CA Unpub Decisions

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, the opposition, and the reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.) As respondent concedes that the orders for sanctions did not meet the requirements for a valid contempt order, Court need not discuss that point. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order directing real party in interest to pay money sanctions.

The court has read and considered the petition, the response, and the record in this proceeding and has concluded that an alternative writ would add nothing to the presentation already made and would cause undue delay in resolving this matter. We therefore issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc., 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another groundin Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.)
Petitioner is DIRECTED to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.

David Z. (Father) petitions for an extraordinary writ vacating the juvenile courts order setting a hearing to consider terminating his parental rights to his daughter, T.Z. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a).) Father contends the juvenile court erred in setting the hearing because substantial evidence does not support the courts finding that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) provided or offered reasonable reunification services to him. Court deny the petition.

On November 28, 2006, appellant, Joel S., helped William Trimble steal two trucks. Kern County Sheriff deputies arrested Joel after seeing him driving one of the stolen trucks. Joel did not have a valid license. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Juan Pablo Becerra challenges his convictions for two counts of murder, three counts of street terrorism, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. He contends the indictment underlying the murder counts and two of the street terrorism counts was impermissibly based on perjury before the grand jury, and insufficient evidence corroborated the testimony of his accomplices. But defendant suffered no prejudice from the perjury the trial jury heard about the witnesss perjury and still found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And all accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Thus, Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

Catherine G. Ventura hired Morton J. Grabel, a real estate broker and attorney, to help her sell her home. After Venturas home sold, she sued Grabel for fraudulent misrepresentation, among other causes of action, based on her belief that the sale was fraudulent. In addition, Ventura made complaints against Grabel to the State Bar of California and the Temecula Police Department. As a result of these complaints, Grabel filed a cross-complaint for slander and libel. Over one year after Grabel filed the cross-complaint, Ventura filed a motion for leave to file a SLAPP[1]motion to strike (SLAPP motion) the cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (f).[2] The trial court denied the motion for leave to file the SLAPP motion as untimely, and Ventura appealed that denial. Court affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion for leave to file a SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint. Grabel is awarded his costs on appeal.

A jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of battery against a cohabitant (count 1Pen. Code, 243, subd. (e)(1))[1]and criminal threats (count 2 422). On appeal, defendant contends that substantial evidence fails to support the sustained fear element requisite for his conviction on the criminal threats count. Court find the verdict supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment below.

Appellant Patrick Hammond (appellant) was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).[1] At the time of his arrest, he was informed by a deputy with the Kings County Sheriffs Department that it was necessary for appellant to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his blood. Since the Kings County Jail facility did not have equipment to perform a breath test, appellant was advised that his only option was a blood test. Appellant refused and no chemical test was performed. He was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol based on the testimony of several deputies who had witnessed appellants condition. Appellant appeals, contending that since section 23612, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides that a suspected drunk driver shall be given the option of either a breath or blood test, the trial court was required to sua sponte instruct the jury that it could consider the failure of county police officials to comply with the California Vehicle Code testing requirements. Court disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Arthur Olguin Robles, was found guilty after a jury trial of 14 of 15 serious felonies related to a crime spree that involved robbery, a high speed chase, and weapons fired at law enforcement officers. Multiple enhancements as to each count were also found true. On appeal, appellant contends, and respondent concedes, several sentencing errors. Court reverse appellants sentence and remand for resentencing.

Appellant Joseph Madrigal is before this court for the fifth time seeking a proper consideration of his motion for a new trial. This time, Court grant a new trial and direct the matter be heard before a different judicial officer.

This is the second time that the sufficiency of the allegations in appellant Esteban M. Martinezs first amended complaint is before this court. The first amended complaint alleged that appellants court-appointed attorneys mishandled their representation of him in a misdemeanor case and committed other wrongs. On appeal, Court conclude that appellant has not demonstrated that the superior court committed reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal will be affirmed.

On July 24, 2007, a subsequent petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, Raul M., committed robbery (Pen. Code, 211).[1] The petition further alleged Raul used a knife in violation of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).[2] The juvenile court sustained the petition at the jurisdictional hearing on August 14, 2007. At the conclusion of the disposition hearing the court committed Raul to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a term of five years for robbery plus a consecutive term of one year for use of a knife and four months for the earlier adjudication for misdemeanor possession of a deadly weapon. Rauls appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Raul was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter on April 7, 2008, Court invited Raul to submit additional briefing. To date, he has not done so.

In Kings County Superior Court case No. 06CM3723 (case No. 3723), it was alleged in an information filed November 14, 2006, that appellant Eric Friend Wendahl possessed marijuana for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359) and had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). On March 16, 2007, appellant, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled no contest to the substantive offense and waived preparation of a presentence report, and the court placed appellant on five years probation. The judgment is affirmed.

It was alleged in a criminal complaint filed January 18, 2007, that appellant Gerardo Bojorquez Cruz committed the following offenses: conspiracy to commit the crime of sale of methamphetamine (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); count 1), conspiracy to commit the crime of possession of methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), Health & Saf. Code, 11378; count 2), transportation of methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); count 3) and possession of methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378; count 4). It was further alleged with respect to each of counts 3 and 4 that the weight of the contraband exceeded two kilograms (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)), and that with respect to count 3 appellant did not transport the contraband for personal use within the meaning of Penal Code section 1210, subdivision (a). The judgment is affirmed.