P. v. Reynolds
Filed 10/15/13 P. v. Reynolds CA1/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAMES D.
REYNOLDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A137792
(Sonoma
County
Super. Ct.
No. SCR-616010)
Appellant
James D. Reynolds entered pleas of no contest to a felony violation of
stalking, and to a misdemeanor violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1),
resisting, delaying or obstructing a police officer. Reynolds was sentenced to the upper term of
three years in state prison on the felony charge, with a concurrent term of one
year in county jail on the misdemeanor.
At the time of sentencing, the court “strongly encourage[d] the
Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation] to immediately assess Mr.
Reynolds for mental health
treatment within the prison system†and to assess Reynolds’s qualification
as a mentally disordered offender (MDO).
Reynolds
contends the court’s statement reflects that the “primary reason†for the
prison sentence was to make him eligible for MDO status, and that the trial
court abused its sentencing discretion in “use of the hope [Reynolds] would be
found an MDO to deny probation and send [him] to prison.†We disagree with Reynolds’s characterization
of the trial court record and find no abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm.
I. Background
Reynolds
does not challenge his conviction. We
therefore address the underlying facts of the offenses only as they are
relevant to the court’s sentencing choices.
On March 11, 2012, Sonoma County
Sheriff’s deputies were called when Reynolds threatened to kill his former
employer, J.F. When the deputies
arrived, Reynolds had a large knife sticking out of his back pocket, and was
making threats to kill J.F. Reynolds
refused the deputies’ orders to lie on the ground and pulled out the knife,
waived it in the air, and continued his threats. Reynolds tossed the knife in the direction of
one of the officers and was taken into custody.
Reynolds, who was known to the deputies as an extreme alcoholic, had no
odor of alcohol about him at the time, but appeared delusional. Reynolds accused the officers of being in a
conspiracy with Satan, accused the victim of molesting his daughter, and talked
about invisible people standing next to the deputy and hiding in trees. Reynolds had previously threatened J.F.’s
life in October 2011. A
5150 was placed on Reynolds.
On March 17, 2012, Reynolds told J.F.’s
girlfriend that he was going to go to J.F.’s house and kill J.F. When a sheriff’s deputy went to Reynolds’s home,
Reynolds had been drinking, a violation of the terms of his probation on
another matter. Reynolds denied
threatening J.F., but said that J.F. was a child molester who was stealing
energy from the ground and God, and that J.F. had stolen Reynolds’s 62 children. When arrested for the
deputy that the next time he was arrested, it would be for killing J.F.
Reynolds
was interviewed while in custody about the allegations that his daughter had
been sexually molested. The interviewing
officer said that Reynolds appeared “fixated†on J.F., that Reynolds’s thoughts
were disorganized and “[h]is behavior was . . . alarming.â€
On March 20, 2012, Reynolds was charged
by felony complaint with threatening to kill J.F. (§ 422.)
On March 26, defense counsel declared a doubt about Reynolds’s
competence (§ 1368), and criminal proceedings were suspended. The psychiatric evaluation report found that
Reynolds was not competent to assist in his defense. The examining psychiatrist found Reynolds
delusional, without insight into his condition, and refusing medication. On May 7, the court found Reynolds
incompetent and ordered him detained in the Napa
State Hospital. On August 31, the court found that Reynolds’s
competency had been restored and criminal proceedings were reinstated. A first amended felony complaint was filed
charging Reynolds with two counts of criminal threats to commit a crime which
would result in death and great bodily injury to J.F. (§ 422;
counts 1, 2), threatening violence upon police officers (§ 69; counts
3, 5), and resisting, delaying or obstructing a police officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1); counts 4, 6).
On November 1, 2012, the complaint was
amended to add the stalking charge (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 7), and
Reynolds entered pleas of no contest to counts 6 and 7 and admitted a probation
violation. As part of the plea
agreement, the court agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the amended
complaint, as well as charges then pending in other cases. No promises were made as to the sentence that
would be imposed.
At a
sentencing hearing on January 28, 2013, the district attorney asked the court to
impose the three-year aggravated term because Reynolds “presents[s] an imminent
risk of very realistic fatal harm to the victim†and that “prison is really the
only viable way to potential lifelong care and treatment, psychiatric
treatment, for [Reynolds] . . . .†Reynold’s counsel argued for a probationary
sentence. Defense counsel contended that
“it is by no means assured that Mr. Reynolds would be deemed an MDO in terms of
going into the prison system,†and said that “to place him into prison on the
hope that he would be deemed MDO also is a pretty drastic remedy for Mr. Reynolds
in terms of if he is not deemed MDO . . . .â€
The court
noted that it had reviewed the probation presentencing report, a probation
supplemental report, and a report from Napa
State Hospital.
The court denied probation, expressing its concern for long-term protection of
the victim and indicating that it had no confidence that Reynolds would comply
with conditions of probation. The court
again noted its review of the record and reports and its concern with the fact
that Reynolds “has a very long history of alcohol related crimes, and he’s had
some treatment voluntarily in the past and yet has found himself here.†The court sentenced Reynolds to the
three-year upper term on count 7, listing the aggravating sentencing factors
as: “One, he does have a long history of
offenses related to alcohol and substance abuse. He was on probation at the time that this
incident occurred. Also the Court finds
most compelling that he was taking actions really in furtherance of his threats
at one of the times that he was contacted by law enforcement, and quite
frankly, Mr. Reynolds, I think you are quite fortunate that you didn’t end up
being shot by law enforcement on that night.â€
The court also expressed its concern with Reynolds’s “lack of incite [
substance abuse and his mental health as well, and I think both of those things
combined really does cause me to be greatly concerned about his level of
dangerousness . . . .â€
The court went on to “strongly encourage the Department of Corrections
[and Rehabilitation] to immediately assess Mr. Reynolds for mental health
treatment within the prison system and that possibly he be deemed an MDO if he
qualifies.†The court explained that “I
think that would be the most beneficial for Mr. Reynolds in the long term,
and I hope that he is provided the services that are available to him through
that process because I am extremely concerned that without ongoing and
long-term mental health treatment, if he doesn’t remain in remission and off of
substances, that he will pose a danger to both himself and to the
community.†The court imposed a
concurrent one-year term on count 6 and awarded Reynolds credit for
543 days served.
