CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Kimberly Michelle Leinenweaver appeals following her conviction for committing lewd and lascivious acts involving a 14- or 15-year-old victim at least 10 years younger than she (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)).[1]
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison and, as relevant to this appeal, ordered her to pay a fine of $1,140 pursuant to section 290.3. Defense counsel agreed that the court need not “specify a breakdown” of the fine’s component fees and assessments. Neither the minute order of sentencing nor the abstract of judgment gives any indication of the amounts or statutory bases of that fine’s components.
Defendant contends, and the People properly concede, the trial court erred in imposing a $1,140 fine pursuant to section 290.3 without articulating the amount of the fine actually imposed under that section, or the statutory bases and amounts of applicable fees and penalty assessments, as required by People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192 (High). She urges us to remand the matter for a proper articulation of the amount of the fine imposed under section 290.3 and the statutory bases and amounts of applicable fees and penalty assessments. We agree.

Paul Thomas filed a complaint with the Labor Commissioner, claiming that he was fired from his job at plaintiff American Corporate Security, Inc. (ACS) in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Labor Code. Defendant Labor Commissioner investigated the complaint and found reasonable cause to believe there was a violation. The Labor Commissioner, however, did not issue her determination until over three years after Thomas filed his complaint. Labor Code section 98.7 requires the Commissioner to give notice of the determination “not later than 60 days after the filing of the complaint.” (Lab. Code,[1] § 98.7, subd. (e).) ACS petitioned for a writ of mandate to order the Labor Commissioner to retract the determination and order for remedial action.
ACS appeals from an order of dismissal after the demurrer of defendant Labor Commissioner was sustained.[2] ACS contends it was an abuse of discretion to sustain the demurrer because it has no adequate remedy at law to challenge the Labor Commissioner’s procedural unfairness, including the failure to complete the investigation within 60 days as required by statute. As we will explain, ACS has an adequate legal remedy because it can raise these points in defense to the Labor Commissioner’s action to enforce her order. Accordingly, we shall affirm.

A Fremont cottonwood tree fell on plaintiff Dwight Meddock while he was in a paved parking lot located in a park along the Sacramento River owned by defendant County of Yolo (County). The trial court granted summary judgment against Meddock and his wife (collectively, Meddock) in their tort suit alleging a dangerous condition of public property, by applying a statutory immunity for injuries “caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property[.]” (Gov. Code, § 831.2, hereafter § 831.2.) As we will explain, we conclude that Meddock’s injuries were “caused by” a “natural condition” of unimproved property where the tree grew, and the fact the tree fell on the improved portion of the public property does not take this case outside the ambit of the immunity.
Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment in favor of the County.

Following her conviction for second degree robbery, defendant Christina Claudine Doscher was granted probation. ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 16 s ZFPTJD000001 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, § 211" Pen. Code, § 211.)[1] As part of the grant of probation, the court imposed a number of probation conditions related to alcohol use. In addition, defendant was ordered to pay a monthly probation supervision fee. On appeal, defendant raises two contentions. First, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol-related probation conditions. If this issue is deemed forfeited based on defendant’s failure to object to these probation conditions, then defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Second, defendant contends the trial court erred when it failed to determine if she had the ability to pay a monthly probation supervision fee.
We conclude defendant has forfeited both contentions by failing to object to (1) the imposition of the alcohol-related probation conditions and (2) procedural errors in the determination of her ability to pay probation supervision costs. As to the alcohol-related probation conditions, we conclude counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to these probation conditions. As to the probation supervision costs, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding of ability to pay. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The minor, I.G., appeals from the March 27, 2013 dispositional order. We affirm the order.
On April 5, 2012, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against the minor, then age 14. The misdemeanor petition alleged the minor possessed marijuana on school grounds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (e). On August 22, 2012, the juvenile court released the minor to his mother and placed him on informal probation for six months. On February 25, 2013, the juvenile court revoked the informal probation because of the minor’s failure to comply with the probation conditions. On March 27, 2013, an adjudication hearing was held on the petition. The juvenile court heard testimony from: Dominquez High School security officer Anthony Martin; school police officer Mariano Venegas; and senior criminalist Nathan Lind from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s crime laboratory. The testimony indicated: the minor possessed marijuana; the minor asked not to be arrested and for “one more chance”; and he admitted possessing the marijuana. After the prosecution rested, the minor moved to dismiss the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. The motion was denied. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding the allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court declared the minor to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The minor was placed home on probation and ordered to comply with all probation conditions. The minor filed his notice of appeal on April 3, 2013.

