In re J.Z.
Filed 1/15/14 In re J.Z. CA1/4
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re J.Z. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
E.A.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
A137106
(Sonoma
County
Super. Ct. Nos. 3534DEP, 3535DEP,
3536DEP)
Introduction
In
this juvenile dependency case,
appellant E.A. (Mother) filed a petition to modify the court’s prior order by
returning her three sons, J.Z., F.A., and E.S. (Minors) to her custody. At a combined hearing on Mother’s
permanent placement hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, selected
adoption as Minors’ permanent plan, and terminated Mother’s parental rights.
On
appeal, Mother contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying her petition to modify; (2) the juvenile court’s finding of
adoptability is not supported by substantial evidence
and (3) the juvenile court erred in terminating Mother’s
have a beneficial relationship with her that outweighs the benefits of
adoption. We reject these contentions,
and affirm the juvenile court’s order.
Facts and Procedural Background
Minors
J.Z., born in 2001, and F.A., born in 2003, share the same father, J.C., who was
married to Mother at the time of their birth.
J.C. died of leukemia in 2006, before these dependency proceedings began.
Minor E.S., born in 2008, has a
different father, L.H.
Starting
in 2007, after J.C. died, Mother was investigated several times due to concerns
about the adequacy of her care of Minors.
In 2008, E.S. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Mother admitted using methamphetamine, but
denied she was addicted. In June 2009,
the home in which Mother and minors lived was found to be so unkempt,
unsanitary, and unsafe that Minors had to be taken into protective custody. For about six months in 2009, J.C.’s sisters
took care of J.Z. and F.A. while Mother was in substance abuse treatment, which
Mother undertook voluntarily.
In
April 2009 and again in December 2010, E.S.’s father, L.H., committed acts of
domestic violence against Mother. As a
result of the December 2010 incident, L.H. was arrested and charged with a
felony, and the criminal court issued a three-year domestic violence protective
order. When the
2011, L.H. was in jail, and was expected to be deported. Soon thereafter, he was released to the
federal immigration authorities, and after that, his whereabouts became unknown. Mother later reported hearing that he was in Mexico. He did not participate in the proceedings in
the juvenile court, and is not a party to this appeal.
On
January 27,
2011, the Sonoma County Human Services
Department (the Department) obtained a protective warrant and took minors into
protective custody. On January 31, 2011, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging that due to
Mother’s substance abuse, she was unable to provide adequate supervision and
care for Minors. The petition also
alleged that Mother repeatedly drove under the influence with Minors in the car;
failed to ensure that J.Z. and F.A. arrived at school on time and attended
school consistently; and exposed Minors to L.H.’s domestic violence against
her.
Minors
were detained and placed in a foster home.
In its report prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on March 2, 2011, the Department recommended that Minors be declared dependents and
removed from Mother’s custody, and that she be provided reunification
services. At the hearing, Mother
requested a settlement conference, and the hearing was continued. On March 23, 2011,
Mother submitted on the Department’s recommendation, which the juvenile court
adopted.
At
a review hearing on June 23, 2011, the Department’s
social worker reported that Minors had been placed together in a foster home,
and had adapted very well. Mother was
visiting with minors and receiving therapy and
and had been accepted into a residential treatment program, Casa Teresa, where
she had been for four days. She was also
pregnant. At the hearing, the juvenile
court judge admonished Mother that she needed to complete the Casa Teresa
program successfully, and to make changes in her life, if she wanted her
children to remain part of her life.
In
its report for the six-month review hearing on September 22, 2011 (the
September 2011 report), the Department recommended that services be terminated
and that the juvenile court set a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26
(.26 hearing). Mother was still using
methamphetamine despite her pregnancy, and the drug treatment services she had
been given; was in denial about her drug use; and had left the Casa Teresa
program a few days after her admission in June 2011. Mother missed nine of her drug tests, and
tested positive four times, with one dilute test in addition. She admitted at the hearing that if she were
drug tested that day, the result would be positive for methamphetamine. Mother was participating in a relapse
prevention group, and making some progress, but the Department social worker
believed that Mother still had not addressed her substance abuse issues.
