CA Unpub Decisions

The mother, S.A., appeals from orders terminating her parental rights as to her sons, I.A. and C.A. The mother argues the order in I.A.’s case must be reversed because the Indian Child Welfare Act notices were defective. The mother also contends she and I.A.’s father were not given proper notice of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] In addition, the mother asserts the juvenile court erred in finding the sibling relationship exception was inapplicable as to I.A. Finally, the mother challenges the juvenile court’s adoptability findings for I.A. and C.A. We affirm the parental termination orders as to both I.A. and C.A.

Defendant and appellant Faniel Ramon Rusher (defendant) appeals his attempted burglary conviction. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. After defendant was notified of his counsel’s brief he filed his own letter brief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the entire record and find that defendant’s contentions are not amenable to review on appeal. Finding no other arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.
In 2011, after defendant pled no contest to attempted first degree burglary and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and prior prison term, the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison, suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation. Conditions of probation included one year in county jail, payment of mandatory fines, fees, and victim restitution, as well as maintaining a residence approved by the probation officer, obeying all laws and regulations of the probation department and the court, and submitting himself to the supervision of the probation department.

Christina B. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings regarding her 14-year-old daughter, Emily, as well as the court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction after awarding custody of Emily to her father, William M. (father). Finding no error, we affirm.

Chris Gatward (Gatward) and M3 Environmental Consulting, LLC (M3) appeal an order denying a special motion to strike PG Inn, Inc.'s (PG Inn) complaint for libel pursuant to the anti-"SLAPP" (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. ( b)(1).)[1] We conclude the complaint did not arise from the exercise of protected speech and that PG Inn established a probability of prevailing on the merits. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Shannon Nicole Jones, appeals from the judgment entered following her pleas of no contest to three counts of the serious (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c))[1] and violent (§ 667.5, subd. (c)) felony of second degree robbery (§ 211) and her admission that, during the commission of the offenses, she personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Jones to 17 years in state prison. We affirm.

Father Candido S. (father) appeals from the partial denial of his petition to vacate dependency jurisdiction over his children and set aside the dispositional order of the juvenile court. He contends that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to use reasonable diligence in searching for him prior to the dispositional hearing, which deprived him of notice and an opportunity to be heard. We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding due diligence had been exercised. We affirm the judgment.

On February 20, 2013 plaintiff[2] submitted to the trial court an application for a DVPA ex parte restraining order, requesting therein that defendant be ordered to stay at least 200 yards away from plaintiff, her home, job, school, and vehicle. The court granted the ex parte restraining order on that date, but limited its scope to plaintiff’s person and home and limited it to 100 yards. On March 4, 2013, defendant filed his Response to the request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order. The hearing on Plaintiff’ s request for a further injunction after hearing was called for hearing on March 20, 2013. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court made the following ruling: “The Court has read and considered the Petitioner’s [Plaintiff’s] request for a restraining order and after hearing testimony from both sides, the Court finds good cause that warrants the granting of a restraining order. [¶] RESTRAINING ORDER IS GRANTED and in effect [sic] until 3/20/15. The Court makes its orders pursuant to the Clets Order After Hearing” signed and filed this date. A copy of the order is presented to the parties in open court.” On April 8, 2013, defendant filed his Notice of Appeal.

The presumed father, Andres P., appeals from the juvenile court’s order assuming jurisdiction over his children, Wendy P., Andrea P. and J.P., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j)[1] and from that portion of the juvenile court’s order removing the children from his physical custody and granting only monitored visits. We affirm the juvenile court’s order assuming jurisdiction and dismiss as moot that portion of Andres P.’s appeal challenging the order removing the children from his custody and requiring that his visits be monitored.

K.F. (Mother) appeals after the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over her daughter, L.P., at a Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 364 hearing. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s exit orders granting sole legal and physical custody of the child to N.P. (Father) with monitored visits for Mother. We affirm.

Appellant Solayman Siraj swallowed a toothpick without knowing it. He claimed that he swallowed it on November 10, 2009, while eating a hamburger at Solley’s Restaurant and Deli (Solley’s), but his own expert testified that Siraj’s theory was highly unlikely. On appeal, Siraj challenges the judgment in favor of Solley’s. His arguments lack merit, and we affirm.

Minor Julian G. appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by reason of his having committed the crime of battery on school property in violation of Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. The juvenile court ordered minor to be placed under terms and conditions of probation.
We appointed counsel to represent minor on appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” containing an acknowledgment that she had been unable to find any arguable issues. On September 10, 2013, we advised minor that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.

This is a presentence credits appeal. (Pen. Code, §§ 2900.5, 4019.) [1] Herbert Allen appeals from the February 13, 2013 judgment entered after he pled no contest in case number GA088409 to 22 counts of second degree burglary (§ 459), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison enhancement (§ 677.5, subd. (b)). Appellant admitted violating probation in two other cases: case number SA076474 and case number SA078077 which were consolidated for sentencing.
At the February 13, 2013 sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked probation in case number SA078077 and ordered appellant to serve a seven year state prison sentence previously imposed for multiple counts of second degree burglary (§ 459) and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)).
In case number GA088409, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight months (one third the midterm) to be served consecutive to the seven year sentence in case number SA078077.
The trial court reinstated and terminated probation in the third case, case number SA076474. ,
In case numbers SA078077 and GA088409, appellant was awarded 58 days custody credit plus 58 days conduct credits. (§§ 2900.5, 4019.)

A jury convicted defendant, Raymond Hurdle Osborne, of deadly weapon assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to 3 years in state prison. We affirm the judgment. We direct the clerk of the superior court, upon remittitur issuance, to amend the abstract of judgment and deliver a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

A jury convicted defendant Edward Jack Martinez of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.(a).)[1] The trial court found true four of defendant’s prior strike conviction allegations and four prior serious felony conviction allegations, which resulted from three separate cases. (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d); 667, subds. (b)–(i); 667, subd. (a).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 45 years to life for the murder, consisting of 15 years to life tripled due to defendant’s prior strike convictions. In addition, the trial court imposed five years in each of the three cases in which defendant suffered a conviction for a serious felony. (§ 667, subd. (a).) Defendant’s total sentence was 15 years plus 45 years to life. Defendant appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter.