CA Unpub Decisions

Alex Rafael Garcia appeals a judgment entered on his plea of guilt to felony driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or more. He contends that the superior court abused its discretion in denying him probation and sentencing him to the upper term of three years in prison. Court find no such abuse and affirm the judgment.

Keith Douglas Dyson entered a negotiated guilty plea to burglary (Pen. Code, 459). Under the plea bargain, which called for a two-year stipulated sentence, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a count of petty theft with a prior and two prior prison term allegations. The trial court sentenced Dyson to the middle term of two years in prison for the burglary. Dyson did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

Defendants Roosevelt Heng, Kevin Anthony Morris, and Tiante Dion Scott committed a brutal home invasion robbery cut short by their own ineptitude. In their primary contention, they disclaim responsibility for their robbery convictions as related to two of their four victims. Court reject these meritless claims.

Defendant Armando Gomez appeals from his convictions on one count of burglary and one count of petty theft with a prior conviction, arising out of an incident in which he took a cellular telephone and a cellular telephone battery charger from a Target store without paying for the items. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Alex Rafael Garcia appeals a judgment entered on his plea of guilt to felony driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or more. He contends that the superior court abused its discretion in denying him probation and sentencing him to the upper term of three years in prison. Court find no such abuse and affirm the judgment.

Keith Douglas Dyson entered a negotiated guilty plea to burglary (Pen. Code, 459). Under the plea bargain, which called for a two-year stipulated sentence, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a count of petty theft with a prior and two prior prison term allegations. The trial court sentenced Dyson to the middle term of two years in prison for the burglary. Dyson did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
The judgment is affirmed.

Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (c)(1)[1]prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including misdemeanor battery ( 242). Section 12021, subdivision (c)(2) allows peace officers convicted of some of the enumerated offensesbut not misdemeanor batteryto petition for relief from the prohibition. In 1999 the San Diego Police Officers Association (SDPOA) and others filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the firearm possession prohibition denied equal protection to peace officers convicted of misdemeanor battery. The San Diego County Superior Court determined there was a denial of equal protection and "issued an injunction (1) barring the San Diego City Attorney and San Diego County District Attorney from 'prosecuting any peace officer . . . under . . . section 12021(c)(1) where the underlying conviction is for . . . section 242, simple battery' and (2) barring the San Diego Police Department and City of San Diego from 'enforcing . . . section 12021(c)(1) against any peace officer employed by the San Diego Police Department based on a legal disability imposed by that statute as a result of a conviction for simple battery' or terminating the employment of the officer 'based on a legal disability imposed by that statute as a result of a conviction for simple battery . . . .' " (People v. Conley (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 566, 570 (Conley).) In Conley, this court concluded "the distinctions drawn by section 12021, subdivision (c)(2) do not offend equal protection." (Conley, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) In 2007 defendants the City of San Diego, the San Diego Chief of Police, the San Diego City Attorney (collectively, San Diego), and the District Attorney of San Diego County moved to dissolve the injunction in the instant case, citing Conley. The superior court denied the motion. San Diego appeals. SDPOA has declined to respond. For the reasons set forth above, Court reverse the order and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a new order dissolving the injunction.

Minor Jason E. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), he argues the juvenile court erred in a dispositional hearing held June 25, 2007, by failing to set a maximum term of confinement. He then argues the juvenile court erred in subsequent hearings held August 21, 2007 and December 14, 2007, by setting the maximum term of confinement at eight years four months. Minor also argues one of the conditions of his probation, which prohibits him from associating within anyone in possession of a weapon, is unconstitutionally vague and must be modified to include a knowledge element.

A jury convicted defendant of attempted manslaughter (count 1Pen. Code, 664, 192, subd. (a))[1]and assault with a firearm (count 2 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury additionally found that defendant personally used a firearm and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury in his commission of the count 1 offense ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in his commission of the count 2 offense ( 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a 13-year aggregate term of imprisonment consisting of the following: the midterm of three years on count 1; the upper term of 10 years on the personal use enhancement to count 1, consecutive;[2]the upper term of four years on count 2; and three years on the great bodily injury enhancement on count 2.

The 22-year-old victim testified she lived in a home with a gated driveway. The gate was not usually locked but had to be pushed to roll it open and closed. She testified it was her usual practice when leaving home in the morning to first start her car and then go back inside to change and get her bag. On the morning of May 3, 2006, the victim testified she awoke about 5:15 a.m., went out to the driveway to start her car, and then went back inside to get ready to leave for the gym. Although she got into the car and began to drive away, she came back when she realized she had forgotten to feed her dogs. With her car idling in the driveway, the victim went back inside the house to feed the dogs, returned to her car, and drove off again. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Craig Robert Boroch appeals from a jury conviction for a single count of petty theft with priors in violation of Penal Code section 666. He claims prejudicial error because the trial court admitted statements he made to an investigating officer and instructed the jury the statements could be used to show a consciousness of guilt.
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Brian Carey Bunn appeals following the revocation of his probation in two separate cases. As a result of the revocation, defendant is currently serving two concurrent four-year terms in state prison for one count of commercial burglary in case No. FSB050143, and one count of commercial burglary in case No. FCH07851.
The judgment is affirmed.

In this matter, Court have reviewed the petition, and requested and received opposition from real party in interest. Court conclude that petitioner is entitled to the basic relief sought and GRANT the petition for writ of mandate.

In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the response filed by the real party in interest. We have determined that the resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Petitioner is DIRECTED to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties. Petitioner to recover his costs in this writ proceeding.