In
addition, Mother missed a few of her visits with Minors, and had not completed
her parenting education services. She
had been inconsistent in attending therapy, and in May 2011, she had been
involved in another domestic violence incident with her new boyfriend, which resulted
in her hospitalization.
In
the September 2011 report, the Department stated that the two older boys were
healthy, behaved normally for their age, and were generally doing well. The youngest, E.S., was physically healthy,
but had some developmental delays, particularly in regard to his speech. He had been referred for speech therapy, and
was expected to start receiving it once the school year began. Minors had been accepted for adoptions
planning by the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), and two
paternal aunts of the older boys had expressed interest in caring for them; one
of the aunts was willing to care for E.S. as well.
The
six-month review hearing set for September 22, 2011, was
continued to October
12, 2011, at Mother’s request, so that a
settlement conference could be held. On
the continued hearing date, Mother was not present. Her counsel reported that Mother was planning
to return to Casa Teresa, and submitted on the Department’s report. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
juvenile court entered an order (the October 2011 order) finding that Mother
had failed to participate regularly and to make progress in her court-ordered
treatment programs and services. The October
2011 order terminated Mother’s reunification services, and set a .26 hearing in
February 2012 to consider a permanent plan.
October 2011 order.
Between
October 2011 and February 2012, Minors remained in the same foster home where
they had been placed in January 2011, and continued to visit Mother once a
week. Mother remained at the Casa Teresa
inpatient drug treatment program, and on December 31, 2011, Mother gave birth to her fourth child (another son), F.Z.
The
Department filed its report for the .26 hearing (the January 2012 report) on January 27, 2012. At that point, Minors’
proposed permanent plan was adoption by Mother’s uncle (Uncle) and his wife
(Aunt) (that is, Minors’ great-aunt and great-uncle), who were in their mid-50’s,
without terminating Mother’s parental rights. Minors were starting to visit with Aunt and
Uncle, but had not yet developed a solid relationship with them. Moreover, the assessment of Aunt and Uncle’s
suitability as adoptive parents had not been completed. Mother, Minors’ counsel, and the Department therefore
agreed, at the hearing on February 16, 2012, to continue
the .26 hearing for 120 days to give Minors more time to transition from their
foster home and to develop a stronger bond with Aunt and Uncle. The juvenile court continued the .26 hearing
to June 14,
2012.
Between
February and June 2012, Minors remained in the same foster home where they had
been all along, continued to be in good health, and were reported by their
foster mother to be “well-adjusted children who present no behavioral
challenges.†E.S. still had
developmental delays, including severe speech issues, but he was receiving
speech therapy, his speech had improved, and he was “a delightful child.†Minors continued to have supervised
visitation with Mother, but the visits were reduced in May 2012 from weekly to
bimonthly, and the Department planned to reduce them to once a month. Minors only had contact with their
half-brother F.Z. during their visits with Mother.
On
June 11, 2012, the Department filed its report (the June 2012 report) for the June 14, 2012 hearing. In the June 2012
report, CDSS reported that “despite deep caring for the boys, and months to
resolve their ambivalence,†Aunt and Uncle had decided they were “unable to
care for all three boys,†especially given E.S.’s young age. Minors had a good relationship with J.Z. and
F.A.’s paternal relatives in another county, and J.Z. and F.A. expressed
interest in going to live with them, but these relatives had been “ruled out as
a placement option some time ago.†The
boys were quite attached to one another, and had lived together all their
lives. Therefore, both the Department
and CDSS recommended that Mother’s parental rights be terminated, and that
adoption be selected as Minors’ permanent plan.
