CA Unpub Decisions

James Lofton Easter entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of selling cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and admitted he had a prior narcotics conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). The plea agreement provided the remaining counts and allegations of the information would be dismissed and Easter would receive a stipulated prison sentence of six years.
The judgment is affirmed.

The successors in interest of Joseph and Eva Ramirez seek to invalidate a deed conveying a parcel of property to the Ramirezes daughter, defendant and respondent Arlene Vigil. Arlene Vigil was a beneficiary of her parents trust, and the property would have passed to her upon the death of the second of her parents by the terms of the trust. However, Arlene persuaded her father to sell the property to her. The trial court apparently found that Arlene forged her mothers signature on the grant deed and other documents. However, the court also found that Eva Ramirez ratified her husbands act, as her agent, by accepting the proceeds of the sale. Further, the court found that upon Evas death, the property became the sole property of Joseph Ramirez, and that title passed to Arlene as a matter of law, pursuant to Civil Code section 1106. Court determine, albeit on different grounds, that Eva ratified the sale to Arlene. None of the other issues plaintiffs raise warrants reversal of the judgment. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Following a physical altercation with his brother Victor, defendant stabbed Victor in the chest with a steak knife. Prior to the attack, Victor, who very angry at defendant, threatened to beat defendant for leaving him for two days with the work on their parents home. Defendant, who was frightened of his brother, stated that he would kill Victor if Victor attacked him. When his brother confronted him, defendant attempted to shield himself from his brothers rage by locking himself in the house and arming himself with a crow bar and a knife. However, defendant eventually let Victor into the house, where the two began arguing and fighting, resulting in Victors death. Victors blood alcohol level was measured at .22 percent; defendant had no alcohol in his bloodstream, but he tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) with the personal use of a knife (Pen. Code, 12022, subd. (b)(1) & 1192.7). Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder with the personal use of a knife.
The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant, Guillermo Guadalupe Paez, of being a felon in possession of ammunition (Pen Code, 12316, subd. (b)(1)). In a separate proceeding, Paez admitted two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). On September 7, 2006, the court sentenced Paez to an aggregate four year term, the middle term of two years on his possession conviction, and two one year prior prison term enhancements. On appeal, Paez contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial. Court affirm.

It was alleged in a felony complaint filed February 14, 2006,[1]that appellant Michael James Todd committed three felonies, including possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)), and that he had served four separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). At his preliminary hearing, appellant moved to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5). The court denied the motion. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to possession of heroin. The court imposed a three-year midterm prison sentence. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the court erred in denying appellants suppression motion and, alternatively, (2) that if his appellate challenge to the denial of that motion is deemed waived by the failure to renew the motion in superior court after the preliminary hearing, appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Court affirm.

Defendant Eddie Carrillo shot his cousin Carlos Urbano several times, at close range, in the face, chest, and back. Consequently, he was convicted of attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1) and assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2). Numerous firearm and great bodily injury enhancements were also found to be true. But the jury was unable to reach a verdict on allegations the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and the court subsequently dismissed the gang enhancements on the prosecutors motion. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant had a prior conviction of violating section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and the court found the conviction constituted a serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law. The court sentenced defendant to prison for a total of 39 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court erred in dismissing a juror during deliberations; (2) the court failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry regarding possible juror misconduct; (3) the postsubmission substitution of jurors violated his constitutional rights; (4) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the gang experts testimony regarding defendants prior criminality; and (5) insufficient evidence supports the trial courts finding that his prior conviction of violating section 245, subdivision (a)(1) qualified as a serious felony within the three strikes law. Court affirm.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) filed March 27, 2007, that appellant Jose P., a minor, committed two misdemeanor offenses: attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer while operating a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, 2800.1, subd. (a); count 1) and driving without a valid drivers license ( 12500, subd. (a); count 2). On April 4, 2007, appellant admitted count 2 and count 1 was dismissed. On April 18, 2007, at the disposition hearing, the court readjudged appellant a ward of the court and ordered appellant committed to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility boot camp program for a period not to exceed 365 days. The court further ordered that if appellant failed to pass the screening for that facility, he would be committed to the Juvenile Justice Campus for 180 days. Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing.

On October 29, 2002, appellant, Jessie Randle Lancaster, pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, 11364). On March 21, 2003, the court placed Lancaster on Proposition 36 probation for three years and ordered him to enroll in the recovery court program. On April 28, 2004, Lancasters probation officer filed an affidavit alleging Lancaster violated his probation by failing to test, failing to enroll in, participate, or complete his treatment plan, and by failing to abstain from the use of drugs. On April 30, 2004, Lancaster admitted violating his probation by failing to test on two dates and the court reinstated probation under the original terms and conditions.
The judgment is affirmed.

In August 2006, appellant Jennifer C., a minor, admitted an allegation that she committed misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). Later that month, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed her on probation and ordered her to comply with various terms of probation. In November 2006 and again in February 2007, the court found appellant to be in violation of the terms of her probation. In both instances, the court continued appellant on probation and ordered her committed to juvenile hall.
The judgment is affirmed.

No opposition was received in response to this courts order of November 30, 2007. Pursuant to the terms of that order, this court deems the decision to not file an opposition to constitute agreement that petitioner be granted a belated appeal without further proceedings. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728.) Petitioner is directed to cause an adequate notice of appeal to be filed on or before 30 days from the date of this order in Madera County Superior Court action no. 06 40546.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested 18-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her daughter H. and son R. Court grant the petition.

Petitioner Brian Baughn was the prevailing party in a proceeding under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). (Gov. Code, 6250 et seq.) The trial court granted his attorneys fees motion but awarded him less than half of the almost $85,000 he had requested. Petitioner argues on appeal that the award was an abuse of discretion.
Court detect no abuse of discretion in the trial courts award of fees incurred for the prosecution of the CPRA petition. However, we find no reasonable basis in the record for the amount the trial court determined was reasonable for litigating the attorneys fees motion itself. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment.

After a court trial, defendant was found guilty of kidnapping Cynthia, a child under 14, to commit a lewd act (Pen. Code 207, subd. (b)),[1] kidnapping her for the purpose of committing a sexual offense ( 209, subd. (b)(1)), committing four forcible lewd acts on her ( 288, subd. (b)(1)), making criminal threats against her ( 422), and committing a lewd act on Jacqueline, a child under 14. ( 288, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to 34 years to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove kidnapping a child under 14 ( 207, subd. (b)) and kidnapping for the purpose of committing a sexual offense ( 209, subd. (b)(1)). Court affirm.

IMX, Inc. (IMX), a subcontractor, brought suit against Boris and Irma Auerbuch on claims of breach of contract, enforcement of mechanics lien and quantum meruit. The court dismissed the contract and quantum meruit causes of action with prejudice. It later entered judgment in favor of IMX on the mechanics lien cause of action, awarding it some, but not all, of the damages it sought. The Auerbuchs appeal from an order denying their motion for attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 (hereafter, section 1717). The order denying the Auerbuchs their attorney fees is affirmed.