CA Unpub Decisions

This case is a companion to another we decide today, the $2.5-million tail on a $353-million dog.[1] Appellant Fiduciary Trust International of California (Fiduciary Trust) is the the successor trustee of the Mark Hughes Family Trust, whose trustees prevailed over respondent Zacadia Financial Limited Partnership (Zacadia) in a three-week jury trial concerning the breach of a secured loan agreement. The agreement included a one-way attorney fee clause, entitling Zacadia to its “actual attorneys’ fees” if it prevailed in any collection proceeding involving the secured loan. Invoking Civil Code section 1717, the trustees moved the trial court for their “actual attorneys’ fees,” which they pegged at somewhat north of $3.1 million.
The trial court awarded the trustees “reasonable fees” of $2.5 million instead. The successor trustee, Fiduciary Trust, has appealed from this order, asserting that it is entitled to the full amount, as Zacadia would have been if it had prevailed at trial.
We affirm the order, which adhered to the unambiguous language of the statute. Fiduciary Trust is entitled only to reasonable fees, and it has not argued that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the amount it did.

A jury convicted defendant Roberto Bedolla Ambriz of several offenses relating to his molestation of two children. The trial court subsequently ordered Ambriz to reimburse the State Victim Compensation Board (Board) for restitution payments it made to one Leonard Rutkevicius. Ambriz contends the court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for assistance the Board provided to Rutkevicius because the prosecution did not prove Rutkevicius was a victim as defined in Penal Code section 1202.4 (all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted). For the reasons expressed below, we agree and modify the order.

Kimberly M. Jones filed a petition for dissolution of her 13-year marriage to Fletcher Jones, Jr. Fletcher[1] filed a response in which he agreed irreconcilable differences existed. Later that year, he moved to bifurcate the trial on the status of the marriage from the remaining issues. Kimberly opposed the motion, arguing the motion should be denied because Fletcher did not comply with the preliminary disclosure requirements of Family Code[2] section 2337, subdivision (b). In the alternative, Kimberly submitted approximately 30 conditions she contended should to be attached to bifurcation. On November 29, 2012, the court granted bifurcation and issued a judgment terminating the status of the marriage. It attached approximately 16 conditions to its judgment. Kimberly appealed and contends the trial court abused its discretion in concluding Fletcher’s financial disclosures met section 2337, subdivision (b)’s requirements, and in granting bifurcation without additional conditions. We affirm.

Defendant Hugo Godinez appeals from his conviction for violating a county ordinance that made it a misdemeanor for a registered sex offender to enter a county park without the county sheriff’s written permission. Godinez argues state law preempts the county ordinance and therefore his conviction is void. We agree. The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the daily life of sex offenders to reduce the risk of an offender committing a new offense. As explained below, we conclude the state statutory scheme imposing restrictions on a sex offender’s daily life fully occupies the field and therefore preempts the county’s efforts to restrict sex offenders from visiting county parks.
We also conclude state law preempts the ordinance’s requirement that sex offenders obtain the county sheriff’s written permission before entering a county park. This regulation is simply a de facto registration requirement. But state law has long occupied the area of sex offender registration to the exclusion of local regulation and the county ordinance’s written permission requirement amounts to an additional registration requirement imposed on sex offenders who wish to enter county parks. We decline to sever the written permission requirement from the county ordinance. To do so would result in an outright ban on sex offenders entering county parks. But taking this step would substantially alter the meaning of the county ordinance as originally enacted because nothing in the language of the county ordinance or its history suggests the county intended to bar sex offenders under all circumstances from county parks.

Mark Hughes, founder of Herbalife, died in 2000. This case is yet another in a handful of appellate decisions relating to the administration of his estate.[1] The basic background facts established in those opinions and the record before us tell a remarkably consistent story: When Hughes died in 2000, most of his nearly $400 million estate was held by the Hughes Family trust, which in turn consisted of ownership of various limited liability companies, the most important of which was the Hughes Investment Partnership. The estate faced death duties of slightly more than $212 million, all immediately due, but it was able to finesse those taxes down to about $50 million by the device of a “Graegin” loan (after Estate of Graegin v. C.I.R. (1988) 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387, 1988 WL 98850). The appeal of a Graegin loan is that an estate borrows money today, to pay its estate taxes today, and gets to deduct on its estate tax return today all the accumulated interest on the loan it will pay tomorrow. And tomorrow in this case was 25 years into the future.
As might be gathered from that description, there is no question the Graegin loan in this case was a really good deal for the Hughes estate. In specific terms, the main arm of the estate, the Hughes Family Trust, borrowed $50 million in 2002 to pay the estate taxes, but since the loan would not be due until 2027, the estate got to deduct in 2002 all the interest that would accrue from 2002 to 2027, about $300 million worth. With such a large deduction taken all at once, the ostensible size of the Hughes estate shrank from something like $400 million to a mere $100 million and change, and the estate only had to pay about $50 million in estate tax.