CDSS
had already identified one potential adoptive home that was willing to accept all
three Minors, but the potential adoptive parents and Minors had not yet
met. A search for additional possible
adoptive placements was still in progress, and CDSS was confident that in time,
it could locate a suitable family. CDSS was
beginning to prepare Minors for “a slow transition to the care of the potential
adoptive family.†CDSS believed the
transition could “be designed with relatively minimal detriment, given
[Minors’] resilience, optimism, [and] connection to one another,†along with
their current foster mother’s “helpful skills.â€
CDSS opined that although Minors derived “some incidental benefit†from
their interaction with Mother, it did not “outweigh the benefit [Minors would]
gain through the permanence of adoption,†and “termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights would not be detrimental†to Minors. CDSS had informed the potential adoptive
parents that they could agree to continuing post-adoption contact between
Minors and Minors’ biological relatives, including Mother, but further
discussion would be needed to determine whether such an agreement would be
appropriate and in Minors’ best interest.
As
of the date of the June 2012 report, Mother was on a court-ordered plan of
family maintenance with F.Z. She was
scheduled to be discharged from Casa Teresa that day. However, she had not yet located suitable
housing for herself and the baby. On the date of the .26 hearing, she requested
a settlement conference and a contested hearing, and the matter was continued
for that purpose.
On
August 1, 2012, Mother filed three petitions to modify court order, one for each
Minor (collectively, the JV‑180
The JV‑180 asked that Minors be
returned to Mother’s custody under a family maintenance plan, based on changed
circumstances that included Mother’s completion of the Casa Teresa program and
her regular attendance at substance abuse recovery groups; her current sobriety
and increased insight into domestic violence issues; and the Department’s
decision not to try to remove F.Z. from her custody. Due to the filing of the JV‑180, the
matter was continued to August 30, 2012, and then again
to September
20, 2012, for a combined contested hearing
on the JV‑180 and contested .26 hearing.
At
the hearing on September 20, 2012 (the
September 2012 hearing), Mother called as a witness Ms. Castaneda-Martinez, the
social worker who was supervising Mother’s family maintenance plan with her
youngest child, F.Z. Castaneda-Martinez
testified that Mother had graduated from the Casa Teresa program on or about June 10, 2012, but had remained housed at Casa Teresa until she was able to
locate suitable housing. Mother was now
renting a room in a two-bedroom apartment, which Castaneda-Martinez
acknowledged would not be large enough to accommodate Minors as well as Mother
and the baby. Mother testified that she
was looking for a two-bedroom or larger apartment, in which Minors could at
least share their own bedroom as they had done in the past, or possibly each
have their own room.
Castaneda-Martinez
reported that Mother was employed; was attending recovery meetings; was
randomly drug testing and had tested clean on her most recent test; was
participating in in-home parenting education; and was in compliance with all
aspects of her family maintenance plan except the requirement for individual
psychotherapy. Mother had missed two
appointments with the therapist first assigned to her, and Castaneda-Martinez
was in the process of locating another Spanish-speaking therapist. Mother explained that she had missed the
appointments because of scheduling conflicts, and had not been able to reach
the therapist because she had not been given her phone number. The Department was not contemplating removing
F.Z. from Mother’s custody.
Castaneda-Martinez
acknowledged, however, that Mother was still in the early stages of recovery,
and opined that substance abusers have the most risk of relapsing when they
have just left a residential treatment program.
Although Mother was doing well, there was still some risk she could
relapse. Moreover, Mother was working
long hours, during which F.Z. was in day care, and Castaneda-Martinez was
concerned that given Mother’s schedule, it would be very challenging for Mother
to manage caring for Minors in addition to F.Z.
Mother
testified in support of the JV‑180 that if Minors were returned to her
custody, her family would support and help her.
Mother said she had been “sober†for a year; was attending three
recovery meetings a week; and had been able to handle her grandfather’s recent
death without relapsing. Mother also
explained that the Casa Teresa program was longer, and included more support
and more relapse prevention education, than the residential treatment program
she had attended voluntarily in 2009.
Mother
acknowledged that all three of her children’s fathers had abused her, and that
Minors had been harmed by their exposure to her abuse by E.S.’s father. Domestic violence treatment had not been
included in Mother’s family maintenance plan, because she did not currently
have a partner. However, Mother
testified that she had voluntarily attended a 16-week domestic violence
program, independently of the Department.
