CA Unpub Decisions

Brian Sr. appeals from the dependency court’s order finding jurisdiction over his two-year-old son pursuant to subdivision (f) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, based on the finding Brian Sr. had “caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.” According to Brian Sr., this subdivision requires criminal negligence, and he was not criminally negligent in causing the death of his nine-month-old son. However, our Supreme Court recently determined that for purposes of a dependency adjudication under subdivision (f) of section 300, the neglect by which a parent or guardian “caused the death of another child” may include the breach of ordinary care, and need not amount to criminal negligence. (In re Ethan C. (2012) __ Cal.4th __ [2012 Cal. LEXIS 6358].) Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Joseph B. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring his three children dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j),[1] removing the children from the custody of Father, and placing them in the home of their mother, Lucia B. (“Mother”). Father raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding the telephonic testimony of the paternal grandmother at the jurisdiction hearing; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding that Father’s prior sexual abuse of six unrelated female children placed his children at substantial risk of sexual abuse under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j); and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding that Father’s history of domestic violence against Mother placed his children at substantial risk of physical harm under section 300, subdivision (b). We affirm.

Appellant Armando T., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare & Institutions Code Section 602, after sustaining allegations that he committed second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding. We find sufficient evidence and affirm the judgment.

Here is a tale of shoddy banking practices. Two national banks are fighting over nearly $1 million, representing the surplus proceeds from a trustee’s sale of real property in Beverly Hills. The trial court distributed the lion’s share of the funds to Bank of America (BofA), leaving only a few ducats for Wells Fargo Bank (WFB).
A scrupulous examination of the evidence shows that BofA (which inherited this fiasco from Countrywide Home Loans) deposited a cashier’s check from WFB that was clearly intended to pay off a loan—ignoring explicit warnings that cashing the check constituted its “unconditional agreement” to close the account and extinguish its lien. BofA also ignored an enjoinder to “bill the customer for any residual balance.” After cashing the check, BofA failed to bill the customer for the residual balance, failed to close the credit line, and failed to extinguish its lien on the property. The evidence supports only one conclusion: the cashier’s check was an accord and satisfaction of a disputed monetary claim. When BofA cashed the check, the debt was discharged. (Cal. U. Com. Code § 3311.)[1] The trial court incorrectly concluded that BofA is entitled to preserve its priority lien in this transaction.

A jury convicted defendant Christian Martinez Sedano of vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a))[1] with the finding that he had committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). After defendant admitted a 2008 robbery conviction (§ 211), the trial court sentenced him to six-year term.
In this appeal, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We disagree. He also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not object to a portion of the gang expert’s testimony and that the trial court erred in failing to submit CALCRIM No. 358. We find no prejudicial error and therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Ayvaz Yegikyan (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff and respondent Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase). Because appellant has not met his burden on appeal, we conclude that the trial court properly entered judgment for Chase. Accordingly, we affirm.

Natalia Morozova appeals[1] from various orders entered to resolve issues relating to spousal support and the appointment of various therapists for her minor daughter, Frances Callow (“Frances”), in the post dissolution proceedings between appellant and respondent, Edward Callow. Before this court, appellant challenges various orders, some of which she did not properly appeal from, others from which she timely appealed and others which are moot. Specifically, as to appellant’s challenges to orders appointing various therapists for Frances, her appeal is moot because all of the parties have moved out of state and California courts no longer have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child custody determinations. In addition, appellant also assails the trial court’s modification of spousal support and child support from the parties’ 2008 stipulated judgment and asks the court to order that she be reimbursed for two of Frances’ therapy sessions. As we shall explain, we do not reach the merits of these contentions because appellant could have, but did not appeal from these matters, or as in the case of the reimbursement request, they relate to issues that were not decided by the lower court, nor were they part of the orders on appeal. As for the order from which she properly appealed, namely, the order capping spousal support, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the court’s findings as to those issues, and that the court did not abuse its discretion. Consequently we affirm.