On the afternoon of August 20, 2012, Steve Lavario saw Marlon Sibrian[1] in the driveway of the home of Lavario’s father. Sibrian had thrust his head and upper body through the open window of a car belonging to Lavario’s father. Lavario confronted Sibrian, who claimed he was not doing anything wrong and walked away carrying a baseball bat. Police arrived, spoke with Lavario and arrested Sibrian. Officers searched Sibrian and found a student identification card and a bank access card belonging to the owner of another car that had been burglarized in the same area.
Sibrian filed a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), which was heard in conjunction with the preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion and held Sibrian to answer.
Sibrian was thereafter charged in an information with one count of petty theft with three prior theft-related convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 484, subd. (a), 666), theft of access card account information (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d)), willfully tampering with or damaging a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852) and attempted petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484, subd. (a), 664). Represented by appointed counsel, Sibrian pleaded not guilty.
Defense counsel renewed the suppression motion in the trial court (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i)). After reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript and hearing counsels’ argument, the court denied the motion.
Following the denial of his renewed suppression motion, Sibrian entered an open plea to the court of no contest to all four counts. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Sibrian on three years of formal probation, on condition he serve 364 days in county jail, with credit for time served. The court ordered Sibrian to pay on each count a $40 court security fee and a $30 criminal conviction assessment. The court imposed a $240 restitution fine and imposed and suspended a probation revocation fine pursuant to Penal Code, section 1202.44.[2]
Sibrian filed a timely notice of appeal based upon the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We appointed counsel to represent Sibrian on appeal. After an examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. On June 3, 2013, we advised Sibrian he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied Sibrian’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

A modification decision.

Based on allegations Eric Manuel Perez had sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s daughter for approximately four years, beginning when she was nine years old, Perez was arrested and charged in a 13-count information with having committed oral copulation of a child 10 years old or younger by a person 18 years old or older (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)),[1] continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288.5, subd. (a)), sodomy of a child 10 years old or younger by a person 18 years old or older (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), lewd act upon a child of 14 or 15 years by a person who is at least 10 years older (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), and nine counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)). Perez pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Appearing with retained counsel, Perez agreed to enter a negotiated plea of no contest to having committed continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years and nine counts of lewd acts upon a child. In return Perez was to be sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 34 years. The remaining counts were to be dismissed.

Following a jury trial, appellant Howard Henderson Jackson was found guilty of two counts of indecent exposure with a prior conviction for the same offense (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. (1)).[1] He admitted he had prior convictions that fell under the “Three Strikes” law (§ 1170, subd. (a)-(d)) and section 667.5, subdivision (b). Appellant was sentenced to 11 years and four months in prison.
The trial court ordered appellant to pay direct restitution of $753.60 to one of the victims in the case. The calculation was based on the victim’s lost wages resulting from her court appearances in the case. Appellant challenges this order as unconstitutional. He also argues the trial court miscalculated his conduct credits. We reject the constitutional challenge but accept respondent’s concession that the credits were miscalculated.

Plaintiff Dennis Senn (Dennis) suffered injuries when using a mobility scooter on a ramp on a cruise ship owned and operated by defendant Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. (Princess). In an effort to recover damages for his injuries, Dennis and his wife, plaintiff Eva Senn, brought this action for damages against Princess for general negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. Princess moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Princess’s motion. Plaintiffs appeal, contending that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether (1) the ramp on which Dennis fell constitutes a dangerous condition, and (2) Princess had knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition.
We affirm.

A mother contends that the juvenile court erred in refusing to permit her to cross-examine her daughter who testified about mother’s substance abuse. Plaintiff and appellant Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) concedes that the juvenile court erred, but argues the error was harmless. We disagree and reverse.
DCFS appeals from the juvenile court’s finding that a child was described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j),[1] based on sustained allegations of a petition involving her siblings, but was not also described by section 300, subdivision (b). We conclude this issue is moot.

Lusik Khdrilaryan (plaintiff) appeals a summary judgment in favor of Olympia Health Care, LLC dba Olympia Medical Center (Center) and the “Medical Staff of Olympia Medical Center” (collectively, defendants). She contends that the evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants terminated her employment as a respiratory therapist because of her complaints about safety issues at the hospital. She also contends that summary judgment of her defamation cause of action was in error because the subject statement was false. We disagree and affirm.

This is a mother’s appeal from court orders concerning her two minor children. The mother is D. L. (referred to here as Mother), and the children are Angel L. (born in December 2000) and L. O. (born in July 2002). She appeals from orders granting de facto parent status to the paternal grandmother, Blanca O. (referred to here as Grandmother), and placing the children with her.[1] Only Mother and Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) are parties to this appeal; neither father, Grandmother nor the children have filed briefing to this court.

Defendants Marino Ivanov, Jennifer Ivanov, and Storybrook Properties, Inc., own and operate a mobilehome park. When they failed to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) for the continued operation of the mobilehome park, plaintiff County of Los Angeles (the County) cited them for violation of the Los Angeles County Planning and Zoning Code (Zoning Code) and ordered them to either apply for and obtain a CUP or cease operating the mobilehome park. Defendants refused to bring the property into compliance with the Zoning Code, prompting the County to bring suit against them. The County moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Defendants appeal, contending: (1) the Zoning Code is preempted by state law; (2) the Zoning Code only applies to new mobilehome parks; (3) the Zoning Code’s amortized schedule amounts is illegal; and (4) the County did not provide them with adequate notice of the alleged Zoning Code violation.
We affirm.