Sarah R.























Filed
12/6/12 Sarah R. CA1/1

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.







IN THE
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION
ONE


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SARAH R., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEL NORTE COUNTY, Respondent; DEL NORTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest.

A136491 (Del Norte County Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ-11-6054, JVSQ-11-6055, JVSQ-11-6056)

SARAH R. (Mother) seeks href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">extraordinary relief from orders of the
Del Norte County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered August 28, 2012,
terminating Mother’s reunification services after a continued 12-month
permanency hearing, and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"
title="">[1]
to select a permanent plan for her three daughters, D.C. (born 1996), E.R.
(born 1998) and L.R. (born 1998). Mother
contends essentially that the Del Norte County Department of Health and Human
Services (Department) failed to identify and offer services for her mental
health issues, and such failure impaired her ability to engage in her
reunification case plan. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Department
provided or offered Mother reasonable services, and deny on the merits Mother’s
petitions for extraordinary writ.href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]


Background

The
Department filed dependency petitions
as to each of the minor girls on April 5,
2011, indicating they had been detained the preceding week. Their detention was based on a referral to
the effect that the girls had been left in the care of “an inappropriate person” whose own children
were dependents of the juvenile court in out-of-home custody. The petitions sought dependency jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging that Mother had a
substance abuse history impairing her ability to provide for the care and
supervision of her daughters, that her current whereabouts were unknown and she
had not been providing for the girls’ care, and that she had previously
declined to engage in voluntary services offered under section 301. In addition, the petitions alleged that
D.C.’s biological father was deceased, and the biological father of E.R. and
L.R.—D.R. (Father)—was homeless and the Department had been unable to assess
his ability to provide for their care and support. The paternal grandmother of D.C. and maternal
grandfather of all three children were additionally alleged to be unable or
unwilling to provide their respective grandchildren with care or support.

The
Department’s detention report noted 23 prior referrals involving the family,
including four substantiated referrals of general neglect by Mother since March
2004. It also detailed an extensive
criminal history for both Mother and Father, and described Mother’s failure to
engage in voluntary services offered by the Department under section 301 in 2009. The juvenile court formally detained the
minors on April 6,
2011, after a hearing at which Mother did not appear. Mother made her first appearance on April 15, 2011, at the
hearing to set the matter to determine jurisdiction when she entered her denial
of the jurisdictional allegations against her.
On the Department’s motion the court dismissed the jurisdictional
allegations regarding Mother’s unknown whereabouts.

The
Department’s jurisdictional report indicated that during 2009 and 2010, D.C. lived
with her paternal aunt or with Mother, while E.R. and L.R. lived with
Father. D.C. told the assigned social
worker (SW) that she did not want to be returned to Mother’s care, whom she
described as a “lifelong tweeker.” E.R.
and L.R., in turn, said they did not want to return to Father’s care, or even
to have visitation with him, due to his physical and emotional abuse. The SW concluded that all three girls needed
stability in their lives, after having been “passed around between the two
parents, other relatives and friends of their parents for several years.” Mother’s and Father’s issues regarding
substance abuse, domestic violence, and criminal activity had adversely
impacted the minors. When the SW
interviewed Mother, the latter saw her lack of housing as the only issue
preventing the children’s return to her care, and described herself as the
“non-offending” noncustodial parent in the proceeding.

At
the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing on April 29, 2011,—at which Mother did not appear—the
juvenile court sustained the jurisdictional allegations summarized above. The following May 13, after a dispositional
hearing at which Mother also failed to appear, the court ordered the children
to continue in out-of-home custody and directed the Department to provide
reunification services to Mother and Father.

The
Department’s report prepared for the six-month status review hearing, completed
in November 2011, noted, among other things, that Mother had not been in
contact since the previous April, and the assigned SW did not know where she
currently resided. Mother had not yet
made any follow through with the referrals the SW had offered her, which
included a referral to “Mental Health” for an assessment. The girls had reported their reluctance to have
contact either with Mother or Father.
Nevertheless, the Department recommended continuing both parents’
services. On December 2, 2011, at the conclusion of the
six-month hearing, at which Mother once more failed to appear, the juvenile
court continued her services as recommended.