Michael Horton was convicted of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187/664) and one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He contends on appeal that the trial should have been severed to separately try each count of attempted murder; that the trial court should have conducted an in camera hearing to review the personnel records of the investigating officer for potential discovery; that the court should have permitted Horton to represent himself at post-trial hearings; that he was entitled to a post-verdict hearing on his request to substitute counsel; and that this court should independently review the trial court’s in camera hearing concerning the disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant. We conclude that the record contains insufficient information to permit a review of the request to disclose the identity of the confidential information, and therefore conditionally reverse the attempted murder convictions so that a hearing may be held pursuant to Evidence Code section 1042. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Raymond Dewayne Finley appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of felony evasion of a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (§ 23152, subd. (a)).[1] The jury acquitted him of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that appellant had been convicted of two prior serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the felony officer evasion, and contends that the court committed prejudicial errors in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser offense of misdemeanor officer evasion, and instructing on flight evidence as consciousness of guilt. He further contends that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike his prior felony convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and that his 25-year-to-life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Appellant Hassan Miah[1] appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate a stipulated judgment on the ground of fraud. The gist of the claim is that the attorney who represented his wife misled Hassan into believing she was a neutral not aligned with either side, and that, relying on this, he did not retain his own counsel as he otherwise would have done. We conclude that denial of the motion to vacate was correct, and affirm.

Two “validated Mexican Mafia associates” were housed next to each other in single-person cells in the high security unit of the Los Angeles County jail. When deputies found one of these inmates trying to clean up the blood pouring from two deep slices in his forearm, neither the injured inmate nor anyone else would say what had happened. There was blood in the adjacent cell, however, and Joseph Sisneros, known as the “shot caller” on the row, said the other inmate “must have fell.”
Sisneros was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and custodial possession of a weapon with gang, prior strike, great bodily injury and personal use of a deadly weapon allegations found true. He was sentenced to a term of 44 years plus 50 years to life in state prison. Sisneros appeals, claiming the gang allegation should have been dismissed, the trial court should have bifurcated the gang allegation, the gang expert’s testimony was improper, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a subsequent attack on the victim, and the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence and deadly weapon enhancement. In addition, we asked the parties to brief the issue of whether imposition of the 10-year gang enhancement was improper in this case.
As the People concede, the deadly weapon enhancement must be stricken, and we conclude imposition of the 10-year gang enhancement was improper, but in all other respects, we affirm.

Fifteen tenants[1] who resided at 5135 Zelzah Avenue in Encino, California (the building) brought a complicated action against the owners of the building, George Yao (Yao) and 4528 Colbath LLC (collectively defendants) after defendants notified the tenants that the building units were going to be sold as condominium units. Following a lengthy, two-phase trial, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed the judgment, challenging the damage award on the claims for wrongful eviction and negligence, penalties award, injunction, and attorney fees and cost award. Plaintiffs cross-appealed, objecting to the trial court’s orders (1) granting defendants’ motion for partial nonsuit, and (2) denying them prejudgment interest.
We agree with defendants that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury pursuant to Government Code section 66459. As the trial court found when it correctly granted defendants’ motion for partial nonsuit, Government Code section 66459 does not apply. We further conclude that the trial court erred in awarding civil penalties against defendants pursuant to Civil Code section 1940.2 “by way of” Business and Professions Code section 11018.2. Finally, because the judgment is reversed, the award for attorney fees and costs is reversed as well.
The trial court’s award of restitution ($2,170) to Grace Ahn is affirmed. In all other respects, the matter is remanded for further proceedings, including a new trial.

Defendant was sentenced to an eight-year prison term following his plea of no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon and admission of a gang enhancement. Execution of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for four years. Defendant filed a timely appeal from the judgment of conviction challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, defense counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any issues deserving of further briefing. Counsel has also notified defendant he can file a supplemental brief with the court. No supplemental brief has been received. Upon review of the record, we conclude no arguable issues are presented for review and affirm the judgment.