CA Unpub Decisions

Tommie Day appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of sale of cocaine base and his admission that he had suffered a prior conviction on which he served a prison term. Defendant contends that his Pitchess motion was erroneously denied and that he was improperly convicted of an uncharged crime. Court conclude that defendant was not improperly convicted of an uncharged crime but conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings under Pitchess.

Davidon Homes (Davidon) appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of this action arising from Christopher Rodgers and Lisa Rodgerss purchase of a home. Court reverse.

Peter Bodian appeals his conviction of two counts of pandering by procuring, in violation of Penal Code section 266i, subdivision (a)(1) (all statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to this code) and one count of pimping in violation of section 266h, subdivision (a). He claims the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and that he was deprived of the right to present a full defense by the courts exclusion of a ledger. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, alleging that J. F. committed the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and making criminal threats (id., 422; count 2). At the jurisdictional hearing held on March 8, 2007, the juvenile court issued its order, finding both counts to be true, sustaining the petition and declaring both counts to be felonies. On March 23, the court issued its dispositional order, declaring appellant a ward of the court, ordering appellant suitably placed, removing her from the care of her parents and placing her in the care, custody and control of the probation department. The court calculated appellants maximum term of confinement as four years and eight months and gave her predisposition custody credit of 40 days.
The dispositional order is modified.

Adoptive father Randy C. challenges a trial court order approving a postadoption contact agreement entered over his objection after the trial court excused the biological fathers failure to comply with an earlier oral agreement. He contends the order failed to comply with the requirements of Family Code section 8616.5. Court agree, and reverse on that basis. Court need not and do not reach Randys other arguments that the order violated his substantive due process rights as a parent, that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the order.

Defendant Demetrie Lloyd Taylor was charged by felony complaint with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and forgery (id., 476). The complaint alleged that defendant suffered three prior convictions of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (id., 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and served a prior prison term (id., 667.5, subd. (b)).
The judgment is affirmed.

Anthony David Aguilar appeals a judgment following his conviction of conspiracy to commit a crime (Pen. Code, 182, count one),[1] murder ( 187, subd. (a), count two), possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1) counts three and four), with findings that he committed counts one and two for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury ( 12022.53, subd. (d)). We conclude the trial court properly denied Aguilar's Wheeler/Batson motion. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79l; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 58.) Court affirm.

Ruben Urquidez and Luis Hernandez (defendants) were charged by information with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1](count 1), with a special allegation a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The information additionally charged Urquidez with two misdemeanor offenses: exhibiting a firearm ( 417, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2), and brandishing a replica gun ( 417.4) (count 3). With respect to Hernandez, the information specially alleged as to count 1, he had committed a serious or violent felony (aggravated assault) within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); and he had served a separate prison term for a felony ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The judgment is affirmed.

Appellants Kimberly Kempton and Charles Kinney appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained respondent Michele R. Clarks demurrer without leave to amend. Court affirm.

Bolden Learoy Johnson appeals a judgment following his convictions for committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)), with a finding that he engaged in substantial sexual conduct ( 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), and for failing to file a sex offender change of address ( 290, subd. (f)(1)). The jury also found that Johnson had two prior serious and violent felony convictions for rape where he used a deadly weapon. ( 667, subds. (c)(2), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (a)(2), (c)(2).) The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 100 years to life. Court conclude, among other things, that substantial evidence supports the finding that Johnson engaged in substantial sexual conduct, the court did not err by admitting evidence of prior sexual offenses and the sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Court affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Christopher Troy Malray of attempted forcible rape. The trial court imposed upper terms for both the offense and a weapon enhancement. Malray argues the imposition of upper terms violated due process because it was based on factual findings by the court, not a jury. Court conclude the trial court permissibly imposed upper terms.

Fredy F. appeals from the dispositional order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him home on probation. The court entered this order after denying appellants motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, 700.1) and finding true the allegation that he possessed etching cream or an aerosol paint container with intent to deface in violation of Penal Code section 594.1, subdivision (e)(1).[1] Appellant challenges the propriety of the order denying his suppression motion and contends the court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement. Court modify and affirm the dispositional order.

Iry M. Smith appeals from his conviction of aiding and abetting the sale of a controlled substance, cocaine base, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). He claims the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Court find substantial evidence exists as to each element of the crime and affirm the judgment.

Daniel M. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his son Dylan M. He argues, and we agree, that the juvenile court failed to adequately inquire into whether Dylan is or may be an Indian child for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Court shall reverse and remand for appropriate inquiry.