CA Unpub Decisions

This case, which is now before us for the third time, “dramatically illustrates how much can go wrong when a trial court takes actions which affect a cause while it is on appeal.” (People v. Malveaux (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1429.) Alexander L. (appellant) challenges a February 15, 2013 dispositional order directing that he be temporarily housed at the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The juvenile court entered the order which is the subject of this appeal while appellant’s appeal from a prior commitment order was still pending in this court.
The settled rule is that the filing of a valid notice of appeal divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the judgment on appeal. Although an exception to this rule permits a trial court to correct an unauthorized sentence despite the pendency of an appeal, we hold this exception does not apply in this case. Consequently, the February 15, 2013 dispositional order is void because it was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we must reverse.

J.S. (Father) and A.R. (Mother) appeal an order of the juvenile court continuing its supervision of their daughter, J.S. (Minor) and requiring Father to submit to a polygraph test as part of his service plan. We shall affirm the order.

In this appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a criminal conviction, appointed counsel for defendant Paul William Mazzei filed a brief requesting this court’s independent review of the record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We dismiss the appeal as abandoned because Mazzei is not entitled to Wende review and no claims of error have been raised.

This is an appeal from final judgment following entry of a no contest plea by appellant Kenneth Gatison after the trial court denied his combined motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and to dismiss the information (Pen. Code, § 995).[1] We affirm.

In this juvenile dependency case, appellant E.A. (Mother) filed a petition to modify the court’s prior order by returning her three sons, J.Z., F.A., and E.S. (Minors) to her custody. At a combined hearing on Mother’s petition and on the selection of Minors’ permanent placement hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, selected adoption as Minors’ permanent plan, and terminated Mother’s parental rights.
On appeal, Mother contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition to modify; (2) the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability is not supported by substantial evidence[1]; and (3) the juvenile court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights, because Minors have a beneficial relationship with her that outweighs the benefits of adoption. We reject these contentions, and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Defendant Cliff B. appeals an order modifying the terms and conditions of his probation pursuant to Penal Code, section 1203.067,[2] which sets forth various new probation conditions for registered sex offenders. The order modifying probation required that he attend an approved sex offender management treatment program (program), pay for the program subject to his ability to pay and waive any privilege against self-incrimination, as well as any psychotherapist-patient privilege, while participating in the program. Defendant challenges the imposition of these additional conditions of probation on jurisdictional and federal and state constitutional grounds, specifically asserting that (1) the modification violated the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions; (2) the modification was in excess of the court’s jurisdiction because no change in circumstances occurred authorizing such modification; (3) the statutory presumption of prospectivity under section 3 precludes retroactive application of section 1203.067 in this case; and, (4) the compulsory waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination violates the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.
We conclude that revised section 1203.067 must be read to apply prospectively under section 3 and, therefore, cannot be applied retroactively to change the terms and conditions of probation for defendant. Because we reverse the trial court’s modification order on that basis alone, we need not address defendant’s other jurisdictional and constitutional arguments.[3]

Plaintiff Ronald D. Minkin (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants State Farm General Insurance Company (State Farm) and Britannia, Inc. (Britannia) after the trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s designated construction repair expert based on a violation of the discovery statutes. Plaintiff argues the court’s ruling amounted to an unauthorized summary judgment in favor of the defense and was an unreasonable use of a “terminating sanction.” We affirm.

Archibald Cunningham appeals from an order entered May 25, 2012, by the San Francisco Superior Court, denying his order to show cause (sometimes OSC) requests for modification of existing child custody and visitation orders, and for other relief arising from the dissolution of his marriage to Mary Wang and related child custody proceedings.[1] The other relief sought by Cunningham and denied by the court included: appointing a guardian and counsel for the minor child; a full psychological evaluation of Wang; a “two-tier evaluation” of the child; lifting of orders declaring him a vexatious litigant; and vacating an order against him under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) (DVPA).[2]
Cunningham raises numerous claims of error. Chief among them is his claim that the trial court erred in denying him the right to call witnesses and to present oral testimony in connection with his OSC requests. (§ 217; rules 5.113, 5.250 and former rule 5.119.) Consistent with his past practice, Cunningham seeks to use this appeal as a vehicle to attack previous trial court orders, long since final. We refuse to follow him down this rabbit hole and shall address only those claims properly cognizable on this appeal. That said, resolution of this appeal requires some description of a few of the many previous proceedings and orders in this case.

