CA Unpub Decisions

On January 14, 2013, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that 15-year-old appellant, Pedro G., continually abused a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5. The People also filed a declaration that appellant was eligible for Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ). On January 22, 2013, appellant waived his constitutional rights and admitted the allegation in the petition contingent on being granted DEJ. The parties agreed there was a factual basis for the plea.[1]
At the disposition hearing on February 11, 2013, the juvenile court indicated it was not going to follow the probation department’s recommendation that appellant be placed on DEJ. The court indicated it would, instead, place appellant into a short-term treatment program for sexual abusers and on probation. This was acceptable to appellant, who reaffirmed his admission of the allegation in the petition.
The juvenile court found that appellant’s maximum term of confinement was 16 years and he had 32 days of custody credits. The juvenile court proceeded to place appellant into the youth treatment center unit for 90 to 180 days and placed him on probation. Appellant was ordered to attend a short-term sexual abuse program and not to leave his home unless he was with a parent, in a school activity supervised by an adult, or at work supervised by an adult. Appellant was not to have contact with anyone under the age of 18 or have any unsupervised contact with minors, except in school settings. Of appellant’s many conditions of probation, the court ordered that he not possess pornographic material or view pornographic sites on the internet. The court also imposed the following probation condition: “[M]inor [shall not] possess any coloring books, comic books, or other material or games targeted for younger minors’ interests.” Appellant contends that this condition of probation is too overbroad and vague to be enforceable. Respondent has not briefed the issue.[2] We do not find that the juvenile court’s condition of probation is improper as applied to appellant.

Minor José B. (henceforth José) contends on appeal that the evidence presented at the jurisdictional hearing was insufficient to support the finding that he was the perpetrator of a burglary. We will affirm.

In 2009, Jesse William Emmett pled no contest to one count of violating Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (c)(1), oral copulation of a person under the age of 14. In 2010, the People filed a petition to have Emmett declared a sexually violent predator pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, et seq. After a jury trial, Emmett was found to be a sexually violent predator and ordered committed to the State Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.) Emmett asserts the commitment must be vacated for three reasons, none of which has merit.

A jury convicted appellant Raul Ramon Lopez of felony vandalism and misdemeanor vandalism. Lopez contends his convictions should be reversed because (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance when she failed to object to remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Frank Shane Parrish was charged and convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), with the special allegations that someone other than an accomplice was present at the time of the offenses (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The court found he had two prior serious felony enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to the third strike term of 25 years to life for count I, plus 10 years for the prior serious felony enhancements; the court stayed the two prior prison term enhancements. As to count II, the court dismissed one of the prior strike convictions and imposed a consecutive second strike term of eight years.
Appellant’s convictions were based on his commission of residential burglaries in the same neighborhood and on the same day. On appeal he contends the court erroneously admitted evidence he committed uncharged burglaries; defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for not objecting to a limiting instruction about the uncharged burglaries; and the court should have stricken instead of stayed the prior prison term enhancements. We will modify appellant’s sentence and otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Leroy French, III, appeals after the trial court denied his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Reform Act). We affirm.

A.H. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to three of her daughters — J.H., now aged nine; S.M., now aged four; and I.M., now aged two. Her sole appellate contention is that, because J.H. had scoliosis, an IQ of 41, and some unpleasant behaviors, the juvenile court erred by finding that the girls were adoptable. We will conclude, however, that the adoptability finding is supported by substantial evidence.

Defendant Hubert Lamar Mitchell appeals his conviction on multiple counts, including three counts of attempted carjacking. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant G.H. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights concerning her children, Jonathan and Jeremiah. Defendant and appellant J.D. (Father), the presumed father of Jonathan, appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to Jonathan. (Jeremiah’s father is not a party to this appeal.) The orders were made at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother and Father (the Parents) contend the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights. We affirm the court’s orders.

The juvenile court declared seven siblings dependants and removed them from their mother’s custody. B.D. (father) is the father of two of the siblings — J.D., a girl now aged seven, and C.D., a girl now aged four (collectively children). At the time, the father was incarcerated; to the best of our knowledge, he remains incarcerated to this day.
In this appeal, the father contends:
1. The juvenile court failed to make adequate findings with regard to whether it would be detrimental to place the children with the father.
2. The juvenile court erred by refusing to order reunification services for the father.
We find no error. Hence, we will affirm.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed in Riverside County, alleging that defendant and appellant Y.S. (minor) committed the offenses of driving with willful disregard for the safety of others while fleeing a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, paragraph 1), unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), paragraph 2), and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a), paragraph 3). Minor admitted the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2, and the juvenile court dismissed paragraph 3 upon a motion by the People. The court found the admitted allegations true, declared minor a ward, and released her to the custody of her mother under specified terms of probation. The court subsequently held a restitution hearing and determined that no amount of victim restitution would be ordered.
The People appeal the court’s determination that no victim restitution be ordered. We affirm.

In October 2012, plaintiff and appellant the People charged defendant and respondent Erwin Maurice Walker by first amended information with burglary (count 1 – Pen. Code, § 459),[1] receipt of stolen property (count 2 – § 496, subd. (a)), possession of burglary tools (count 3 – § 466), unlawful taking of a vehicle (count 4 – Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a)), and receipt of a stolen vehicle (count 5 – § 496d, subd. (a)). The People additionally alleged defendant had suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1) & 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pertinent to counts 1 through 3, which the court granted. The People found they were unable to proceed and the court dismissed counts 1 through 3 on defendant’s motion.[2] The People appeal contending the court erroneously suppressed the relevant evidence pertaining to counts 1 through 3. We reverse.

Defendant Larry Wade Davis was stopped on the street at 2:00 a.m. in San Bernardino. A search of his admitted residence was conducted based on his parole status. Checks belonging to other persons were found in a room that he occupied with his girlfriend. He was arrested, and on the way to the police station, he told the transporting officer that he was going to snap her neck and kill her when they got to the jail. Defendant was convicted of two counts of aiding in the concealment of stolen property.
Defendant now contends on appeal as follows:
1. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that they need only find he possessed the general intent to aid in the concealment of stolen property rather than specific intent.
2. One of his convictions of aiding the concealment of stolen property must be reversed because the People proved only a single act of concealing stolen property.
3. Independent review by this court of the Pitchess[1] materials reviewed by the trial court is necessary.
We reverse one of defendant’s convictions of aiding in the concealment of stolen property and remand for resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Defendant Dakota Wallace Bever appeals from an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to county jail. According to defendant, the order revoking his probation must be reversed because the record does not contain substantial evidence that he willfully failed to complete the Inyo County Drug Court program. He also contends that, even if he violated his probation, his violation was so technical and de minimis that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to county jail instead of reinstating probation. Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in calculating his custody credits.
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence that defendant willfully failed to complete the drug court program, that the trial court properly revoked his probation, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing him to county jail. However, we order that the minute order awarding presentence custody and conduct credits and the abstract of judgment be amended. As so amended, we affirm the judgment.