found defendant mentally competent to stand trial. Criminal proceedings were reinstated.

Plaintiff and appellant Dayna Derry appeals from a summary judgment on her second amended complaint, alleging employment discrimination and other causes of action based on the failure of her former employers to reinstate her to her former position when she attempted to return to work following maternity leave.
We will affirm the judgment.

On October 24, 2005, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Lamar Coushan Williams with one count of possessing cocaine base for sale under Health and Safety Code section 11351.5.
On October 25, 2005, defendant pled guilty as charged. He was sentenced to three years of formal probation. Defendant was also ordered to pay numerous fines and fees.
On July 25, 2008, the court filed an allegation that defendant violated probation for failing to pay certain fines and fees. On August 29, 2008, after defendant failed to appear in court, defendant’s probation was revoked and a bench warrant was issued.
On May 26, 2011, defendant appeared in court. Defendant’s probation had been transferred to Georgia and had been completed there. The People’s motion to withdraw the allegation for violation of probation was granted and probation was terminated. The court ordered defendant’s remaining fines and fees to be paid, and for the payment to proceed civilly.
On June 2, 2011, defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.

Defendant perpetrated three crimes that involved strikingly similar modus operandi. In each of these offenses, the victims believed they were going to a location to have a date with a girl they met on the Internet. When they arrived, defendant approached the victims armed with a shotgun. During one heist, defendant absconded with the victim’s wallet and cellular telephone; in another defendant shot at the victim when he tried to drive away; and in another incident, the shotgun discharged when the victim and defendant struggled over it.
Defendant was convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and firearm, and shooting at an occupied vehicle.
Defendant claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support three of his convictions because the evidence consisted only of circumstantial evidence of similar modus operandi.
We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Alfredo Rodriguez was at the party, helping his brother, who was the disk jockey (DJ). Defendant took it upon himself to arm himself with a shotgun, to station himself just inside the entrance to the party, and to shoot the first member of the gang member’s group who came in, killing him.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd (a), 189), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm and causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Defendant was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life, plus the usual fines and fees.

Defendant perpetrated three crimes that involved strikingly similar modus operandi. In each of these offenses, the victims believed they were going to a location to have a date with a girl they met on the Internet. When they arrived, defendant approached the victims armed with a shotgun. During one heist, defendant absconded with the victim’s wallet and cellular telephone; in another defendant shot at the victim when he tried to drive away; and in another incident, the shotgun discharged when the victim and defendant struggled over it.
Defendant was convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and firearm, and shooting at an occupied vehicle.
Defendant claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support three of his convictions because the evidence consisted only of circumstantial evidence of similar modus operandi.
We affirm the judgment.

A gang member — along with his wife and his brother-in-law — was turned away from a party, apparently because two rival gang members were present and did not want him there. After a brief fistfight, he left; however, he soon returned, accompanied by friends and family members as reinforcements.
Defendant Alfredo Rodriguez was at the party, helping his brother, who was the disk jockey (DJ). Defendant took it upon himself to arm himself with a shotgun, to station himself just inside the entrance to the party, and to shoot the first member of the gang member’s group who came in, killing him.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd (a), 189), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm and causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Defendant was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life, plus the usual fines and fees.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder within the meaning of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).[1] In addition, the jury found the special allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) true. Defendant was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison.

A jury convicted defendant, McClain Bell, of transporting and possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a); 11351),[1] possessing testosterone (§ 1377, subd. (a)) and possessing less than 28.5 grams of marijuana (§ 11357, subd. (b)). He was granted probation and appeals, claiming his motion for a continuance to substitute counsel was erroneously denied, the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to instruct on accomplice testimony and one of the conditions of his probation is unconstitutional. We reject his first two contentions, and conclude that the probation condition must be narrowed. We therefore affirm the judgment, while directing the trial court to modify the probation condition at issue.

A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd, (a)), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm and causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison, plus the usual fines and fees.

A jury found defendant guilty on five counts of a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)); one count of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)); one count of possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)(1)); one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); see now id., § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and one count of unlawful possession of a billy club (former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1); see now id., § 22210).
The information had alleged a multiple victim special circumstance for purposes of the “one strike” law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) Although the jury did not return a separate verdict on this allegation, it did find defendant guilty of lewd acts on two named victims. (See People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 712 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found two “strike” priors true. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
Defendant was sentenced to a total of 240 years to life, plus the usual fines and fees.

Brent M., Sr., (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders and findings of August 19, 2011, which include orders declaring minors, two-year-old Brent M., Jr., and eight-month-old Brent M. III (collectively “minors”), dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)[1] and ordering father to take parenting classes, participate in individual counseling to address domestic violence and anger management issues, to undergo random alcohol and drug testing, and to discontinue using medical marijuana.[2] Father contends that the dispositional orders are unsupported by substantial evidence.
We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Tami B. appeals a judgment declaring her minor son, T.S., a dependent of the juvenile court, removing him from her custody, placing him in out-of-home care and denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11).[1] Tami contends the court erred by denying her reunification services because, despite having lost custody of T.S.'s siblings in prior dependency cases, she made reasonable efforts to treat her substance abuse problem. She further contends it was in T.S.'s best interests to provide her with reunification services. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found Edgar Martinez guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] (count 1); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2); making a criminal threat (§ 422) (count 3); burglary (§ 459) (count 4); and grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)) (count 5). As to count 1, the jury found that Martinez personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). As to all counts, the jury found that Martinez personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Martinez to an aggregate term of 15 years.
On appeal, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements that a witness made to law enforcement officers, as prior consistent statements, pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1236 and 791. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements and affirm the judgment.[2]