CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Oscar D. Perez Perez (defendant) of 22 counts of lewd acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),[1] four counts of lewd acts with a child under the age of 16 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), and found true allegations defendant committed sex crimes with multiple victims under the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), (e)(5)). The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 330 years to life.
Defendant’s sole challenge to the judgment is that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. We find the contention meritless and affirm the judgment.

Michael Kahn, the owner of seven car dealerships that composed Superior Automotive Group (SAG), accuses the lending company that financed his automobile empire of causing its collapse. This appeal concerns certain trial court rulings that stopped the jury from reaching Kahn’s and SAG’s tort claims in their cross-complaint against the lender.
The lender, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation (NMAC), sued Kahn and SAG for breach of various loan agreements and obtained a $40 million contractual damages award. Kahn and SAG do not appeal from the jury verdict on the contract claims and instead appeal only from the judgment against them as to certain claims in their cross-complaint. Essentially, they contend the trial court erred in excluding under the parol evidence rule all evidence of fraudulent oral promises by NMAC, which led to pretrial dismissal of their fraud claims and nonsuit as to their claims for fraudulent concealment and violation of the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (15 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq; ADDCA).
We agree the trial court erred in its parol evidence ruling as well as in granting the partial nonsuit. We further find these errors prejudicial. Consequently, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for a retrial of appellants’ claims against NMAC for negligent and intentional misrepresentation, promissory fraud, fraudulent concealment and violation of the ADDCA.

The City of Huntington Beach (City) appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of respondent Shon Lee after the trial court sustained Lee’s demurrer to the City’s first amended complaint without leave to amend. Lee bought a unit in a low- and moderate-income condominium project in Huntington Beach that had sale restrictions as to the purchase price and the income of any buyer. In addition, the City was required to approve any sale. None of these conditions was met.
There was a problem, however, with the restrictions. Through an oversight, the legal description of the condominium property that included them was not recorded. Accordingly, the court refused to enforce the restrictions against Lee, citing certain statutory requirements for recording a legal description. Lee was dismissed from the City’s suit.
We reverse. The City has stated a cause of action for reformation of the defective restrictions. There is no dispute that the legal description was omitted by mistake. The statutes mandating a legal description as a condition of enforceability of property restrictions do not preclude a court from reforming an instrument under the proper circumstances. The demurrer should have been overruled.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 731, which authorizes city officials to file a nuisance abatement action under Civil Code section 3480 in the name of the People of California, the City of Brea (the city) filed a nuisance cause of action against Cloud 9, Inc. (Cloud 9) for operating a medical marijuana dispensary in violation of a city ordinance banning such property uses. On summary judgment, the trial court upheld the ban against Cloud 9’s claim it was preempted by state medical marijuana law, found Cloud 9’s dispensary activities therefore constituted a per se nuisance based on the ban, entered a permanent injunction against the dispensary, and Cloud 9 now appeals. During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729 (Inland Empire) that local governments may ban medical marijuana dispensaries without triggering preemption by the voters’ enactment of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA; Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted) or California’s Medical Marijuana Program (MMP; § 11362.7 et seq.).

Qualified Patients Association, a former medical marijuana dispensary, and its owner and operator, Lance Mowdy, (collectively, QPA) appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying their declaratory relief action in which they argued state medical marijuana law preempted a City of Anaheim (city) ordinance banning medical marijuana dispensaries. During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729 (Inland Empire) that local governments may ban medical marijuana dispensaries without triggering preemption by the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA; Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted) or the California’s Medical Marijuana Program (MMP; § 11362.7 et seq.).
In supplemental briefing, QPA contends Inland Empire is not dispositive because it did not resolve whether state medical marijuana law preempts local governments from enforcing dispensary bans with misdemeanor penalties typically used to enforce other zoning bans. In a similar vein, QPA argues Inland Empire left unanswered other related questions, including: (1) whether a city “can remove a defense[] created by the MMP[]”; (2) “[w]hether Anaheim can do indirectly what it cannot do directly;” (3) whether Anaheim’s ordinance “burdens criminal defenses allowed by the MMP[]”; and (4) whether Anaheim’s ordinance is “overbroad.” These contentions, however, are simply variations on QPA’s core preemption claim. Inland Empire determined state medical marijuana law does not preempt total local bans, and we are bound by that conclusion. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity).) We therefore affirm the judgment.

In December 2003, Alan Rigby was adjudicated to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] He is the subject of SVPA recommitment petitions filed in 2004 and 2006. In our prior opinion, Rigby v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045614) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202314, we denied Rigby’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his motion to dismiss the 2006 SVPA recommitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Rigby’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Rigby and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

In October 2002, James Yancy was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA)[1] and was committed for two years. He was the subject of SVPA recommitment petitions filed in 2004 and 2006. In our prior opinion, Yancy v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045213) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202359, we denied Yancy’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Yancy’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Yancy challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Yancy and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

Ronnie Chambers is the subject of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, Chambers v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045209) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202334, we denied Chambers’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Chambers’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Chambers challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Chambers and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

Leroy Lunday is the subject of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, Lunday v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045208) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202366, we denied Lunday’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Lunday’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Lunday challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Lunday and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

Donald Gordon is the subject of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, Gordon v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045207) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202322, we denied Gordon’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Gordon’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Gordon challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Gordon and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

Robert LeFort is the subject of commitment and recommitment petitions filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, LeFort v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045204) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 27, 2012, S202311, we denied LeFort’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the recommitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny LeFort’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to LeFort and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA

James Wright is the subject of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, Wright v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045203) (nonpub. opn), review granted June 13, 2012, S202320, we denied Wright’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Wright’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Wright challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Wright and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.

Defendant Lanard Lamar Kitchens was charged with attempted murder, evading a pursing peace officer, and other offenses based on his conduct following a traffic stop that occurred in May 2010. In another criminal case, he was charged with robbery and assault, based on an incident that occurred in December 2009. The two cases were consolidated for trial, and after a jury trial, Kitchens was convicted of all charges.
On appeal, Kitchens contends he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court refused to sever the charges related to the December 2009 robbery from the charges related to the May 2010 attempted murder and evasion. Recognizing that this issue was not properly raised with the trial court, he argues, in the alternative, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the consolidation of the two cases.
We reject Kitchens’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Richard Boysel is the subject of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).[1] In our prior opinion, Boysel v. Superior Court (Mar. 28, 2012, G045202) (nonpub. opn.), review granted June 13, 2012, S202324, we denied Boysel’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition, which sought a writ directing the respondent court to grant his plea in abatement and dismiss the commitment petition.
The California Supreme Court granted review of our opinion. After issuing its decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 (Reilly), the Supreme Court transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of that decision. No party filed a supplemental brief pursuant to rule 8.200(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
As the Supreme Court directed, we have reconsidered this matter in light of Reilly and again deny Boysel’s petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Our decision is without prejudice to Boysel challenging the probable cause determination pursuant to Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pages 656‑657, footnote 5, and without prejudice to Boysel and the People obtaining further examinations and evaluations permitted by the SVPA.