CA Unpub Decisions

Ronald Apodaca was discharged from his employment as a blood gas technician for the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS or the department) for violating DHS policies regarding conduct toward others. He unsuccessfully appealed his suspension to the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles (the commission), then petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (a). The superior court denied the petition. On appeal, Apodaca contends evidence before the commission was insufficient to support his termination. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Gregory Ware appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his misdemeanor conviction of failure to disclose the origin of a recording or audiovisual work (Pen. Code, § 653w, subd. (a); count 1).[1] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years under certain terms and conditions, including the condition he stay away from the 5th Street corridor in Los Angeles.[2]
On appeal, defendant contends this “stay-away” order is unauthorized, unlawful, and a violation of his “federal and state constitutional rights to travel and freedom of movement, speech, association, and assembly.” He contends his attorney was ineffective for failing to object on these constitutional grounds.
We shall affirm the judgment. The “stay-away” order is not constitutionally infirm. Defendant’s counsel therefore was not ineffective for not objecting on those grounds.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) has exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding apportionment of attorney fees arising from the underlying workers’ compensation proceedings. They further contend the court erred in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that another action is pending between these parties on the same cause of action, because the pending WCAB proceeding is unrelated to the apportionment of the attorney fees claim. They also contend the trial court erred in concluding the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for declaratory relief because the complaint seeks a prospective determination of the rights and duties of the parties under a contract for apportionment of attorney fees. Last, they contend the court abused its discretion in not allowing plaintiffs to amend the complaint to state a cause of action.
We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. We conclude the court erred in sustaining the demurrer on the ground the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction over these claims and on the ground of another action pending before the WCAB. The court properly sustained the demurrer on the ground the complaint fails to state a cause of action for declaratory relief, but the court abused its discretion in not allowing leave to amend.

Appellant Larry Armstrong appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to one count of first degree residential burglary with a person present in violation of Penal Code section 459. The trial court sentenced appellant to 23 years in state prison, which consisted of the upper term of six years doubled to 12 years based on appellant’s admission of a prior burglary “strike” under Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d), plus 11 years based on appellant’s admission of two prior serious felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant was ordered to pay fines and fees.
The judgment was filed on October 20, 2011. On November 22, 2011, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea on the grounds that he was not arraigned within 48 hours of his arrest, he was not competent at the time he made his plea because he was taking “psych-medications,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not properly negotiate his plea. The court heard the motion on December 20, 2011, with appellant and his attorney present. The court treated the motion as one filed under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, and denied it. On December 29, 2011, appellant filed the same motion, which the court took off calendar. The court notified appellant of its action by letter dated January 17, 2012. Apparently, appellant refiled his original motion. The court took no action on the motion, as indicated by minute order dated February 7, 2012. On February 22, 2011, appellant filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause to challenge the denial of his plea withdrawal motion. The trial court granted the certificate of probable cause on March 9, 2012.

On the afternoon of September 16, 2011, LAPD Officers Svoboda and Lantz were patrolling the area near the residence of appellant Tammy Rudy Austin. The area had a high rate of car burglaries and narcotics activity. The officers contacted Ernesto Cabral, a known probationer. Cabral indicated that he lived with Austin, who was his girlfriend, at 6012 Carpenter Ave.
The officers knocked on the front door of Austin’s residence, and she opened the door. They asked if they could come inside to discuss recent burglaries in the area. Austin said, “yes,” and stepped aside in a way that appeared to the officers to be an invitation to enter. They walked into the living room with Cabral. In plain view, Officer Svoboda saw a cylindrical glass pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine in the bedroom a few feet away. Officer Svoboda also saw a plastic baggie containing what was later determined to be 2.15 grams of methamphetamine on the bed.
The Officer arrested appellant and asked permission to search the house, to which Austin consented. The officer found additional methamphetamine in a dresser drawer, and narcotics in Austin’s purse. Austin admitted that the drugs found in the residence were hers. Officer Svoboda asked Austin if Cabral lived in the residence. She said he sometimes slept on the living room couch, and confirmed that they had a relationship.

Norma L. (mother) appeals the finding of the juvenile court that her twin children, Kayden A. and Nevaeh A., are dependents as described by section 300, subdivision (b), of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] based on her conduct. We conclude the finding is supported by substantial evidence, and so affirm.

Defendant and appellant Daniel Sanchez appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] during the commission of which he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Sanchez to 12 years in prison and awarded him a total of 249 days of presentence custody credit. We affirm.

Father Eduardo D. appeals the juvenile court order that he enroll in a drug treatment program. He contends the order violates a negotiated settlement of this case and that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s order. We agree and reverse.

For the second time, defendant and appellant Fred DiPaolo (defendant) appeals from his conviction of three counts of felony sex abuse.[1] Defendant contends that the trial court failed to comply with this court’s directive to exercise its discretion in determining whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive term as to count 2. He also contends that the consecutive term amounting to 30 years to life in prison violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We conclude that the trial court exercised its discretion as directed and that defendant’s sentence was not cruel or unusual. We thus affirm the judgment.

T.G. (mother) challenges a juvenile court dispositional order placing her two children, A.C. (born Sept. 2000) and D.G. (born Mar. 2004) with their respective fathers and terminating jurisdiction. [1] To the extent mother attacks the juvenile court’s dispositional order, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err. However, as for mother’s complaint that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) notification requirements, we agree that notice was deficient. Those deficiencies do not compel reversal of the juvenile court’s order. Rather, pursuant to In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, this matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing DCFS to provide proper ICWA notice.

Joshua T. appeals from the order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered as a result of the juvenile court’s finding he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The court placed Joshua T. at home on probation. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Arthur Leeds appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to serve an indispensable party. We affirm.

Defendant Francine M. Turner appeals from the judgment entered after her no contest plea to one count of transporting, selling, or offering to sell a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and one count of possessing marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). She was placed on probation for three years with conditions.
The lead appellant, Kelton Bernard Lasley, abandoned his appeal, which was dismissed on March 29, 2012. Codefendant Stacy Tyrone Lee is not a party to this appeal.
Turner’s notice of appeal states that she challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(A).) Her appointed counsel filed a Wende brief. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) On January 17, 2012, we directed appointed counsel to send the record and a copy of counsel’s brief to Turner and notified Turner of her right to respond within 30 days. We have received no response.

P.H. (grandmother), the paternal grandmother of Andrea B. (Andrea, born Nov. 2006), challenges the juvenile court’s findings and orders sustaining three counts of a four-count Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 petition,[1] removing Andrea from her custody, denying her reunification services, and terminating her legal guardianship.
We affirm.