CA Unpub Decisions

Villa Vista Mobile Estates Transitional Team (Transitional Team) sued Richard Collins, the owner of a mobilehome park, alleging Collins violated a City of San Marcos ordinance providing mobilehome residents with a right of first refusal to purchase the property. The trial court granted Collins's summary judgment motion on various grounds, including that the undisputed facts established the Transitional Team did not properly exercise the right of first refusal because its offer was materially different from the third party offer. Transitional Team appeals. Court affirm.

Lindsey Stewart, in propria persona, appeals an order for the issuance of a bench warrant for her arrest, with bail set at $25,000, stemming from her knowing and willful failure to submit to a debtor's examination. The Poway Unified School District (the District) moves for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that a party in flagrant defiance of the superior court's orders may not seek our assistance. Under a well established line of authority, Court grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

Leah R. appeals orders declaring her daughter, Trinity R., a dependent child of the juvenile court and placing Trinity in her care. She contends the court erred in denying her petition to invalidate the judgment, in which she alleged the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not comply with requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). She asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the jurisdictional findings and the court erred in declaring Trinity a dependent child when she (Leah) was cooperative and immediately began services. She also contends she was denied due process. Court conclude the issues Leah raises concerning ICWA are moot, and we do not discuss these issues. As to the other matters Leah raises, we hold the court did not err in finding the allegations of the petition true or declaring her daughter a dependent child, and Leah has not shown a denial of due process. Court affirm the orders.

On June 17, 2004, Kenyatta Smith entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing cocaine in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). The trial court deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Penal Code[1]section 1000 and ordered her to participate in a drug rehabilitation program. After Smith's three failed attempts to complete diversion, Judge David Szumowski found she had not performed the assigned program satisfactorily, and on April 27, 2007, entered a judgment of guilt as to the drug possession charge. ( 1000.3.) The judgment is affirmed.

Alexis M. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter D.W. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Alexis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the judgment.

Harold M. appeals denial of his post-dispositional Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Harold's counsel also requests leave for him to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant and Appellant Royce W. (Royce) is the father of six year old T.W. Royce appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to this child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. In his appeal, Royce contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for substitute counsel (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)); (2) the juvenile court erred in granting his motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed.2d 562] (Faretta); (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition; (4) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights, as the adoption assessment report was inadequate; (5) the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial relationship exception under former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to render termination of parental rights detrimental to the child; and (6) the juvenile court erred in finding that the sibling relationship exception under former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) did not apply. As explained below, Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Royce claims his counsel was ineffective during the entire dependency proceedings and therefore claims certain orders of the juvenile court should be reversed. Court reject this contention and deny Royces writ of habeas corpus petition.

Lennie Williams (Williams) appeals from an order granting a civil harassment injunction at the request of Carla Simpson (Simpson), the significant other of Williamss son. Williams asserts she was not properly served with the temporary restraining order (TRO) or notice of the hearing, the judgment was based on false testimony by Simpson at the hearing, that the trial court was biased and had prejudged the matter, and that the court refused to hear defense evidence or witnesses. Simpson did not file a respondents brief. Therefore, we decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by appellant. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) Court reverse.

Plaintiff purchased real property for $33,000 at a trustees foreclosure sale and discovered afterwards that it was subject to a senior lien of $330,000. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted defendants summary judgment motion. The primary matter in dispute is a legal issue regarding the effect of a real estate subordination agreement. In the absence of any material disputed facts, Court conduct a de novo review and affirm the trial courts legal conclusions.

Appellant Edward James Pull touched six-year-old R.R.s vagina through her clothing numerous times and twice had her touch his penis by gripping it with her right hand and going up and down in a motion. He had had hundreds of child pornography images, along with internet search histories for, inter alia, prime lolitas, on his computer. He struggled with sheriffs deputies during his arrest. A jury found Pull guilty of three counts of lewd and lascivious and of one count of resisting an officer. (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1), 288, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years in state prison the three-year mitigated term on one lewd and lascivious count, two years consecutively (one third the middle term) on each of the other two lewd and lascivious counts, and six months concurrently on the resisting count.

At the conclusion of an adjudication hearing held in June 2007, the juvenile court found true allegations contained in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602; 777, subd. (a))[1]filed on May 8, 2006, that on May 5, 2006, appellant Steven C. discharged a firearm at an occupied building or vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 246, the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) and during the commission of the offense, Steven personally used a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and sustained the petition. Following a disposition hearing held later that same month, the court ordered Steven committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice (DCRJJ), formerly known as the California Youth Authority (CYA). The court also declared Stevens maximum period of physical confinement (MPPC) to be 22 years, six months, based on the instant offense and enhancements, as well as offenses adjudicated in prior wardship proceedings.
The orders sustaining the petition and committing Steven to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice, are affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to (1) strike the Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a) gun enhancement and (2) calculate the maximum period of physical confinement based on the facts and circumstances before it. The court is directed to prepare an amended commitment order reflecting these changes and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice.

Deanna G. appeals from a 2007 order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her two young daughters, A. and M. She contends the court erred in 2005 when it determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) did not apply. On review, Court affirm.

Five-month-old E.C. was injured as a result of non-accidental, physical trauma inflicted by her father, Jesus C. (father). Dependency jurisdiction was taken over E. and fathers four-year-old son, J.C. The juvenile court denied father reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5). Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts findings denying him services. As we shall explain, Court affirm.

In June 2003 defendant Robert Norman Martin pleaded guilty to two counts of oral copulation with a person under the age of 18. (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (b)(1); all further statutory references are to this code.) He was ordered to register as a sex offender and placed on probation. He claims the court abused its discretion in requiring lifetime registration as a sex offender under former section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E) (now 290.006). Court disagree and affirm.