The class included information about the effect on children of
witnessing domestic violence.
Mother
testified that Minors kissed her during their visits, called her “momma,†and
wanted to return to her custody.
Mother’s counsel noted that Mother’s visitation with Minors had been
regular and consistent.
Minors’
counsel opposed the JV‑180, and argued in favor of termination of
Mother’s parental rights. Counsel argued
that Mother had not consistently taken a parental role with Minors, noting that
even prior to Minors’ removal from Mother’s custody, J.Z. and F.A. had often
been forced to take care of their little brother E.S. The Department’s counsel also argued in favor
of termination of Mother’s parental rights, noting that Minors had already been
in a temporary placement for almost two years, and that this impermanence would
be prolonged if they were not freed for adoption, because even if Mother
retained her parental rights, Minors could not return to her custody
immediately.
The
juvenile court denied the JV‑180, finding that continued efforts at
reunification would not be in Minors’ best interest. With respect to the .26 hearing, the court found
there was insufficient evidence of exceptional circumstances on which to base a
finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be against Minors’
best interests. Therefore, based on the
statutory preference for a permanent plan of adoption, the court terminated
Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely
appealed.
discussion
A. Denial of Petition to Modify Order
Under
section 388, a parent may petition to modify a previously issued court order
in a dependency proceeding on the basis of changed circumstances or new
evidence. The parent must also
demonstrate that the requested modification would be in the best interests of
the dependent child. The party seeking
the modification bears the burden to prove both of those requirements by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1); see also In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.)
In
the present case, Mother’s JV‑180 was not filed until after her
reunification services had been terminated.
“After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest
in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the
focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’
[citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued
foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]
A court hearing a motion for change of placement [i.e., a JV‑180]
at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in
determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the
child.†(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Accordingly, after reunification services are
terminated, “[i]n order to revive the reunification issue, the parent must
prove changed circumstances pursuant to section 388. [Citations.]â€
(In re Hashem H. (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1791, 1800.) Thus, in the
present case, Mother was not entitled to a further opportunity to reunify with
Minors unless she persuaded the juvenile court to grant her JV‑180.
As
Mother acknowledges, we review a juvenile court’s order granting or denying a
JV–180 for abuse of discretion. (
358; In re Michael B.,
that of the juvenile court; reversal is warranted only when the juvenile court
“exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd determination.
[Citation.]†(
merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.
[Citation.]†(
681, 685-686.)
More
specifically, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a section 388
petition that “alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying
the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has
repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some
future point,†because granting such a petition “does not promote stability for
the child or the child’s best interests.
[Citation.] ‘ “[C]hildhood
does not wait for the parent to become adequate.†’ [Citation.]â€
(In re Casey D. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
In
the present case, in support of her contention that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in denying her JV-180, Mother relies extensively on
519 (Kimberly F.). Kimberly
F. is readily distinguishable, however.
children who permitted her home to become filthy and unsanitary because she was
overwhelmed by the needs of her oldest child, a teenager who had a
life-threatening illness. As a result,
her two youngest children were removed from her care. The mother ultimately managed to remedy the
conditions in the home that had led to the younger children’s removal, but this
did not occur until after the termination of reunification services. Accordingly, the mother filed a petition
under section 388 shortly before the permanency planning hearing, but the
juvenile court denied it.
On
the mother’s appeal, the court concluded that although “[i]t is rare that the
denial of a section 388 motion merits reversal as an abuse of discretion, . . .
this is such a case.†(
court considering a JV‑180 “must consider the seriousness of the reason
for the dependency in the first place.
Not all reasons for initial dependency jurisdiction are equal from the
point of view of a child’s interests.†(
F., the original reason for the children’s removal from their mother’s home—its
unsanitary condition—was the least
serious of the circumstances that can justify intervention by the dependency
system, and one of the most easily remedied.
