CA Unpub Decisions

Denis Hebert, an attorney, filed a complaint against Carl Latting, his former client, to recover unpaid fees. Latting answered, claiming the fees were excessive. Pursuant to the parties agreement, the dispute went to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Hebert the entire amount of billed but unpaid fees. Latting petitioned the superior court to vacate the arbitration award. The court did so, and Hebert appeals. Court reverse.

Rebecca B. (mother) appeals the courts termination of her parental rights over Tatiana G. (now age 2). Mother contends (1) the court and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), and (2) termination of mothers parental rights was detrimental to Tatiana under the beneficial relationship exception contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A). Court disagree and affirm the order.

A jury found appellant guilty of three counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 and four counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child. (Pen. Code, 269, 288, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to a state prison term of 45 years to life plus 24 years. Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that there was insufficient evidence as to three counts, that the trial court erred in admitting excerpts of testimony from the preliminary examination, that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, and that CALCRIM No. 220 is a defective reasonable doubt instruction. Court modify the judgment. By separate order filed this day Court dispose of appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

On March 23, 2006, defendant Felix Reyes pleaded no contest to a single count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5) and admitted a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).[1] Additional counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. On May 18, 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years in prison, but suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years. On December 28, 2006, defendant admitted to two violations of probation, and, on February 2, 2007, the trial court imposed the previously suspended sentence. Defendant appeals and contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the prison term. Court agree and reverse the judgment.

Numerous plaintiffs unsuccessfully sued respondent Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron) based on a predecessor company's release of toxic substances into the surrounding area. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in overruling their challenges of three prospective jurors for cause. We conclude, however, that plaintiffs forfeited this issue by failing to exhaust their peremptory challenges. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rudy Gonzalez appeals from a judgment imposing a state prison sentence after a contested probation revocation hearing. His appointed counsel has briefed no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have conducted our review and find no meritorious issues to be briefed or argued. On November 9, 2007, this court notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. To date, we have not received a response from defendant.
Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we provide "a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed." (Id. at p. 110.) Court have also included information about certain motions, stipulations, or other aspects of the trial court proceedings that might become relevant in future proceedings. (Id. at p. 112.)

Appellant Ronald Gene Knight was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree robbery of a transit operator. (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd. (a).) He admitted prior conviction and prison term allegations, and was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 15 years. (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed because the jury heard evidence that he invoked his constitutional right to silence during a police interview, having initially waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Court affirm.

Appellant Dennis ONeal Perry (appellant) appeals from his conviction for vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants pretrial motion for substitution of defense counsel, pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Court find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant A.B. appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).[1] Defendant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ because there was no substantial evidence demonstrating (1) that he would benefit from the commitment or (2) that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. Defendants arguments are without merit, and Court affirm.

Appellants Manuel Carranco, Oscar Herrera, and Cubus, Inc. appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of respondent Eric Quintana on appellants cross-complaint to quiet title to residential real property.[1] Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment despite the presence of disputed factual issues outside the scope of the issues framed by the pleadings. Because appellants cross complaint did not allege that Quintana obtained his title fraudulently, Court reject appellants contention that Quintana had the burden of establishing that he gave valuable consideration for his interest in the property. The trial court properly granted Quintanas motion based on the undisputed fact that his interest in the property was created prior to appellants interest.

Jermaine West (defendant) appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351), being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)), possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, 12280, subd. (b)), and possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, 12316, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true an enhancement allegation that defendant possessed 14.25 grams or more of cocaine base, and defendant admitted that he had served one prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). After a court trial on sentencing factors, the court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of nine years eight months in state prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that: (1) One of the aggravating factors upon which the court relied in selecting the upper term is not supported by the evidence; and (2) the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

This appeal has been taken from the denial of appellants request for a declaration of presumed father status, visitation rights, and reunification services. He claims that the juvenile court erred by failing to designate him as a presumed father, and respondent Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to undertake adequate efforts to identify, locate and serve him in the dependency proceeding. We conclude that appellant was not entitled to presumed father status in the proceeding, and the Department afforded appellant timely notice of his rights. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant George T. appeals from a dispositional order placing his minor son, T.T., with him but retaining court jurisdiction over the minor. Appellant contends that the provision for continued jurisdiction was unsupported by substantial evidence. Appellant neglects to mention that he consented on the record to the specific term he now challenges. In light of appellants stipulation to the juvenile courts continued jurisdiction, Court affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment after the denial of a defense motion to suppress evidence and the entry of a no contest plea by appellant Herman Brown, Jr. Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial courts denial of the motion to suppress evidence violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Court disagree, and thus affirm.