P. v. Farr
Filed 1/8/14 P.
v. Farr CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHARLES EVANS FARR,
Defendant and Appellant.
G048121
(Super. Ct. No. R-00961)
O P I N I O N
Appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Gregg L. Prickett, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lizabeth
Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R.
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After a
hearing, the trial court found Charles
Evans Farr in violation of probation and sentenced him to serve 180 days in
jail as provided for under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Pen.
Code, § 1170, subd. (h))
and Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (PRCS) (§ 3450 et seq.).
He argues the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the maximum term allowable under section 3455,
subdivision (d). We disagree and affirm
the judgment.
FACTS
In July
2008, Farr pled guilty to three felonies, evading a police officer (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2), buying or receiving a stolen vehicle or vessel (§ 496d,
subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (b).). The trial court sentenced him to four years in
prison.
In June
2012, Farr was released from prison and placed on PRCS. In November, the probation department
petitioned for revocation of Farr’s PRCS.
An attachment submitted in support of the petition alleged Farr stopped
reporting to the probation department, Farr failed to provide a current address
or make himself available for drug testing, and had been arrested for being
under the influence of a controlled substance.
Farr admitted the alleged violations on November 14, 2012, and the trial court ordered him committed to jail for 90
days.
In
January 2013, the probation department filed a second petition for revocation
of Farr’s PRCS. The petition alleged
Farr quit reporting to the probation department, failed to seek
failed to appear for drug testing, and possessed .10 of a gram of
methamphetamine. Following a contested hearing,
the trial court found Farr in violation of PRCS and ordered him committed to
jail for 180 days.
DISCUSSION
Section
3455 governs violations of PRCS. Subdivision
(a) of that section states, “Upon a finding that the person has violated the
conditions of postrelease community supervision, the
authority to do all of the following:
[¶]
Return the person to postrelease community supervision with modifications of
conditions, if appropriate, including a period of incarceration in county jail. [¶]
Revoke and terminate postrelease community supervision and order the person to
confinement in the county jail. [¶]
Refer the person to a reentry court pursuant to Section 3015 or other
evidence-based program in the court’s discretion.†Section 3455, subdivision (d) limits the
period of confinement ordered pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) or (2) to a
maximum of 180 days.
On
appeal, Farr argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 180 days
in jail for what he describes as a technical violation of the terms of his
PRCS. We disagree.
“In
reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have
sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.â€â€™ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed
merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized
nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.Չۉ۪ [Citations.]
Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.â€
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)
Here,
the trial court imposed the maximum period of confinement after Farr was twice
found in violation of the terms of his PRCS, each time for failing to report as
directed, possessing or using drugs, and refusing to submit to drug
testing. There is nothing arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd in the trial court’s determination Farr deserved
the maximum period of confinement to effectuate the purposes behind PRCS, which
is the reduction of recidivism and the costs associated with prison
incarceration. (§ 3450.) Consequently, the trial court acted well
within its broad sentencing discretion.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
THOMPSON,
J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
ARONSON, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