(See id. at pp. 522, 532.) The Kimberly
F. court expressly distinguished cases such as the one now before us, in
which the original reason for removal is drug addiction or substance abuse.
Meanwhile,
the mother in Kimberly F. had had “a
substantial amount of unmonitored visitation during the period of dependency,â€
and there was an “undisputedly strong bond†between the children and their
mother—“a bond which [was] strong enough . . . to vitiate the
children’s desire to be adopted by their caretakers.†(Kimberly
F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at
p. 532.) The children were also
strongly bonded to their two older brothers, who had remained in the mother’s
care. (Ibid.) For all of those
reasons, the court concluded that the denial of the mother’s section 388
petition was an abuse of discretion.
None
of the factors on which the court relied in Kimberly
F. is present in this case.
Substance abuse is a far more serious and intractable problem than a
dirty house, and requires a correspondingly more extensive showing of
can convincingly contend that the conditions justifying removal have been
permanently eliminated. The
this distinction. (See
September 2012 hearing, Mother had less than a three-month track record of
maintaining her sobriety outside the
context of a residential treatment program, and the social worker whom Mother
called as a witness acknowledged that Mother was still in the early stages of
recovery, when she was at greatest risk of a relapse.
In
addition, in the present case, Mother’s showing regarding Minors’ bond with her
is far weaker than the showing made by the mother in Kimberly F., supra, 56
Cal.App.4th 519. We do not discount the evidence that Minors recognized
Mother as their mother, had affection for her, and enjoyed seeing her. J.Z., at least, had expressed a desire to continue
visiting with her. On the other hand,
during the entire course of the dependency proceedings, Mother never had more
than brief, supervised visits with Minors, which occurred twice a week at most,
and were later reduced to weekly and then every other week. Despite this separation from Mother, Minors
flourished in their foster mother’s care, and never expressed a desire to
return to living with Mother.
Accordingly, Mother has not persuaded us that the evidence of Minors’
bond with her was so strong as to render it an abuse of discretion to deny the
JV‑180.
Finally,
unlike the younger children in Kimberly F.,
Minors do not have a strong bond with their sibling who has remained in
Mother’s care.
title="">[7] Minors were removed from Mother’s custody
before their baby half-brother was born, and have seen him only during their
brief visits with Mother, which have occurred twice weekly at most. We recognize that Minors wished to remain in
contact with their extended family, including Aunt and Uncle, but this does not
outweigh their need for the permanence and security that Mother was not
prepared to offer them. For all of the
foregoing reasons, and notwithstanding the result in Kimberly F., we are not persuaded that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in the present case.
B. Adoptability
In
her opening brief on appeal, Mother argued that the trial court’s finding that
Minors are adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence. In its respondent’s brief, the Department
pointed out that Mother, through her counsel, affirmatively stipulated at a
juvenile court hearing on August 30 that Minors are adoptable. Accordingly, the Department argued that
Mother either waived the issue, or is estopped from raising it on appeal.
In
her reply brief, Mother conceded that she waived her right to raise this issue
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
juvenile court’s finding that Minors are adoptable.
C. Termination of Parental Rights
At
a section 366.26 hearing, when reunification services have been terminated
and adoption is likely, parental rights must be terminated unless the objecting
parent satisfies the burden of proving that termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the minors under one of the exceptions listed in
section 366.26, subdivision (c).
(In re S.B. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) Mother asserted
in the juvenile court, and reiterates on appeal, that her parental rights
should not have been terminated because the statutory beneficial relationship
exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(1) [parental rights not to be terminated when “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationshipâ€].)
To
meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show
more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant
visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent must show he or she occupies a
“parental role†in the child’s life (ibid.),
resulting in “ ‘a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child
to parent.’ [Citation.]†(In re
Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs
only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s
needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s
rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.†(In re
Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
There
is some dispute in the case law regarding the correct standard of review on
appeal from an order rejecting the applicability of the beneficial relationship
exception to the termination of parental rights. “Most courts have applied the substantial
evidence standard of review to this determination [citations], although at
least one court has concluded that it is properly reviewed for an abuse of
discretion [citation].†(
621.) The Sixth District has adopted a
hybrid standard, under which the determination whether a parental relationship
exists is reviewed under the substantial evidence test, whereas the abuse of
discretion standard applies to the determination whether that relationship is
sufficiently important that the detriment from its termination would outweigh
the benefit of adoption. (
1308, 1314-1315; accord, In re K.P.,
pp. 621-622.)
