CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Irene Thibault appeals from a judgment entered against her after a jury found defendant Anaheim General Hospital, L.P., did not wrongfully terminate her. Because plaintiff failed to designate the reporters transcript as part of the record on appeal, Court cannot evaluate her claims of insubstantial evidence and jury instructional error, and therefore affirm the judgment. In addition, Court deny defendants conditional motion for appellate sanctions because defendant failed to adequately argue the issue.

The fire department (the department) of defendant City of Newport Beach (the City) fired plaintiff David Wenger, who had been employed by the department as a lifeguard lieutenant, after the fire chief determined Wenger had engaged in misconduct. After a five day hearing, the City of Newport Beach Civil Service Board (the Board) rejected Wengers appeal and upheld the departments decision. Wenger filed a petition for writ of mandate which sought the issuance of a writ compelling the department to set aside its decision to terminate his employment. Wenger presented a single argument in support of his petition: Pursuant to the departments procedure (SOP) 7.C.300.07(B), the department had forfeited the right to discipline Wenger because it had failed to either administer the discipline or advise Wenger of the departments intention to apply substantial punitive discipline within 10 days of the day Wengers supervisor [wa]s made aware of an action requiring a disciplinary response. The trial court denied Wengers petition on the ground the so called 10 day rule contained in SOP 7.C.300.07(B) did not apply to the termination of Wengers employment because the rule was no longer in effect. Wenger contends the trial court erred in reaching that conclusion.
Court affirm. As Court discuss in detail post, substantial evidence before the trial court shows the 10 day rule contained in SOP 7.C.300.07(B) was no longer in effect at the relevant time.

Defendant Michelle Benabou appeals from the courts imposition of sentence pursuant to her written request. She contends the court should have refused her request because she did not admit committing another offense, and had been released on Proposition 36 probation. But her request implied she had committed another offense, and the record shows she committed a parole violation i.e., another offense. Also, the court properly revoked her Proposition 36 probation because she committed a non drug related probation violation by failing to report to her probation officer. Court affirm.

Donald Sanford DeAngelis, represented himself at trial. He was convicted of possession of two baggies of methamphetamine and admitted two strikes and four prison term priors. He was sentenced to 44 months in prison. The trial court arrived at this number by striking one of his strike enhancements and three of his prison term priors. It imposed the low term of 16 months for the instant offense, doubled that term in consideration of the remaining strike prior, and added a year for the remaining prison term prior.
Counsel was appointed for DeAngelis on appeal and challenged the fact the trial court awarded DeAngelis only 414 days of presentence credits (276 days actually served plus 138 days for good conduct credit). Careful analysis by counsel convinced both the Attorney General and this court that the proper number of credits is actually almost three weeks more. Remarkably, while they disagree about the actual computation (DeAngelis says he should get 327 days actual time and 106 days good conduct credits; the Attorney Generals reckoning arrives at 325 days plus 108 days conduct credits), the parties agree that when all is said and done, DeAngelis is entitled to credits totaling 433 days. Both sides agree postsentence credits are a matter for computation by state prison authorities in the first instance and not before us at this time.
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Brian Eugene Logsdon appeals from the judgment following his guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs as a felony after three previous convictions for the same offense. (See Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a), 23550.) He received the bargained-for low term of 16 months in prison.[2] On appeal, he contends the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence, after which he changed his plea. Court affirm.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant Chad Michael Fear on appeal. Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client, but advised the court he found no issues to argue on his behalf. We provided defendant 30 days to file written argument in his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him. After examining the record pursuant to People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, Court conclude there are no arguable issues warranting further briefing. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Judith F., the mother of three-year-old S.D., claims the juvenile court erred in granting two motions filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) and improperly refused to apply the benefit exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Court find no error and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Appellant Wendy Caldarulo sued her former employer, respondent the San Jose Police Officers Association (the Association), for wrongful termination. The parties agreed to mediate their dispute. A few days before the mediation, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment. The parties did not settle during the formal session with the mediator, but agreed to continue their negotiations. They arrived at an agreement approximately two weeks before the date set for hearing the motion for summary judgment. Rather than take the motion off calendar while the settlement documents were circulating, the Association appeared at the hearing and obtained summary judgment. The court subsequently denied Caldarulos request to reconsider the motion or grant a new trial and denied Caldarulos motion to strike or tax the Associations costs.
Court conclude that Caldarulo was entitled to a new trial on the grounds of surprise and that the court erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Court therefore reverse the summary judgment and direct the trial court to grant Caldarulos motion for a new trial and her motion to strike the Associations costs.

Bankers Insurance Company ("the surety") appeals from the denial of its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate a $20,000 bail bond and from the summary judgment rendered against the surety. Among other things, the surety contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to declare the bond forfeited in open court the first time the bailee did not appear. Santa Cruz CountyCounsel, on behalf of the People (respondent), does not oppose the relief requested by the surety. For the reasons outlined in this opinion Court agree that the bond should have been exonerated. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment.

This appeal concerns the scope of an attorneys authority to execute a settlement agreement on behalf of his or her client. Appellants Mahmood and Farah Alam and Ok Boon Lee (collectively, appellants) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of respondent Mohammad A. Khan following the trial courts determination on summary adjudication that a purported settlement agreement signed by appellants attorney, but not by appellants, was enforceable against them. For reasons discussed below, Court reverse.

In this appeal, Marshall G. Berol (Berol), a class member and objector, challenges the trial courts settlement approval of class and derivative claims brought by investors against the general partners and the limited partnerships in which they invested. Berol claims that the named plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives for the derivative claims and that the entire settlement is unfair and inadequate. He also claims the court erred when it denied his motion to intervene. Court disagree and affirm.

A modification decision.

Hong Soi Lau was convicted of unlawful possession of a billy under Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a).) He contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his in limine motion to present evidence relating to the defense of entrapment by estoppel. As discussed below, Court find no error and affirm.

Donald Ray Williams appeals from a judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) and his admission that he suffered two prior convictions of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), served five prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) and suffered a prior drug offense conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). The trial court struck one of the prior serious or violent felony convictions and all of the prior prison term enhancements and sentenced appellant to prison for 11 years, consisting of the middle term of four years, doubled by reason of the Three Strikes law, plus a consecutive three year sentence enhancement pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). He requests that this court conduct an independent review of the arresting officers personnel records in order to ensure that his trial below was fair.