CA Unpub Decisions

Erick G. appeals from an order denying deferred entry of judgment after the juvenile court found he had committed the offense of possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610), a felony. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Rogelio Reyes (defendant) was convicted of four counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)[1]). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgment.

Shawn M., Sr. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order removing his three children, three-year-old Shawn M., two-year-old Michael M. and one-year-old Elizabeth M., and placing them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department), contending the findings and order are not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends the Department violated his due process right to notice when it amended the section 300 petition[1] at the contested jurisdiction hearing to add an allegation he had physically abused Michael. We affirm.

Appellant J.M. appeals from a juvenile court decision finding a charge of trespass upon school grounds to be true, as part of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. He contends the court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that he violated the relevant trespass statute because the school failed to provide a sufficient hearing and notification. Without reaching appellant’s claims, we find the evidence insufficient to support the court’s ruling, because respondent failed to demonstrate appellant’s willful and knowing entry upon the school campus. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

Greg F. contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings with respect to him at the jurisdictional hearings concerning his son, Evan F. He also asserts that the court failed to make appropriate findings in conjunction with its removal orders and that there was not clear and convincing evidence of detriment if Evan F. were to be placed with him. We affirm.

Rakesh (Ray) Patel, Thakor I. Patel and Kusum T. Patel appeal from the judgment confirming an arbitration award resolving an attorney fee dispute in favor of the Patels’ former counsel Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Esensten LLP (WCCE). The Patels contend the award of approximately $4.8 million, plus attorney fees and costs of another $200,000, should have been vacated because (1) the arbitrators failed to disclose their service as neutrals in cases involving the law firm with which counsel for WCCE was associated as “of counsel” in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9 and the California Rules of Court, Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, and (2) the arbitrators exceeded their powers by issuing an award that violates the public policy set forth in rule 3-300 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We affirm.

Defendant Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (Mid-Wilshire) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration and to stay this wrongful termination action filed by plaintiff Maribel Mendez. We hold that the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement governing Mendez’s employment does not apply to Mendez’s statutory discrimination claims, and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Robert Lee Ellis of false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code, § 236[1]), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)). The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the false imprisonment, criminal threats, and assault. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b) through (i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). The trial court sentenced defendant to 21 years, four months in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right of self-representation when it denied his Faretta[2] motion. We affirm.

Appellant Marisa S. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s exit order requiring that her visitation with her daughter AH be monitored, and providing that if she and the child’s father Raymond H. (Father) cannot agree on a monitor, Father is empowered to choose the monitor. She also appeals the portion of a restraining order issued by the court at Father’s request, requiring her to stay 100 yards away from AH and her school. We reverse the restraining order in part, concluding there was no evidence to support that Mother intended to violate any prior order or that AH needed the protection of a restraining order. We otherwise affirm.

Defendant Sophon Chhom appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of the attempted murder of Marcelio Rodriguez, Jr., (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1), assault by machine gun or assault weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(3); count 2), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3).[2]
On count 1, the jury found true the allegations that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (a)) and that during the commission of the offense Chhom personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The jury also found true the allegations that Chhom personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d))[3] and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), causing Rodriguez to become comatose (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)). As to counts 2 and 3 the jury found true the allegations that Chhom personally used an assault weapon (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally used a firearm (§ 12022.5), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) that caused Rodriguez to become comatose (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Chhom to state prison for life with the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life.
Chhom appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s determination that his attempted murder of Rodriguez was willful, premeditated, and deliberate. Chhom also argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Rodriguez’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible at trial because Rodriguez was unavailable. We affirm the judgment.

Defendants, Millbrae Paradise LLC and L.F. George Properties Corporation, successfully secured relief from entry of default and a default judgment. Plaintiffs, Wei Hao and Faxue Gong, appeal, arguing the trial court improperly granted defendants’ motion for relief on an ex parte basis. Defendants contend plaintiffs’ brief failed to present an adequate record for review. We agree.

Defendant Wilfredo Melendez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found not true the allegations of great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and commission of the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Melendez to state prison for a term of five years. Melendez argues on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. We conclude the evidence did not warrant such an instruction and affirm the judgment.

As part of a negotiated agreement, Avetis Vartanyan pleaded no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter and admitted a firearm-use enhancement. Prior to sentencing, Vartanyan moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and imposed a 16-year state prison term pursuant to the plea agreement. On appeal, Vartanyan contends the court coerced him to enter a guilty plea. We affirm.

Appellant Andrew Michael Tyler appeals his judgment of conviction of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (Pen. Code,[1] § 288.5, subd. (a)), one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child by rape (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child by oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)). Tyler’s sole contention on appeal is that his conviction for aggravated sexual assault by rape must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove that an act of sexual penetration occurred. Because substantial evidence supported Tyler’s conviction, we affirm.