An arbitration award against the sellers of residential real property was confirmed to judgment. The sellers, Tam and Kim Le, contend the court erred in confirming to judgment the awards of attorney fees and punitive damages, inasmuch as the arbitrator exceeded his powers in making those awards in the first place. We disagree. The terms of the purchase agreement between the Les and the buyers of their property, Sina and Shekoufeh Sharifpour, did not bar an award of attorney fees under the facts of this case. Moreover, contrary to the Les’ assertion, they had an opportunity to rebut the evidence of their financial condition as presented by the Sharifpours, and indeed did rebut that evidence, so they were not deprived of fundamentally fair procedures. We affirm.

Charlene Funk (formerly Charlene Harris) appeals from an order modifying child visitation, which follows the judgment dissolving her marriage to David Harris. The order contains several provisions which, taken together, are intended to facilitate what the court refers to as “reunification” between Harris and the couple’s daughter, T. Funk argues the order must be reversed because: (1) it improperly grants temporary legal custody of T. to her counsel; (2) it effectively overrules the factual finding at the heart of the parties’ original custody order issued in 2008, which awarded sole legal and physical custody to Funk on the basis that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence points to the father as the perpetrator of sexual abuse on [the child]”; (3) it reflects a failure to consider Harris’s earlier physical abuse of Funk; (4) it improperly orders “reunification services” in a child custody proceeding, in violation of Family Code section 3026; and (5) it improperly delegates discretion to determine Harris’s visitation and schedule to a court-ordered “reunification counselor and child’s therapist.” Funk also requests that we order the case assigned to a new judge on remand.

Shadi Nasser Fararji appeals from a judgment after he pleaded guilty to kidnapping to commit a sex offense while personally using a deadly weapon and forcible rape. He argues his federal and state constitutional rights to due process were violated by the six-year delay in the prosecution of the case. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

F..V. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s order denying her reunification services based on her extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(13)) and setting a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for her seven-year-old son and two-year-old daughter.[1] Mother alleges the court’s order was erroneous because she was sober from 2010 to May 2013. She also asks for a “second chance” to parent her children.
On review, we conclude mother’s petition is inadequate because it fails to comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. She fails to allege, let alone make an arguable claim, that the juvenile court committed any error. Thus, we will dismiss her petition.

Kristina T. in propria persona seeks extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s orders denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)[1] because of her mental disability and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her four-month-old son, Justin. We deny the petition.

Sandra F. appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights to her nine-year-old son I.P., seven-year-old daughter A.P. and six-year-old son M.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26).[1] Sandra contends there is insufficient evidence her children are adoptable. We affirm.

At a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that appellant, Rafael S., a minor, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), and that in doing so he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, viz., a knife (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). At the subsequent disposition hearing, the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of the court and ordered him committed to the Tulare County Correctional Center Unit for a period of 240 to 365 days.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support the instant adjudication. We affirm.

On appeal following adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) petition, Jessie O., Jr. contends there is insufficient evidence he attempted to enter a residence. Thus, he argues the court’s jurisdictional findings must be reversed. We will affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a petition filed January 29, 2013, the Kern County District Attorney alleged Jessie committed the following violations: count 1—willful and unlawful attempt to enter an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664, 460, subd. (a)) and count 2—violating a prior court order regarding juvenile probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)).
Following contested proceedings held March 5, 2013, the juvenile court found all counts as alleged in the petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the disposition on March 19, 2013, the court ordered, inter alia, Jessie be committed to Camp Erwin Owen for a period not to exceed three years four months, less 33 days’ credit for time served. This appeal followed.

David Luis Garfield was charged with several crimes in a 10-count indictment that included several enhancements. He pled guilty to four counts and one enhancement for an agreed-upon term of 14 years in prison. Before sentencing, Garcia moved to withdraw his plea, asserting newly discovered evidence provided good cause for doing so within the meaning of Penal Code section 1018.[1] The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Garcia to the agreed term. Garcia argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.