As
pointed out in In re Jasmine D.,
“[t]he practical differences between the [various] standards of review are not
significant†in reviewing a juvenile court’s conclusion that the beneficial
relationship exception does not apply.
In any event, we need not resolve this issue in the present case, because
regardless of the standard of review we apply, we find insufficient reasons to
overturn the juvenile court’s decision.
The
Department disputes that Mother “maintained regular visitation and contactâ€
with Minors, as required by the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(1).) Mother argues that she did, and the record
arguably supports her position. We need not
decide, however, whether Mother has met this prong of the statutory test. In order for the beneficial relationship
exception to apply, Mother must also
demonstrate that her “relationship [with Minors] promotes the[ir] well-being . . .
to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being [Minors] would gain in a
permanent home with new, adoptive parents.â€
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) In other words,
the burden is on Mother to show that her parent-child relationship with Minors
is such that they will be greatly
harmed by the termination of her parental rights, so that the presumption in
favor of adoption is overcome. (
847, 853-854.) Implicit in this standard
is that “a parental relationship is
necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one. [Citations.]â€
(In re Jasmine D.,
original italics.)
In
support of her argument that she meets this standard, Mother points to the
evidence that Minors are old enough to know her as their mother, showed
affection for her, and lived with her most of their lives. These facts alone are not sufficient,
however, to demonstrate that breaking the familial bond between Mother and
Minors would be so detrimental to them as to outweigh the benefits of
adoption. “To overcome the preference
for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent’s rights, the parent
must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the
child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.
[Citations.]†(
454, 466, original italics.) The
evidence here is to the contrary. Minors
flourished under the care of their foster mother, and nothing in the record
suggests that they suffered any detriment from having their contact with Mother
reduced to weekly and then bimonthly visits.
Mother
relies on In re S.B.,
facts here are sharply distinguishable.
In In re S.B., the social
worker and bonding study expert both opined that terminating the father’s
parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. The minor was unhappy when her visits with
father ended; missed him when they were not together; and told him she wished
she lived with him. (
[that father had] continued the significant parent-child relationship despite
the lack of day-to-day contact with [his daughter] after she was removed from
his care. [Citation.]†(Id.
at p. 299, italics omitted.)
The
record in the present case is not comparable. Here, there was no expert testimony supporting
a finding of detriment to Minors from terminating Mother’s parental
rights. Moreover, Mother points to no
evidence that Minors requested longer or more frequent visits with her, or
exhibited distress or behavioral problems when separating from her at the
conclusion of their visits. (Cf.
799, 811 [even though mother maintained regular contact with minor and had a
positive relationship with him, beneficial relationship exception did not apply
where minor relied entirely on other caregivers to meet his physical and
emotional needs, and did not appear to be upset when visits with mother
ended].) Moreover, at the time of the
September 2012 hearing, Mother was not yet prepared to take custody of Minors
immediately; she had not yet found a place to live that was large enough to
accommodate them, and she presented no evidence that she had any specific plan
for how to ensure that Minors were adequately cared for during her extensive
work hours.
In
sum, the beneficial relationship exception “does not permit a parent who has
failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by
showing that the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship
maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.†(In re
Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1348.) Regardless of the
applicable standard of review, we find nothing in the record that would justify
overturning the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Disposition
The
juvenile court’s orders denying Mother’s motion to modify and terminating
Mother’s parental rights are AFFIRMED.
_________________________
RUVOLO,
P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
RIVERA, J.
_________________________
HUMES, J.
Mother, to which J.Z., at least, was exposed.