The
reports for the 12-month permanency hearing, completed by the Department in May
2012, recommended the termination of Mother’s services and the setting of a
hearing under section 366.26. Mother,
again, was reported to be homeless, unemployed, and not in regular contact,
although she had in January 2012 resumed visitation with the girls. She had still not followed through with the
referrals provided as early as the jurisdictional hearing over one year
ago. Mother was present at the contested
12-month review hearing, which commenced on June 29, 2012.
At the conclusion of this continued hearing, on August 28, the court
terminated Mother’s services and set the matter for a hearing under section
366.26.

Mother’s petitions
followed. (§ 366.26, subd. (>l).)

Discussion

Mother’s
petitions, as to each of her daughters, are identically presented in the form
of a declaration, to the effect that the Department’s intervention was
“confusing” and “unclear” to her, as were the reunification services
offered. She avers that she became
depressed and overwhelmed. Her
engagement in mental health
services offered by the Department did not provide treatment for her
depression, and she blames the Department for failing to identify and offer
proper treatment for her depression, suggesting that this failure impaired her
ability to pursue successfully the requirements of her reunification case plan.


Her argument, in essence, challenges the
juvenile court’s finding that Department offered or provided reasonable
services during the period under review at the continued 12-month hearing. In reviewing the challenged finding, we
examine the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order,
to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding under the clear and convincing
evidence standard. (In re Isayah C.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694.) We
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of a finding regarding the adequacy
of an agency’s reunification plan and the reasonableness of its efforts. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
41, 46 (Julie M.).) We likewise
resolve conflicts in favor of such a finding and do not reweigh the
evidence. (In re Jasmine C.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.)

An
agency is not obligated to provide the best services possible in an ideal
world, but only those that are reasonable under all the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547; Julie M., supra, 69
Cal.App.4th 41, 48.) Services may
be deemed reasonable when the case plan has identified the problems leading to
the loss of custody, the Agency has offered services designed to remedy those
problems, has maintained reasonable contact with the parent, and has made
reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas in which compliance has proven
to be difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)

In
light of these principles we find no legal merit to Mother’s averments. In addition to the facts reported in the
Department’s report for the 12-month hearing, mentioned above, the assigned SW
testified on June 29, 2012, that she had, as early as April 2011, recognized
that Mother “struggle[d]
to understand a lot of what the process [involved], a lot of the paperwork,
[and] a lot of the requirements.” She
had at that time offered to Mother a referral for a mental health evaluation,
because she believed Mother had mental health issues. From April 2011 up to the time of the SW’s
testimony Mother had failed to follow through with this referral. At the conclusion of the continued hearing,
on August 28, a newly assigned SW testified she had attempted to have Mother
sign off on this and other referrals after the hearing on June 29, so that
Mother could access services. Mother,
however, had failed to show for meetings arranged for this purpose. Although the SW finally had face-to-face contact
with Mother after a scheduled visitation on August 1, Mother chose to leave
rather than sign the referrals. This was
notwithstanding Mother’s own testimony, at the June 29 hearing, that she was
willing to engage in a mental health assessment.

From the
12-month report, and the foregoing testimony, it is clear the Department
identified the fact that Mother had potential mental health issues and sought
to have her assessed for appropriate counseling or other treatment. Although the Department was
obligated to offer Mother reasonable reunification services, reunification is fundamentally
a parental obligation, and the assigned SW’s were not required to “take
[Mother] by the hand and escort . . . her to and through
. . . counseling sessions.” (>In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d
1448, 1463, fn. 5.) “A parent whose children have been
adjudged dependents of the juvenile court is on notice of the conduct requiring
such state intervention. If such a
parent in no way seeks to correct . . . her own behavior or waits
until the impetus of an impending court hearing to attempt to do so, the
legislative purpose of providing safe and stable environments for children is
not served by forcing the juvenile court to go ‘on hold’ while the parent makes
another stab at compliance.” (>Ibid.)

We
conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the
Department offered or provided Mother with reasonable href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">reunification services under the
particular circumstances of this case.

Disposition

The
petitions for extraordinary writ are denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; >Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3
Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd.
v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) The decision is final in this court
immediately. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rules
8.452(i), 8.490(b)(3).)






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	__________________________________ Dondero, J.
We concur: __________________________________ Marchiano, P. J. __________________________________ Banke, J.