CA Unpub Decisions

Gail B., the mother of four-year-old H.B., appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26. Without ever affirmatively stating either she or H.B. may have American Indian ancestry, Gail B. contends the juvenile courts failure to inquire about such ancestry violated the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. (ICWA)) and requires reversal of the termination order. Court affirm.

Appellant Holly H. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court which deems Tom S. the presumed father of her child, Harmony. The Department concedes there was insufficient evidence presented at the January 25, 2007 hearing to support the finding that Tom S., the biological father, is Harmonys presumed father.
Based on our review of the record, we accept the Departments concession. The order deeming Tom S. to be Harmonys presumed father is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct a proper inquiry into the matter.

Joseph M. is the father of five minor children: Tamra M. (age 14), Joe M. Jr. (age 12), J. M. (age 9), Trinity M. (age 4), and Violet M (age 2) (hereafter collectively referred to as minors). He appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights to minors. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.)[1] Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that minors are likely to be adopted; (2) the court erroneously failed to consider minors' wishes; and (3) the court abused its discretion and denied him due process by refusing to conduct a contested hearing on one of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights. Court affirm.

Adriana C. (mother) appeals from an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction over her three children and awarding legal and physical custody to their father, Albert I. (father). Court find no error, and Court affirm.

Travon H. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he committed a second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211). He was ordered home on probation. The evidence at the adjudication hearing established that on April 13, 2007, C. and his brother were sitting on their bikes in front of Quartz Hill Elementary School in Los Angeles County when appellant and his companion M. approached. M. said his feet hurt and told C. to give him the bike. M. said, If you give me the bike[,] no one gets hurt. Appellant stood behind M. and also told C. to give M. the bike. When C. said he had to get home, M. said he too had to get home and yanked the bike out of C.s hands. M. got on the bike and rode away, and appellant walked away in the same direction. C. was frightened when M. demanded the bike, and when appellant approached and demanded that C. turn over the bike, that frightened C. even more. C.s brother rode home to tell their parents what had happened. Their father picked up C. in a van and they drove around looking for the bike. At some point, they found appellant and C.s father grabbed him by the shirt. Appellant punched C.s dad in the neck. C. and his father, thereafter, found M. and recovered the bike. The order is affirmed.

Plaintiff and Appellant Swarnapali Timmann (Timmann) filed suit against a number of defendants, including defendants and respondents John F. Napoli (Napoli), JFN Project Consultants, a California corporation (JFN Consultants); and JFN Project Consultants Limited, a United Kingdom corporation (JFN Limited) (collectively defendants), for fraud and breach of contract, among other causes of action. According to Timmann, defendants breached an investment agreement by failing to pay interest on the principal amount and by failing to return the principal amount after Timmann canceled the agreement. Court reverse. Timmann properly served JFN Limited in December 2004. JFN Limiteds 2007 motion to quash was therefore untimely. In addition, because Timmann properly served JFN Limited in December 2004, the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the action against JFN Limited based upon Timmanns alleged dilatory service of process. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Joanna C. (mother) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights over seven-year-old Aliyah C. and five-year-old C. A. pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mothers sole contention on appeal is that the evidence did not support the juvenile courts finding that the exception to termination of parental rights found in former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply. Court affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

In connection with separate incidents, the juvenile court sustained two petitions filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against minor and appellant Xavier H. As to the first petition, filed on February 9, 2007, the court sustained one count of trespass by entering and occupying (Pen. Code, 602, subd. (m)). As to the second petition, filed on April 3, the court sustained one count of sale or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11360, subd. (a)). At the disposition hearing on both petitions on September 4, 2007, the court placed the minor home on probation, imposed conditions of probation, and set the maximum term of confinement at four years, two months. The judgment is affirmed as modified.

Defendant and appellant Donald Steven Moss entered a plea of no contest to transportation of methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a). Defendant was placed on formal probation on November 19, 2004. Following a violation of probation, on June 2, 2005, defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison; sentence was suspended and additional probation conditions were imposed. Following another probation violation, defendant was sentenced to state prison on July 24, 2007, for a term of three years. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. This court appointed counsel for defendant on appeal. On January 7, 2008, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, but requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised by this court of his right to file a supplemental brief. The judgment is affirmed.

Bret H. (father) petitions for extraordinary writ review under California Rules of Court rule 8.452 of the orders made October 29, 2007, at a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22[1](referral hearing) terminating reunification services and setting a permanent plan hearing under section 366.26 for Alana H. Father contends the finding reasonable services were given is not supported by substantial evidence. There is substantial evidence to support the dependency courts ruling. The petition is denied.

Following the deaths of his twin infant daughters, defendant Ernest Dashon Noel was found guilty of two counts of felony child endangerment. He was sentenced to five years and four months in prison (the middle term of four years for the first count, and a consecutive term of 16 months for the second count); was awarded 13 days of presentence custody credit; was ordered to pay an $800 restitution fine, a $800 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked, a $20 court security fee for each conviction, a $213.37 main jail booking fee, and a $23.50 main jail classification fee; and was required to provide DNA samples.
Defendants supplemental brief contends (1) the lesser included charge [of misdemeanor child endangerment] was the only charge for which [he] could possibly be found guilty based upon the evidence, (2) he was not present when the crimes allegedly took place, (3) he did not live at that residence and [his] name was not on the lease, and (4) Child Protective Services (CPS) and Birth & Beyond, not defendant, are criminally liable for the twins deaths. Court affirm the judgment.

A classroom at Davis High School was flooded, causing substantial damage. The juvenile court sustained charges that Adam S. and Zachary F. committed felony vandalism and conspiracy to commit a felony. (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), 594, subd. (b)(1).) Adam timely appealed from the dispositional order. In Zacharys separate appeal, Court remanded with directions for the juvenile court to declare whether the offenses should be treated as felonies. (In re Zachary F. (Oct. 30, 2007, C054276) [nonpub. opn.].) That claim is not raised by Adam and we decline to order supplemental briefing on that issue in this appeal.

After a jury trial defendant Albert Fleming was found guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245),[1]dissuading a crime victim from reporting ( 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), dissuading a crime victim from testifying ( 136.1, (a)(2)), and battery against a cohabitant ( 242, 243, subd. (e).) After a second phase of the trial, the jury found true enhancement allegations that defendant had four prior convictions of serious or violent felony offenses ( 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)). Sentenced to an aggregate term of 95 years to life in state prison, defendant appeals.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in: (1) its instruction on the offense of dissuading a crime victim from reporting; (2) failing to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; and (3) failing to instruct, as to the offense of dissuading a crime victim from testifying, that evidence he was a family member who interceded to protect the victim creates a presumption of absence of malice. He also contends that: (4) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request the lattermost instruction; (5) there is no substantial evidence to support the conviction of dissuading a crime victim from reporting; and (6) there is insufficient proof that one of his prior offenses was a serious felony. Finding no merit in these contentions, Court affirm the judgment.

Cornell O. Johnson appeals from a family court judgment awarding the sum of $125,821, a 1996 Ford Explorer, and $3,500 in attorney fees to Muriel Johnson pursuant to Family Code sections 271 and 2030. Court affirm the judgment.