Reynolds
filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging only his sentence.
II. Discussion
“A
sentencing court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to grant or
deny probation. A defendant who is
denied probation bears a heavy burden to show the trial court has abused its
discretion. [Citations.]†(People v. Mehserle (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1157, citing inter alia People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are
guided by two fundamental precepts.
First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.]
In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
review.†’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘ “decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized
nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial
judge.’ †’ [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that
a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.†(People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) “ ‘[A] denial of probation after
consideration of the application of its merits is almost invariably
upheld. [Citations.]’ (3 Witkin &
Epstein, Cal.
Criminal Law [(3d ed. 2000)] Punishment, § 532, pp. 718–719.)†(People v. Mehserle, at p. 1157.)
Reynolds
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to state
prison on the “hope†that he would be treated as an MDO. We find no abuse of the court’s considerable
discretion.
A. Forfeiture
The Attorney
General first contends that Reynolds has forfeited his challenge to his
sentence by failure to object to the court’s statement “strongly encourag[ing]â€
assessment of Reynolds by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for
mental health treatment, and by failing to object to the aggravating factors
relied upon by the trial court in support of the upper term. “[C]omplaints about the manner in which the
trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting
reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal†(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356), because “[r]outine
defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected
if called to the court’s attention†(id.
at p. 353).
Were
Reynolds specifically challenging the court’s choice of the aggravated
three-year term, we would agree that such a claim would be forfeited. But Reynolds makes no such argument.
decision to deny him probation, and contends that the court relied upon an
improper factor in doing so. It is
questionable whether Reynolds has preserved his claim that the court relied
upon an improper factor in denial of probation, since he made no specific
objection to any of the reasons set
forth by the court as the bases for its decision. However, even if we were to assume that his
generalized argument for probation, and that MDO treatment in prison was “by no
means assured,†was sufficient to preserve the more narrow issue for appeal, we
would reject it on the merits.
B. Denial
of Probation
Reynolds
insists that there “should be no question the primary reason the court
sentenced him to prison was to make him eligible for MDO status.†We first disagree with the foundational
premise upon which Reynolds’s arguments rest, and we disagree with his
conclusion.
“Where [a]
defendant is eligible for probation, the court must state its reasons for
selecting a prison commitment as its sentencing choice. This obligation to state reasons is satisfied
by an explanation of why probation has been rejected in favor of
imprisonment. [Citations.]†(People
v. Leung (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 482, 506.) “For instance, the ‘ “nature and
seriousness of the offense†’ is sufficient. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Mehserle, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1158.)
“Criteria
affecting the decision to grant or deny probation include facts relating to the
crime and facts relating to the defendant. . . .†(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414; People
v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1312.) “In deciding whether to grant or deny
probation, a trial court may also consider additional criteria provided those
criteria are reasonably related to that decision. ([Cal. Rules of Court], [r]ule 4.408(a).)[
. . . Unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise, a trial court
is deemed to have considered all relevant criteria in deciding whether to grant
or deny probation or in making any other discretionary sentencing choice. ([Cal. Rules of Court], [r]ule 4.409.)†(People
v. Weaver, at p. 1313.)
The record
here reflects that the court carefully considered the facts relating to both
the offenses committed by Reynolds and his demonstrated substance abuse and
mental health issues. Despite Reynolds’s
insistence otherwise, nothing in the record reflects that the court’s “primary
reason†in rejecting probation was the possibility of MDO treatment in state
prison. Rather, the court urged MDO
evaluation based on Reynolds’s well-documented history of delusional behavior,
compounded by substance abuse, and the resulting danger that Reynolds presented
to the community and to himself if untreated.
Reynolds fails to demonstrate that the court’s decision to deny
probation was limited to any single factor, and does not meet his heavy burden
to show that decision was irrational or arbitrary.
Moreover,
Reynolds fails to carry his appellate burden to show the error allegedly made
by the court was prejudicial. “When a
trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a
reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable
that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some
of its reasons were improper.
[Citation.]†(
324, 492.) Reynolds contends, without
any cited support in the record, that “[h]ad the trial court realized, in the
circumstances, using the hope that [Reynolds] would be found to be an MDO as
support for a state prison sentence was improper, it is reasonably probable it
would have granted [Reynolds] probation as recommended by the probation
officer.†Again, we read the court’s
clearly expressed concerns with Reynolds’s level of dangerousness, and his
failure to comply with prior conditions of probation, very differently than
what Reynolds urges. Reynolds does not
show any reasonable probability that the court would have granted him probation
even absent consideration of the possibility of MDO treatment, and any alleged
error in denying probation was unquestionably harmless.
The
judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Bruiniers,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Jones, P. J.
_________________________
Needham,
J.
are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
treatment for prison inmates with severe mental disorders who meet certain
specified criteria (see § 2962) and can result in involuntary civil
commitments for treatment beyond the term of imprisonment (§§ 2970, 2972).