Appellant Christine E. Gray (mother) appeals from orders issued by family court Commissioner Thomas Nixon, which resolved the separate applications of mother and Robert Gray (father) for permanent restraining orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200, et seq.[1]). Mother argues the commissioner erred in denying her request for a permanent restraining order and granting father’s request for a permanent restraining order. Father has moved to dismiss the appeals on the ground of mootness, and alternatively, argues there is no substantive merit to mother’s appeals. We conclude the merits of mother’s appeals challenging the orders regarding the parents’ permanent restraining orders are properly before us. Nevertheless, mother’s arguments do not require reversal of those orders. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiffs Rodrick I. Satre and Bonita Satre Daley (plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment following a court trial on a single cause of action for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were not in default on a loan secured by a deed of trust encumbering their residence. Following trial, the court found that plaintiffs were in default on the loan beginning in September 2005 and had never cured the default.
Plaintiffs’ claims of error on appeal consist of four discrete issues that are essentially procedural in nature. First, they contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to vacate summary judgment for defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). They assert that Wells Fargo was bound by a previous order denying summary judgment for defendant America’s Servicing Company, which is purportedly “one and the same” as Wells Fargo. Second, they argue the court exceeded its jurisdiction when it vacated a default as to defendant First American Loanstar Trustee Services (Loanstar), which had previously filed a declaration of nomonetary status as a trustee pursuant to Civil Code section 2924l. Third, they contend the court erred in rejecting their purportedly unopposed statement of decision following trial. Fourth, they claim the court abused its discretion when it denied leave to file a third amended complaint. We reject plaintiffs’ contentions and affirm the judgment.

Sina and Shekoufeh Sharifpour obtained a $712,682.89 judgment against Tam and Kim Le. In this appeal, we determine whether the court erred in staying enforcement of the judgment pending appeal, without the requirement of an undertaking. We reverse.

A jury convicted defendant Erik Galvez of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 1),[1] and second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count 2).[2] The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years on count 1, a concurrent middle term of two years on count 2, and stayed execution of sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. Defendant was given credit for 97 actual days in custody and 19 days of conduct credit for a total of 116 days. The court also imposed a state restitution fine of $200, imposed and stayed a $200 parole revocation restitution fine, imposed a $40 court operations fee, and imposed a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel did not argue against defendant, but advised the court he was unable to find an issue to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument in his own behalf, and he has done so, submitting a three page handwritten brief (excluding exhibits).
We have examined the entire record, and considered the briefs submitted by counsel and defendant, but have not found an arguable issue. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A police officer observed A.G. (the minor) running across a busy street, after dark, in front of oncoming traffic. The officer attempted to stop the minor to caution him regarding his violation of Vehicle Code section 21954, subdivision (a). The minor, however, ran away. The minor was eventually detained, and a petition was filed in the juvenile court, alleging that the minor had resisted arrest, in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The juvenile court found the allegation to be true, declared the minor to be a ward of the court, and placed him on probation.
On appeal, the minor argues there was insufficient evidence he resisted arrest. He argues the officer was not lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties when he attempted to stop the minor. We reject the minor’s argument. The record contains sufficient evidence that the officer witnessed the minor violating Vehicle Code section 21954, subdivision (a), by failing to yield the right-of-way to vehicles near enough to be an immediate hazard. Therefore, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

After a hearing, the trial court found Charles Evans Farr in violation of probation and sentenced him to serve 180 days in jail as provided for under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h))[1] and Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (PRCS) (§ 3450 et seq.). He argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum term allowable under section 3455, subdivision (d). We disagree and affirm the judgment.