CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant George Lance Akrey appeals from judgment entered following his no contest plea to arson (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (d)). We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief in this court raising no issues and requested that we independently examine the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. On November 6, 2007, we advised appellant that he had 30 days in which to submit a written brief or letter stating any contentions or arguments he wished us to consider. Appellant did not respond. Court find no arguable issues and Court affirm.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

A jury found defendant Sal Esquivel guilty of forcible rape and sustained an aggravated kidnapping allegation. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of asportation to support the aggravated kidnapping enhancement and the court failed to instruct on an aider and abettor liability as it related to the enhancement. Court reject the contentions and affirm.

In March or April 2006, defendant Eric James Collins provided 14 or 15 year old K. methamphetamine, forcibly raped her and digitally penetrated her against her will. From February to April 2006, defendant resided with 14- or 15-year-old H. and her mother. He had forcible sexual intercourse with H. on approximately 20 occasions. On most occasions, he injected her with methamphetamine. The judgment is modified to impose a $120 court security fee. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted Jason C. Morreo of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code,[1] 245, subd. (c)), carjacking ( 215, subd. (a)), attempted escape from custody by force or violence ( 4532, subd. (b)(2)), and resisting an executive officer with force or violence ( 69). The jury also found true that during the commission of each of the offenses, Morreo personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) The jury found Morreo not guilty of attempted murder of a peace officer. ( 187, subd. (a).) After finding that Morreo had two strike priors ( 667, subd. (b)), a serious felony prior ( 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prison priors ( 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court sentenced Morreo to 64 years to life in state prison. As discussed below, Court conclude that Morreo's challenges to his convictions are without merit. Court agree, however, that he must be resentenced.

The Board of Trustees of California State University (CSU) appeals from the trial court's postjudgment orders requiring that CSU pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by Del Cerro Action Council (DCAC) in its lawsuit brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Res. Code, 21000 et seq.) (CEQA) to challenge the environmental impact report (EIR) certified by CSU for a plan to expand the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU). Court conclude that the trial court properly awarded fees and costs in favor of DCAC, and Court accordingly affirm.

Priscilla G. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor children Cynthia S. and E.S. (together the minors) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Priscilla challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the minors are adoptable. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, 205)[1]and making criminal threats ( 422). As to the conviction for aggravated mayhem, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. ( 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a determinate term of four years plus an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole. Defendant contends the court erred by (1) not applying section 654 to his sentence for making criminal threats;[2]and (2) sentencing him to the upper term for making criminal threats in violation of his rights to a jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Court affirm the judgment.

On September 23, 2004, at approximately 1:51 p.m. appellant, Twanyo Mjumbuto Farmer, was driving a car traveling west on Hatch Road in Ceres at a speed of 60 to 70 miles per hour. A car driven by Stephanie Nilsson was traveling south out of a parking lot and attempted to make an unsafe turn eastbound onto Hatch Road. The vehicles collided, killing Nilsson and injuring her two daughters who were passengers in her car. Farmer had a .03 percent blood alcohol content when he was tested sometime after the accident (case No. 1081756).
On September 27, 2004, the district attorney filed a complaint charging Farmer with two counts of driving with a blood alcohol count of .08 or greater causing injury (counts III & V/Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)), driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (counts II & IV/Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a)), and one count each of vehicular manslaughter (count I/Pen. Code, 191.5),[1]driving while addicted to drugs (count VI/Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (c)), and driving with a suspended license (count VII/Veh. Code, 14601.1, subd. (a)). Count I also included a multiple victim enhancement (Veh. Code, 23558).
The judgment is modified to lift the stay of execution imposed on the aggregate sentence of two years four months imposed in case No. 1081756 and that term is to run concurrent to the aggregate term of six years imposed in the two other cases. The judgment in case No. 1081756 is also modified to award Farmer 769 days of presentence custody credit as calculated above.

Defendant Gary Delmar Henderson was convicted of multiple crimes for a home invasion burglary and the heinous acts he committed on three women who were inside the home. The trial court sentenced him to 494 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to declare a doubt as to his mental competence and to hold a competence hearing, (2) the trial court erred by failing to hold a second Marsden hearing,[2]and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to appoint counsel to represent him after he had chosen to represent himself. Court affirm.

In September 2005, appellant Gumaro Valenzuela, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled no contest to willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5). In October 2005, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years probation, with various terms and conditions, including that he serve the first year of his probationary period in county jail, complete a one-year batterers treatment program and an outpatient substance abuse counseling program, and obey all reasonable instructions of the probation officer.
On January 29, 2007, the Kern County Probation Department (KCPD) filed a DECLARATION LETTER alleging that appellant failed to do the following: complete the outpatient substance abuse counseling program, complete the batterers treatment program, and report to the probation officer as directed. Following independent review of the record, we have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist. The judgment is affirmed.

An information filed on February 22, 2007, charged appellant, inter alia, with taking a vehicle without the owners consent in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (count 1), receiving a stolen vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d (count 2), and felony evading a pursuing police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 (count 3). Other crimes charged in the information were dismissed prior to trial. It was alleged as to all counts that appellant had suffered a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5 subdivision (b). The jury acquitted appellant on counts 1 and 2 and convicted on the evading charge in count 3. Trial on the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior was bifurcated, and appellant waived jury trial on that charge. The trial court subsequently found the alleged prison prior enhancement true. The judgment is affirmed.

The Newhope Corporation (Newhope) was an independent sales representative for Yamaha Electronics Corporation USA (Yamaha). Newhopes principals formed a partnership called The Experience At, LLC. (TEA), and opened an electronics sales showroom selling Yamaha and its competitors consumer electronic products. A large Yamaha customer then refused to place further orders for Yamaha products through Newhope because by opening TEA, Newhope had become a competitor. Yamaha subsequently terminated Newhope as its sales representative pursuant to a provision in the written sales representative agreement allowing termination of the agreement at will with or without cause on 90 days advance notice. Newhope and TEA sued Yamaha for promissory fraud and promissory estoppel. They contended that prior to executing the written contract, Newhope had asked for and received oral assurances from Yamaha that if Newhope opened TEA, Yamaha would not invoke a noncompetition clause in the contract (which prohibited Newhope from selling Yamahas competitors products without Yamahas written permission), and Yamaha would not terminate Newhope as its sales representative for any reason having to do with its opening TEA. The trial court granted summary judgment/adjudication motions and motions in limine concluding the parol evidence rule precluded Yamaha and TEA from introducing evidence of Yamahas alleged oral promises that contradicted the written agreement. Newhope and TEA appeal primarily contending the trial court misapplied the parol evidence rule. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.