CA Unpub Decisions

Juan Manuel Tapia-Huante was convicted of one count of sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), one count of possession of cocaine base for sale ( 11351.5), two counts of transporting methamphetamine ( 11379, subd. (a)), two counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale ( 11378), one count of possession of a controlled substance with a firearm ( 11370.1, subd. (a)), one count of use of a false compartment to conceal controlled substances ( 11366.8, subd. (a)), and two counts of child endangerment (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a total of 11 years in prison.
Appellant attacks several of his convictions on appeal. He contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court denied his request for a continuance to retain new counsel after trial had begun. He claims the court committed prejudicial error by admitting a statement made by him before Miranda warnings were given. He argues that the child endangerment convictions and one of his methamphetamine possession convictions must be reversed because the trial court did not give the jury unanimity instructions as to those counts. And he argues that his conviction for use of a false compartment must be reversed because the false drink container in his car was not a false compartment within the meaning of section 11366.8.
Court affirm.

In this action for wrongful termination based on sex discrimination, plaintiff Debra Schellenberg appeals from the summary judgment in favor of her former employer, defendant Sun Microsystems (Sun). Court affirm the judgment.

After hearing evidence that appellant had a blood alcohol level of 0.17 percent, a jury convicted appellant of driving under the influence of alcohol and of driving while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher. The jury initially deadlocked on another charge of possessing a dirk or dagger, but ultimately convicted him of that charge. On appeal, Hidalgos counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, stating that no arguable issue exists. Court have independently reviewed the record, find no arguable issue, and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Lawrence Morelock, the appellant in this case (appellant) has appealed from an order that denied his request for a restraining order against respondent Mark Mastandrea (respondent). The request was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. The trial court, after a hearing on the matter, determined appellant had not presented statutory grounds to support the request. Court find the record supports the trial courts determination and Court affirm the order.

Burnett Davis appeals from his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under Penal Code section 2960 et. seq. He contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his underlying crime of cruelty to an animal rendered him eligible for commitment pursuant to section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(P). Court affirm.

Angel Jauregui appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of possessing heroin (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Jauregui on three years' formal probation, with conditions that he complete 100 hours of community service and participate in drug treatment.

On September 29, 2006, Jauregui was contacted by Oxnard police officers outside his residence after witnesses identified him as having displayed a gun. As one of the officers conducted a patdown search for weapons, Jauregui stated that he had used heroin the previous day. Following a drug abuse recognition examination, Jauregui was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance. During a booking search, a small bindle containing .06 grams of heroin was found in his pocket. A blood test subsequently verified that Jauregui was under the influence of an opiate at the time of his arrest. Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Jauregui's attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 126.) The judgment is affirmed.

Mohammad Azadrad appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11350(a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that appellant had suffered a prior felony strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)(d).)[1] Appellant was sentenced to 32 months state prison and ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 parole revocation fine ( 1202.45), a $20 court security fee ( 1465.8), a $50 lab fee plus a $85 penalty assessment (Health & Saf. Code, 11372.5, subd. (a)), and a $20 DNA assessment fee. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Frederick W. Penney sued defendant Jeffrey Isbell for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought a civil restraining order and injunction prohibiting Isbell from harassing him. (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6.) Isbell opposed the application for restraining order and injunction and filed a special motion to strike Penneys complaint under the anti SLAPP statute. ( 425.16.) The trial court issued the requested restaining order and injunction prohibiting harassment and denied Isbells special motion to strike. Isbell filed appeals in each case. Court have consolidated the appeals on our own motion. Court dismiss as moot the appeal from the restraining order and injunction prohibiting harassment. Court affirm the order denying Isbells special motion to strike.

Defendant Douglas Erwin was tried for robbery (Pen. Code, 211 count one), assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2) count two), and possession of a firearm in violation of probation ( 12021, subd. (d) count three) together with multiple enhancements, including the allegation that he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury ( 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court declared a mistrial after the prosecution discovered a surveillance video previously believed to be missing. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty to robbery in count one and admitted a single enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c) in exchange for a stipulated aggregate prison term of 22 years. The court sentenced defendant in accordance with the agreement: two years for robbery and 20 years for the enhancement. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in denying defendants section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence located in the common living area and the master bedroom. Court conclude that there was no error and affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a negotiated settlement in Lassen County case Nos. CR023718 and CR023379 (the latter consolidated with CR023141), defendant Daniel Wood White pled guilty to transportation of methamphetamine and admitted enhancements for being on bail and of three prior prison terms; he also pled guilty to receiving stolen property. Defendants pleas and admission were given in exchange for a stipulated sentence of eight years eight months and the dismissal of several other charges as well as two other cases. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Gregory Smith appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of murder and assault on a child resulting in death. The charges against Smith arose after Smith's daughter, Alexis, suffered severe injuries while she was in his care on the morning of May 6, 2004. Alexis was unresponsive when police and paramedics arrived, and she was taken to the hospital. Doctors determined that Alexis had extensive brain damage, as well as severe chest and abdominal injuries. Alexis died the following day, after she was taken off of life support on the recommendation of her doctors.
We conclude that, with one minor exception, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Smith's prior acts of domestic violence. To the extent the trial court may have erred in admitting evidence of Smith's violence against one ex-girlfriend because that incident was not sufficiently similar to the violence of which he was accused in this case, Court conclude that the error was harmless. Because Court find only one possible error that does not require reversal, the cumulative error doctrine also provides no basis for relief. Finally, Court disagree that the admission of prior acts evidence pursuant to section 1109 violated Smith's constitutional rights. Court therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff/cross-defendant Del Taco, Inc. (Del Taco) appeals from a judgment entered against it and in favor of the defendant/cross-complainant 1033 Third Street Corporation (Third Street) after the trial court granted Third Street's motions for summary adjudication and summary judgment on Del Taco's first amended complaint alleging a breach of contract and seeking declaratory relief concerning its rights under a commercial ground lease agreement and the obligations to pay for the repairs of a sewer line. Del Taco essentially claimed that Third Street, as successor in interest of the original landlord University Real Estate Partnership V (University), breached the lease by failing and refusing to repair the sewer line that was part of the "common area," which was an obligation of Third Street under the lease to repair.
The judgment is affirmed.

Claudia Warnack Sanders (Claudia) appeals an order denying her motion to set aside the judgment entered in the proceeding to dissolve her marriage to J. Randolph Sanders (Randolph) and the subsequent order denying her motion to vacate that order or, alternatively, for a new trial. On appeal, Claudia contends that because Randolph breached his fiduciary duty to disclose to her all material facts regarding the valuation of their community property interest in a corporation before they entered into a marital settlement agreement, the trial court erred by denying her motion to set aside the judgment of dissolution entered based on that agreement. She further contends the trial court erred in denying her subsequent motion to vacate that order or, alternatively, for a new trial. Finally, she contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against her for filing those motions. The order denying Claudia's motion to set aside the judgment is reversed.