CA Unpub Decisions

At trial plaintiff Norlito Soriano failed to convince the court that respondent Ronald Chew was liable on multiple causes of action arising from the promise of foreclosure relief in a scheme initiated by Chew's co-defendants, World Marketers, Inc. and its principal, C. Bryan McCord. The co-defendants, having failed to answer the complaint, were subjected to a default judgment and are not parties to this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks review of the judgment in Chew's favor. He contends that the court's statement of decision was deficient and that the court's factual findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Yung Tsai Lai appeals after conviction, by jury trial, of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.)[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 years to life, consecutive to a one-year term for the jury’s finding that defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed his post-arrest statements because (1) he made the incriminating statements after insufficient Miranda advisements (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)), (2) the police continued interrogating him after he requested an attorney, and (3) he waived his Miranda rights involuntarily. Defendant also contends the trial court allowed expert witness testimony about his intent in violation of section 29. He further contends that CALCRIM No. 362 erroneously permitted the jury to find him guilty of first degree murder because he made a false statement.
For reasons that we shall explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Daniel Lee Tilbury killed his ex-wife by shooting her seven times with a .50 caliber pistol. He was convicted by jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), and the jury found true allegations that he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). On appeal, he first contends that his conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of malice. He also asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred in (2) refusing to allow two questions to be posed in voir dire, (3) excluding defense evidence, (4) admitting evidence of defendant’s ownership of numerous firearms other than the .50 caliber pistol, (5) telling the jury that the court could not provide “better definitions,” (6) failing to define provocation, (7) refusing defense requests for two pinpoint instructions, and (8) failing to include lack of provocation as an element of murder in the murder instructions. Finally, defendant claims that the cumulative prejudice from these errors requires reversal. We reject all of his claims and affirm the judgment.

Laura D. Wills appeals from the eight-year prison sentence executed following a probation violation. She contends the trial court misunderstood its discretion to make a downward modification to a previously imposed but suspended sentence. She also asserts her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by acting under the same misapprehension as the trial court.
We conclude Wills and the district attorney entered into a negotiated plea agreement and, at the time of the guilty plea, the trial court actually imposed and suspended execution of an eight-year term. Thus, at the probation violation hearing, the trial court correctly understood it had two choices, either reinstate probation or execute the previously imposed sentence. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Adrienne D. (mother) personally seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) following juvenile court orders denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her infant son, Nicholas.[1] In her petition, mother states “I Adrienne want all my kids back” and “mistakes on court papers parents are safe and want all 4 kids back.” She also appears to state “the conservatorship judge said yes I have a problem.” Mother does not explain what it is about the juvenile court’s orders that she contests. Because mother’s petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, we will dismiss it as inadequate.

Appellant Steven L., Sr. (father) is the biological father of one-year-old Steven L., Jr. (Steven), the subject of this appeal. Father appeals from the permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] at which the juvenile court terminated his parental rights as well as those of Steven’s mother, Monica. Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying him presumed father status under Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.). Monica joins in father’s argument. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant D.F. was found by the juvenile court to have committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1), second degree robbery (§ 211; count 2), grand theft person (§ 487, subd. (c); count 3), and two counts of misdemeanor battery (§ 242; counts 4 & 6).[2] The court further found that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). On appeal, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings with respect to counts 1, 2, 4, and 6. He also contends insufficient evidence supports the section 12022.7 enhancement in count 1. We disagree with appellant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Juan Manuel Mendez of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)),[1] and two counts of being an accessory after the fact (§ 32). The convictions resulted from an unprovoked attack by three Hispanic males who shot and murdered DeAngelo S., and shot and seriously wounded J.S., while the two sat near a basketball court in an apartment complex. The jury also found true the allegation that a principal personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (e) in conjunction with the conspiracy count. The evidence established that Mendez was not one of the shooters, but he drove the vehicle used to transport the shooters to and from the apartment complex.
Mendez primarily raises two contentions. First, he contends the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, in violation of the Batson/Wheeler[2] line of cases. Second, he asserts the conviction for conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed because the vagueness of the verdict form renders the verdict unreliable. Mendez attacks the verdict form from several fronts. We reject each of these arguments and affirm the judgment of conspiracy to commit murder. We agree with the People’s concession, however, that one accessory count must be reversed, and the enhancement on the conspiracy count pursuant to section 186.22 must be stricken because it is prohibited by s

On September 14, 2012, an information charged defendant and appellant Robert Raymond Nira with damaging and destroying property in an amount of $400 or more. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1), count 1.) The information also alleged that defendant served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and that he had been convicted of a prior serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
On November 29, 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of count 1. Thereafter, the trial court found that the three prior prison term allegations and prior serious and violent conviction were true.
On January 11, 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of six years in state prison, and ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees. Defendant was awarded 545 days of credit for time served, consisting of 273 actual days and 272 days pursuant to Penal Code section 4019.
On January 16, 2013, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Lynne McGinnis, Felicity Senoski, and Linh Lam, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In early 2010, defendant Ralph Charles Negroni leased a house in Desert Hot Springs with his wife, Emilia Negroni. However, by June 2010, he had moved out of the residence into another apartment due to marital problems. On June 28, he came to the home and saw through a bedroom window Emilia using methamphetamine with another man in her bedroom. Defendant threw a rock through the window, entered the bedroom, and beat up Emilia.[1]
Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)[2] and corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subdivision (a)). The special allegation that someone other than an accomplice was present during the burglary (§667.5, subdivision (c)(21)) was found true. Defendant was granted three years of formal probation with 60 days in the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department in the work program.
Defendant now contends on appeal as follows:

Michelle D. appeals a judgment terminating parental rights to her daughter, Abbey R., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] She contends there is not substantial evidence to support the finding Abbey was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Abbey R. is the daughter of Michelle D. and Bradley R.[2] In October 2000, when Abbey was two weeks old, she was removed from her parents' care due to their substance abuse and because her one-year-old half sister had suffered unexplained bruises and contusions to her face. Abbey's sister was adopted by their maternal grandmother. Abbey reunified with her father after he successfully completed substance abuse treatment. Michelle did not maintain contact with Abbey.

Adolfo Barrientos and Maria Enriquette Barrientos (together, Barrientos) appeal a judgment entered against them in a declaratory relief action brought by the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (the Exchange). Barrientos argues the trial court erred in interpreting and applying an insurance contract issued by the Exchange. As we will explain, we conclude that Barrientos's appellate arguments lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us after the sustaining of a general demurrer; accordingly, the rule is that we accept as true all the material allegations of the complaint." (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 7.) The pertinent facts alleged in Reilly's complaint are as follows.
Reilly and Lena Brion agreed to operate Brion Reilly, Inc. (BRI) to provide architectural and interior design services. Brion owned 51 percent of the shares of BRI and Reilly owned 49 percent, but they agreed to share BRI's income and profits equally. After Brion informed Reilly she intended to terminate their business relationship, she wrongfully excluded him from BRI's premises and misappropriated BRI's assets. Greenwald, who had been retained to provide legal services to BRI, assisted Brion in her misconduct.