CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Fred Morisaki[1] appeals from a judgment entered after the court sustained a demurrer to his complaint without leave to amend. He had alleged defendant Ogden Murphy Wallace, a law firm advising the underwriter of a municipal bond offering, negligently acquiesced in misrepresentations concerning bonds sold to plaintiff. But defendant owed no duty of care to plaintiff. Court affirm.

Roland Ervin, representing himself, obtained the default of two persons, William Little Jr. and the Estate of Johanna Little-Beck, in this action. We have serious doubts as to whether Ervins complaint is sufficient to apprise any defendant of the nature of the relief that Ervin is seeking. The first two pages of the complaint, filed January 16, 2007, consist of a Judicial Council form on which are written a barely legible hodgepodge of handwritten interlineations. But thats not all; the form complaint appears to incorporate a previous, conventionally typed complaint, filed August 22, 2005. That previous complaint goes on for 335 pages. No doubt Ervin is trying hard to sound like an attorney, but the effect of his two-page form complaint filed in January 2007 apparently incorporating by reference an August 2005 335-page complaint provide a hard-to-follow scramble of confusing allegations. If our characterizations of what Ervin actually alleges in his complaint seems somewhat tentative, the confusing nature of the complaint is the reason.
1) Court affirm the trial courts order to the extent that it dismisses all claims for personal injuries with prejudice.

Anne J. Mazzella appeals from an order that granted a special motion to strike her multi-count complaint against Robert Savitsky as to all but a slander cause of action. Mazzella argues none of the claims arose from protected speech, and she established a probability of success on the merits. Savitsky appeals from the denial of the motion as to the slander claim, and from an order that denied a second special motion to strike an amended complaint. Savitsky argues the slander claim arose from protected speech, and Mazzella failed to establish a probability of success. He makes the same arguments as to the amended complaint. Court conclude no errors are shown and affirm both orders.

Proposition 13, adopted in 1978, limits the amount that the assessed value of real property may be increased to reflect increases in the propertys actual market value. When ownership of the property changes, however, the property may be reassessed at its current market value. [Citation.] Changing the assessed value of real property to its current market value can result in a substantial increase in the tax on that property. Thus, determining whether and when a change of ownership has occurred can have significant tax consequences. (Auerbach v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1 (2006) 39 Cal.4th 153, 157.) Section 60 of the Revenue and Taxation Code (section 60) defines the phrase change in ownership for purposes of Proposition 13 as a transfer of a present interest in real property, including the beneficial use thereof, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest. (See Auerbach v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 160 161.)
The trial court sustained the Assessors demurrer to the first amended petition for writ of mandate without leave to amend. Court affirm.

The jury found appellant Oscar Mendoza Guereca guilty of dissuading a victim without force or threat (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (b)), a lesser-included offense in count two of the amended information. The jury acquitted him of the charge of second degree robbery in count one and, although it found him guilty of receiving stolen property in count three, he does not challenge that conviction. The judgment is affirmed as to count three.

Appellant Jumah Thomas Moore-Ali, a self-represented litigant, filed a civil complaint[1] on December 14, 2005, alleging that during his incarceration at Salinas Valley State Prison, he required a special religious diet but he was not transferred to another prison facility equipped to accommodate his special religious dietary needs and he was not provided with medical treatment and care. The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to (1) deny the motion for summary judgment by respondents Nola Grannis and Thomas Surges, (2) enter an order striking the answer by respondents Nola Grannis and Thomas Surges to appellants first amended complaint, and (3) reverse the order

Numerous plaintiffs sued Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron) based on a predecessor company's release of toxic substances into the surrounding area. After a jury found in Chevron's favor, the company sought its costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to tax costs, and Chevron appeals. Court find no abuse of discretion, however, and therefore must affirm the postjudgment order.

On July 19, 2007, without trial, the superior court issued a retroactive order of commitment against Denis Rotroff under the new provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) The order committed him to an indeterminate term of commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commencing on May 1, 2005, the date of his original commitment. Appellant challenges the retroactive commitment order on a variety of grounds, both constitutional and statutory. Court reverse.

On July 19, 2007, without trial, the superior court issued a retroactive order of commitment against Mike Sanchez under the new provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)[1] The order committed him to an indeterminate term of commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commencing on January 19, 2000, the date of his original commitment. Appellant challenges the retroactive commitment order on a variety of grounds, both constitutional and statutory. Court reverse.

On July 19, 2007, without trial, the superior court issued a retroactive order of commitment against Ernest Vasquez under the new provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)[1] The order committed him to an indeterminate term of commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commencing on December 18, 2001, the date of his original commitment. Appellant challenges the retroactive commitment order on a variety of grounds, both constitutional and statutory. Court reverse.

On July 19, 2007, without trial, the superior court issued a retroactive order of commitment against Roosevelt Burgess under the new provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) The order committed him to an indeterminate term of commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commencing on September 17, 2004, the date of his original commitment. Appellant challenges the retroactive commitment order on a variety of grounds, both constitutional and statutory. Court reverse.

James Ary, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187)[1], carjacking ( 215), robbery ( 211) and being a felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstances that the murder occurred during the commission of a carjacking, a robbery and while lying in wait. ( 190.2, subds. (a)(15), (a)(17).) It also found true a firearm use allegation. ( 12022.5, subd. (b)(1).)
Although we conclude the trial court erred in ordering the disclosure of this material, Court find this error was not prejudicial. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Robert Lee Zimmerman, plaintiff below, appeals from the judgment after jury trial in favor of defendants Forrest R. Morphew and Ephimia Morphew on all of the causes of action brought by Zimmerman against defendants, his former landlords. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Juanita Daly appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendants California State University Long Beach and Thomas Rhee. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants objections to her evidence and failed to specify the evidence it believed established that no triable issue of fact existed. She also contends defendants are estopped to claim failure to comply with the government claim-filing requirements and that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether she was a victim of sexual harassment, sexual discrimination and retaliation. Court affirm.